What Stalin Knew (42 page)

rate of Red Army Air Forces for Long-Range Bombardment Aviation.3 On

October 29 Proskurov attended what appears to have been a meeting of the

Main Military Council at the Kremlin, apparently to discuss the forthcom-

ing changes in long-range bombardment aviation.4 Then, on November

5th, a decree of the Council of People’s Commissars created independent

long-range bombardment aviation divisions under the control of a new

assistant to the chief of the Main Directorate of Red Army Air Forces.

Proskurov would occupy this post. In addition to specifying the designa-

tions and locations of the new long-range bombardment (DD) divisions,

the decree called for creation by March 1, 1941, of sixteen new airfield-

engineering battalions and fifty-three aviation-technical companies.5 This

last proviso was a direct reflection of lessons learned in the Finnish war:

both Pavel Rychagov and Yevgeny Ptukhin had complained of the short-

age of good airfields and the lack of airfield construction and mainte-

nance units.6

How did Proskurov receive this prestigious assignment when we know

he was no favorite of Stalin and not at all liked by Timoshenko? The an-

swer must have been his very close friendships with the two top officers in

the Red Army’s air forces. One, Yakov V. Smushkevich, was the assistant

chief of the general staff for aviation.7 Proskurov’s other patron was the

chief of Red Army aviation, Rychagov.8 With such backing, it was no won-

der that Proskurov was given his new responsibilities. But it was true, too,

that Stalin had a propensity for allowing his victims to remain at liberty or

even to advance while he waited patiently for the right opportunity to

destroy them. Proskurov, of course, was unaware of Stalin’s ultimate in-

tentions and that Rychagov and Smushkevich were also on Stalin’s list.

Bombers were his specialty and he was delighted to be back in his favor-

ite field.

Rychagov and Proskurov both knew that the principal task of the new

bomber organization would be training aircrews in flights at night and in

poor weather conditions. Rychagov recalled from his experience in the

Finnish war that such training was a major problem. If a pilot crashed an

aircraft while practicing instrument flying or landings and takeoffs from a

small airfield, the accident investigators would try to make the unit com-

mander appear to be undisciplined or suspicious.9 Because the accident

investigations were run by more than one organization, the voice of the

unit commander was seldom heard. In Rychagov’s view, a great many mis-

takes were made in air force training because ‘‘we were afraid of crashes,

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accidents, and incidents.’’10 Proskurov understood this and was deter-

mined to create training programs for the bomber regiments that would

come as close as possible to approximating combat conditions. Still, he

had to deal with issues created by the bureaucratic machinery of the De-

fense Commissariat. At the end of December 1940, Proskurov attended the

conference on the way the German army functioned in the Polish and

French campaigns of 1939 and 1940. In early January, at one of the war

games, he played the role of a front air force commander on the Western

side. On January 29, 1941, he attended a meeting in Stalin’s office pre-

sumably to discuss the games. Also present were Timoshenko, Semyon

Budenny, Kulik, Meretskov, Zhukov, Voroshilov, and others. The air forces

were represented by Rychagov, Pavel F. Zhigarev, and Proskurov.

Training remained Proskurov’s major concern. The story is told that

when Proskurov inspected a bomber regiment at Zaporozhe, the com-

mander reported that ‘‘his unit was ready to undertake any mission, day or

night, under any weather conditions.’’ When midnight came Proskurov put

the brigade on alert, and he heard the same story from the commander.

When he then ordered the regiment to undertake a mission at the bombing

range at Rostov-on-Don, some 300 kilometers to the east, it turned out that

there were only ten aircrews in the entire regiment capable of the mission.

On their return flight three aircraft misjudged their altitude and crashed.11

The loss of aircraft during training affected not only the long-range bomber

regiments but the entire air force. At a meeting with Stalin in early April

1941, possibly the session at which Molotov and Zhdanov were also pres-

ent, Rychagov attributed the accident rate to the fact that Stalin made the

aircrews fly in ‘‘coffins.’’ Stalin replied, ‘ You should not have said that.’’12

Rychagov had sealed his fate.

This was not the first time the problem of accidents plaguing the air

forces would arise at the highest levels of the party and government. For

example, in May 1939 the Main Military Council held a two-day session

that resulted in a lengthy order by the defense commissar on ‘‘Accidents in

Units of the Red Army’s air forces.’’ A draft of the order was circulated at

the council meeting, and comments were requested. Proskurov, then a

member of the council, formally objected to a paragraph on flight schools

that ‘‘eliminated training in aerial gunnery and high-altitude flights.’’ He

insisted that such training be retained because it permitted instructors to

better evaluate trainees’ ability.13

By April 9, 1941, the Politburo discussed the aerial accident rate. It

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195

asserted that not only was the rate not being reduced but it was increasing.

Its report pointed out that two to three aircraft per day were being lost to

crashes and that the leadership of the air forces did not seem ready or able

to deal with the situation, nor could it enforce the flight rules. The cause of

these accidents, according to an excerpt of the Politburo meeting, was

‘‘simply a lack of discipline.’’ The report cited cases in which aircraft and

lives were lost because unit commanders insisted on having their aircrews

fly in bad weather. It singled out Rychagov for having attempted to conceal

the lack of discipline and the laxity causing these accidents. The Politburo

then issued a joint decree of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) and the

Council of People’s Commissars:

1. Remove Rychagov from his post as chief of the Red Army’s air

forces and as deputy people’s commissar for defense, as he is un-

disciplined and unable to fulfill his responsibilities as chief of the air

forces.

