What Stalin Knew (46 page)

of readiness of his air defense system ‘‘without the sanction of the defense

commissar.’’ Zhukov ordered the change in the level of readiness rescinded

because the actions involved—which included enforcement of blackout in

the cities of the district—could ‘‘cause damage to industry, give rise to

various rumors, and upset the public.’’28

After the war Timoshenko and Zhukov explained that Stalin had

‘‘strictly warned them of the necessity when improving defenses of taking

maximum precautions in order not to provoke the Germans into armed

conflict.’’29 They both knew the dangers inherent in opposing Stalin. It is

ironic that on June 16 Stalin signed a decree as chairman of the Council

of People’s Commissars and secretary of the Central Committee of the

VKP(b) complaining that ‘‘the provision of armaments to fortified areas

under construction is proceeding unsatisfactorily’’ and ordering various

military districts and industrial enterprises to meet a deadline of no later

than the first quarter of 1942.30

There can be little doubt that both Timoshenko and Zhukov were fully

aware of the importance of camouflage in protecting aircraft, airfields, and

support structures. It would not be until June 19, however, that Stalin

would sign a decree calling for camouflage of aircraft, runways, tents, and

airfield support structures and directing the chief of the air forces, Pavel F.

Zhigarev, to complete these tasks by July 30, 1941. The same day, June 19,

Timoshenko and Zhukov signed an order implementing the decree but ex-

tending it to cover ground forces weapons (tanks, artillery, etc.), transport,

warehouses, and other structures. The order made clear that the purpose of

camouflage was to ensure that ‘‘airfields and the aircraft stationed there do

not attract attention from the air.’’31 These directives were too little and too

late. Everyone from Stalin on down to the Defense Commissariat, the

general staff, the border troops, the military districts, and those officials in

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213

the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs who had to prepare and

present protests knew full well that the Luftwaffe had been carrying out an

extensive reconnaissance program over Soviet territory for the past year.

The offices of the Operations Directorate of the general staff offered a

stark contrast to the quiet, sunny streets and parks of the capital. Tele-

phones were busy as staff officers from the military districts and major

commands called in with reports from their front-line units of German

troops now concentrated directly on the border and preparing to attack.

Changes were still being made in front organizations, and other assign-

ments were under consideration. A draft decree in preparation on June 21

called for creation of a Southern Front, to be commanded by the com-

manding general of the Moscow Military District, Ivan V. Tyulenev, and

with headquarters in Vinnitsa, in the southeastern Ukraine. The member

of the front’s Military Council would be Aleksandr I. Zaporozhets, who had

been head of the Chief Directorate for Political Propaganda of the Red

Army; he would be replaced in that position by Lev Z. Mekhlis, a devoted

Stalinist, who would retain his position as People’s Commissar of State

Control. The last two paragraphs evidently assumed war was imminent

because they entrusted Zhukov with overall leadership of the Western and

Southwestern Fronts and Kiril A. Meretskov with responsibility for the

Northern Front. This draft, signed by Malenkov on June 21, was very

strange as regards the Zhukov and Meretskov assignments. Zhukov, still

chief of the general staff, was not sent to Kiev to check on the South-

western Front until the afternoon of June 22. It would not be until June 26

that Stalin recalled him to Moscow and sent him to the Western Front,

where he stayed until June 30 interviewing members of the front staff.

How could Malenkov had known in advance what Zhukov would be doing

on June 22 and 26–30?32

The case of Meretskov is even stranger. As a former Soviet adviser in

the Spanish civil war, he had already been mentioned in the continuing

interrogations of civil war veterans arrested in April, May, and June 1941.

Was his assignment as a high command representative to the Northern

Front for real (he did, after all, have considerable experience fighting

Finns), or was it a trick to get him out of Moscow and arrest him later?33

Between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. on June 21, Stalin, Molotov, and other

members of the Politburo gathered at Stalin’s Kremlin apartment. Accord-

ing to Anastas Mikoyan, who was there, ‘‘the atmosphere was tense. Stalin

still held to the view that Hitler would not begin a war.’’34 About 9:00 p.m.

Zhukov, who was in the general staff offices, received a call from

214

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Maksim A. Purkayev, chief of staff of the Kiev Special Military District,

reporting that a German deserter had just come over with disquieting

news. The deserter, one Alfred H. Liskow of the Twenty-second Engineer

Regiment, testified that on June 21 his platoon commander, a Lieutenant

Schulz, explained to the soldiers that that night, after artillery preparation,

the river Bug would be crossed with rafts, boats, and pontoons. Liskow,

who apparently considered himself a Communist and a supporter of So-

viet power, decided to flee and report the news. At this, Stalin ordered

Timoshenko and Zhukov to come to the Kremlin. He was suspicious,

though, asking whether ‘‘the Germans might have sent him over to pro-

voke us.’’ The others believed the report and prevailed on Stalin to bring

the troops to combat readiness ‘‘just in case.’’ Stalin insisted on caution in

formulating the order.35 While those assembled were debating whether to

send a warning message, at 10:00 p.m. the chief of staff of the Baltic Spe-

cial Military District, P. S. Klenov, reported that the Germans had com-

pleted the construction of bridges across the river Neman, they had evacu-

ated all civilians from an area up to twenty kilometers from the border, and

their troops had apparently occupied jump-off positions for an invasion.

In addition, the chief of staff of the Western Special Military District, V. E.

Klimovskikh, reported that the German barbed wire entanglements that

had been present earlier in the day had been removed in the evening, while

in the nearby woods the sound of motors could be heard.36

This is what those assembled at the Kremlin finally agreed on:

I am transmitting an order of the people’s commissar of defense for

immediate execution:

1. On June 22–23 1941, it is possible there will be a surprise attack by

the Germans on the fronts of the LVO [Leningrad Military District],

PriBOVO [Baltic Special Military District], ZapOVO [Western Spe-

cial Military District], KOVO [Kiev Special Military District], and

OdVO [Odessa Military District]. The attack may start with provoca-

tive actions.

2. The task of our troops is to not respond to any provocative actions

that might result in serious complications. At the same time, the

troops of the LVO, PriBOVO, ZapOVO, KOVO, and OdVO, must be

in full combat readiness to meet a sudden blow by the Germans or

their allies. I ORDER:

a. During the night of June 22, 1941, secretly occupy firing positions

in the fortified areas along the state frontier.

b. Before dawn on June 22, 1941, disperse to reserve airfields all

aviation, including troop aircraft, carefully camouflaging it.

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215

c. All units bring themselves to combat readiness. Troops are to be

kept dispersed and camouflaged.

d. Bring air defense to combat readiness without calling on additional

staff. Prepare all measures for blackout of cities and installations.

3. Take no other measures without special permission.

Although this document was signed by Zhukov on June 21, it was not

received in the signal center until 1:45 a.m. on June 22 and was not sent to

the troops until 2:25–2:35 a.m. It remains one of the strangest military

orders in history. Instead of delivering a straightforward warning and a

code-word order to execute defensive plans, it quibbled about provocative

actions. The result was that many units did not receive the order at all and

were taken by surprise.37 Stalin and his visitors continued to discuss the

situation but most of them left by 10:20 p.m. Beria, at 11:00 p.m., was the

last to leave. Stalin followed later, returning to the Kuntsevo dacha at

about 1:00 a.m. He went right to bed but would be awakened within a few

hours by Zhukov’s telling him that the war had begun.38

≤∞

C H A P T E R

A Summer of Torture

At dawn on Sunday, June 22, 1941, the Germans

invaded the USSR. It would take Stalin, who had rejected as disinforma-

tion the scores of intelligence reports predicting the attack, several hours,

even days, before he could bring himself to acknowledge war’s reality. He

would never admit that Hitler had successfully deceived him. Much of his

concern, as the Red Army suffered its tragic losses on the battlefields,

would be to ensure that others, then in prison, who knew or suspected the

truth of his culpability would never live to testify against him.

Although the exact date and even the hour of the German invasion had

been reported by Soviet intelligence sources, it was only the arrival of a

German deserter on the evening of June 21 that finally alerted the Kremlin

to the reality of a Wehrmacht attack at dawn the next day. The deserter was

immediately brought to the headquarters of the Ninetieth Border Troop

Detachment in Vladimir-Volynsk, on the border of German-occupied Po-

land. Even before the interrogation was finished, all could hear the sound

of artillery fire. The commander tried to call out, but the telephone lines

had already been cut. This was the work of the hundreds of saboteurs

dispatched by the Abwehr in the days before the attack or dropped from

aircraft that night.1

The artillery fire heard by the border troop detachment commander

was repeated along the entire western border of the USSR from the Baltic

to the Black Sea. Masses of German armor and infantry moved into the

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217

Soviet Union toward their assigned objectives. In accordance with opera-

tional plans drawn up on the basis of aerial photos obtained during a year

of unopposed photo reconnaissance, the Luftwaffe sent its aircraft against

Red Army air bases, command centers, warehouses, troop concentrations,

and other targets, destroying the heart of the air capability of the border

military districts and giving the Germans complete air superiority. There-

after they were able not only to continue their precision attacks against

well-defined strategic and tactical targets on the ground but also to sup-

port their advancing columns by strafing those Soviet units trying desper-

ately to hold off the enemy.

As news of the German assault by land, sea, and air reached the gen-

eral staff, Zhukov called Stalin. When he finally got through to him, there

was a long silence, with only the sound of heavy breathing on the other

end. At last Stalin responded. He asked Zhukov to tell his secretary, Alek-

sandr N. Poskrebyshev, to assemble the Politburo for a meeting at the

Kremlin. Meanwhile, the general staff informed all military districts and

major commands of what was happening. At 5:45 a.m. Stalin was joined

by Molotov, Beria, Timoshenko, Mekhlis, and Zhukov. Stalin was still try-

ing to come to grips with Molotov’s account of the meeting he had just

had with von Schulenburg. The ambassador had given Molotov a brief

note complaining of the ‘‘intolerable threat to Germany’s eastern borders

brought about by the massed concentration of Red Army forces’’ and de-

claring that ‘‘the German government considers it necessary to take mili-

tary countermeasures.’’ Although not a formal declaration of war (which

was not Hitler’s style), the note and the ongoing German attacks should

have made it clear, even to Stalin, as taken aback as he was, that the war

predicted by so many had finally started.2

Stalin agreed with his military leaders that a new directive had to be

given to the border military districts. It would be issued in the name of the

Defense Commissar Timoshenko and countersigned by Malenkov:

1. Troops in full strength and with all the means at their disposal will

attack the enemy and destroy him in those places where he has vio-

lated the Soviet frontier. In the absence of special authorization,

ground troops will not cross the frontier.

2. Reconnaissance and attack aircraft will locate the concentration

areas of enemy aircraft and the deployment of his ground forces.