2. Send Colonel Mironov [chief of the operational flight section of

the air forces staff] to trial for having given a criminal order, ob-

viously disregarding the elemental rules of flight.

3. Place the discharge of the responsibilities of chief of the air forces

of the Red Army on First Deputy Chief Comrade Zhigarev.

4. Propose that Timoshenko present to the Central Committee

VKP(b) a draft order of the Main Military Council in the spirit of this

decree.

Nowhere in the excerpt is the state of training of aircrews raised as a pos-

sible cause of the rise in the accident rate. This same excerpt from the Polit-

buro protocol reprimanded Timoshenko for having attempted, in an April 8

report, to assist Rychagov in concealing shortcoming in the air forces.14

The next step in this deadly bureaucratic farce was a memorandum

from Timoshenko to Stalin presenting the draft of an order to be issued by

the Defense Commissariat in the name of the Main Military Council, as

directed by the Politburo decree. The memorandum was signed by Timo-

shenko and Zhukov, as chief of the general staff. The date ‘‘12/IV/41’’ is

written in by hand to the left of Timoshenko’s signature line. The memo-

randum shows two attachments. The first is a draft order in five copies; the

second is a draft order ‘‘with corrections’’ for Zhdanov and Malenkov, also

in five copies. Over this copy of the memorandum, in a very bold hand, is a

note to Timoshenko from Stalin: ‘‘I agree, with the proviso that in the order

there be included a paragraph on Comrade Proskurov, that Comrade Pro-

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skurov also be tried along with Comrade Mironov. That would be the hon-

est and just thing to do.’’15

Rychagov was dismissed on April 12, 1941, and enrolled in the General

Staff Academy; he was replaced by his deputy, Zhigarev, who would later

become a chief marshal of aviation.16 As for Proskurov, that same day the

Defense Commissariat issued Order No. 0022–41 relieving him of his posi-

tion as deputy to the chief of the Red Army air forces. The order also sent

Mironov and him to trial for giving a criminal order ‘‘violating the elemen-

tary rule of the flying service’’ and resulting in deaths and injuries. No trial

was held, but the actions ascribed to Proskurov and Mironov were re-

corded in their personnel records as ‘‘obviously criminal behavior.’’17

Proskurov, however, was not one to remain silent for long. On April 21

he sent a memorandum to Stalin and Zhdanov ‘‘on the subject of aviation

training for war.’’ He recalled Stalin’s conclusion following the Finnish war

‘‘that the troops had not been trained under conditions approaching those

of combat’’ and pointed out that ‘‘the main shortcoming in aircrews’ train-

ing . . . was their inability . . . to operate safely in poor weather conditions

and at night.’’ He noted their lack of adequate weapons training and intel-

ligence preparation; most aircrews could not locate their targets even in

large populated areas. Citing comments by reserve officers of the Civil Air

Fleet who were specialists in night flights and instrument navigation, he

said that ‘‘under existing flight rules in the air forces, they would not be

able to fulfill the tasks given to them. The limitations are too great. They

have visited aviation units and are convinced that the commanders have

too great a fear of flying in poor weather or at night. At the same time, all

understand that without realistic training we cannot do battle with a se-

rious adversary. The task is clear: whatever happens, we must break down

this fear and force the units of the air forces to train under conditions

approaching actual combat.’’

Proskurov described how

the Germans by tens and hundreds fly for considerable distances

in poor weather conditions. Also, the English fly by the hundreds

against heavily defended positions in poor weather and at night . . .

and they fulfill their assigned tasks. When will our aviation be capa-

ble of safely carrying out similar mass flights? Are our pilots or air-

craft worse than those abroad? This question, Comrade Stalin, has

tormented me and other air force commanders. When I took over

the leadership of long-range bomber aviation, I received a concrete

task—during 1941 to make the units of long-range aviation capable

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197

of carrying out combat missions at the maximum range of the air-

craft in poor weather conditions and at night. As of December 1940,

there were 2,000 aircrews in high-speed bombers. Only 231 flew at

night; 138 could fly in poor weather conditions and 485 were trained

in instrument flying. During the last four to five months of winter

flight training, we worked intensively on raising the quality of flight

training in high-speed bombers. We did so in poor flying weather,

with limitations on fuel and lubricants and with poor motors (many

aircraft have been or are still undergoing repairs). By the middle of

April the figures cited above had CHANGED. Now 612 crew fly at

night, 420 fly in poor weather conditions, and 963 crews have been

trained for instrument flying. I understand, however, that this train-

ing is manifestly inadequate. The latest figures characterize the ca-

pabilities of the majority of crews to fly in poor weather and at night,

but only from their own airfields. Training in real long-range flights

is still in the future.

This turning point in the quality of training has been accom-

panied by a large increase in the number of flight accidents—serious

accidents, and there are many, it is true, but the interests of the work

demand that we continue to increase the intensity of flight work. . . .

Serious warnings and orders . . . will force the command of the air

forces to pull itself together but at the same time reinforce the fear of

accidents and therefore reduce the tempo of quality training.

Dear Comrade Stalin, we have never in the history of aviation

had a case where a commander was tried for poor training of a unit

subordinate to him. Therefore, people involuntarily choose between

the lesser of two evils and reason thus: ‘For shortcomings in training

I’ll be reprimanded or, in the worst case, demoted, but for accidents

or catastrophes I’ll be tried.’ Unfortunately, more than a few com-

manders reason this way. Such attitudes exist and will continue to