What Stalin Knew (58 page)

NOTES TO PAGES ≤π – ∂∂

277

Started the Second World War?
(London, 1990), 43. Suvorov cites it in defense of his largely

discredited theory that Stalin intended a preventive war against Germany.

10. Ivo Banac, ed.,
The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov
(New Haven, 2003), 115–16.

11. M. Yu. Miagkov, ed.,
Mirovye Voiny XX Veka
(Moscow, 2002), book 4, 199–200.

Chapter ∂: Soviet Borders Move Westward

1. Anthony Read and David Fisher,
Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin, and the Nazi-

Soviet Pact
(New York, 1998), 334–35. See also I. F. Ivanovsky, ed.,
Krasnoznamenny Belo-

russky Voenny Okrug
(Moscow, 1974), 79–80.

2. A. Z. Bednyagin et al., eds.,
Krasnoznamenny Kievsky Voenny Okrug
(Moscow,

1974), 130–34.

3. Read and Fisher,
Deadly Embrace,
341.

4. Dimitri Volkogonov,
Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy
(Rocklin, 1996), 359.

5. A. A. Grechko et al., eds.,
Sovietskaia Voennaia Entsiklopedia
(Moscow, 1974), vol.

2, 585.

6. Volkogonov,
Stalin,
359. See also Bednyagin et al.,
Krasnoznamenny,
134.

7. S. V. Stepashin,
Organy Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti SSR v Velikoy Otechestven-

noy Voine
(Moscow, 1995), book 1, 70–73.

8. Ibid., 79–81.

9. Ibid., 88–90.

10. Ibid., 96, n. 2. See also Pavel Sudoplatov,
Special Tasks
(New York, 1994), 3–29.

11. Stepashin,
Organy,
book 1, 283–87.

12. Ibid., 404–13.

13. Ibid., book 2, 99–100.

14. Ibid., 121.

15. Ibid., 154–55.

16. Ibid., 172–87.

17. Ibid., 234–36.

18. Ibid., 297.

19. Ibid., book 1, 74.

20. Ibid., book 2, 166–70, 172–87.

21. Ibid., 263–64.

22. Ibid., 349–50.

23. Ibid., 138–39. See also Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, ed.,
1941 god
(Moscow, 1998), book

2, 394–95.

24. Stepashin,
Organy,
book 1, 110–11.

25. Ibid., 112–13.

26. Ibid., 123–26.

27. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 1, 31.

28. Ibid., 42–43, 44–45.

29. Ibid., 177–80.

30. Stepashin,
Organy,
book 2, 79–81.

31. Ibid., 133–34.

32. Ibid., 144–46.

33. Ibid., 162–63, 218–19.

34. Robert E. Tarleton, ‘‘Bolsheviks of Military Affairs: Stalin’s High Command, 1934–

1940’’ (PhD diss., University of Washington, 2000), 293–94.

278

NOTES TO PAGES ∂∂ – ∑∫

35. John Erickson,
The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin’s War with Germany
(New Haven,

1999), 68.

36. Stepashin,
Organy,
book 1, 22–28, 31–35.

37. Tarleton, ‘‘Bolsheviks,’’ 345.

38. Ibid., 305–06.

Chapter ∑: The Finns Fight

1. L. A. Bezymensky, ‘‘Sovietskaia Razvedka Pered Voinoi,’’
Voprosy Istory,
no. 9,

1996, 85.

2. E. M. Primakov and V. A. Kirpichenko,
Ocherki Istorii Rossyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki

(Moscow, 1997), vol. 3, 297–98.

3. Vaino Tanner,
The Winter War: Finland against Russia, 1939–1940
(Stanford,

1957), 3–5.

4. Ibid., 8–9. The Aaland Islands are at the mouth of the Gulf of Bothina, between

Finland and Sweden. The Russian Empire obtained control over them in 1809, Sweden

occupied them briefly after the Russian Revolution, and in 1921 the League of Nations gave

them to Finland, on the condition that they be demilitarized. Moscow’s position that it

would assent to Finnish fortifications only if they participated became moot as Finland and

Sweden were making joint plans for the islands.

5. Ibid., 12–13.

6. A. Kolpakidi and D. Prokhorov,
Vneshniaia Razvedka Rossii
(Moscow, 2001), 341–42.

7. Tanner,
Winter War,
28–32, 76–80.

8. Ibid., 84–88.

9. William J. Spahr,
Stalin’s Lieutenants: A Study of Command under Duress
(Novato,

1997), 221–23.

10. Ivo Banac, ed.,
The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov
(New Haven, 2003), 121.

11. Tanner,
Winter War,
104–05.

12. Ibid., 105. See also M. Yu Miagkov, ed.,
Mirovye Voiny XX Veka
(Moscow, 2002),

book 4, 160.

13. Tanner,
Winter War,
105–06.

14. Ibid., 104.

15. Spahr,
Stalin’s Lieutenants,
224; A. I. Gribkov, ed.,
Istoria Ordena Lenina Lenin-

gradskogo Voennogo Okruga
(Moscow, 1974), 150–54; http://www.mannerheim.fi/10 ylip/

e mlinja.htm (accessed October 17, 2004); V. A. Zolotarev and G. N. Sevostianov, eds.,

Velikaia Otechestvennaia Voina, 1941–1945
(Moscow, 1998), book 1, 33.

16. Ibid.

17. E. N. Kulkov and O. A. Rzheshevsky, eds.,
Zimniaia Voina, 1939–1940: I. V. Stalin

I. Finskaia Kampania
(Moscow, 1998), 1–6. The material taken from the Russian edition

was checked against the English-language version,
Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War, 1939–

1940,
ed. Alexander O. Chubaryan and Harold Shukman (London, 2002).

18. Chubaryan and Shukman,
Stalin,
283.

19. Kopets was later commander of the air forces of the Belorussian Special Military

District, which became the Western Front when the war started. Horrified at seeing his

aircraft destroyed by the Luftwaffe on the first day of the war, Kopets committed suicide.

20. Chubaryan and Shukman,
Stalin,
111, 139, 149.

21. Ibid., 180.

22. Ibid., 202–04.

23. Ibid., 198.

NOTES TO PAGES ∑∫ – ∏π

279

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., 200.

27. Ibid., 201.

28. Ibid., 201–04.

29. From the party archives,
Izvestia TsK KPSS,
no. 1, 1990, 203.

30. Although France and Great Britain both declared war on Germany on Septem-

ber 3, 1939, after Hitler ignored their ultimatums, for eight months there was no fighting on

land except for a brief French advance into the German border area, which the Germans

drove back in two days. Their failure to do anything to assist the Poles resulted in what was

termed the ‘‘phony war’’ by the English and ‘‘la drole de guerre’’ by the French.

Chapter ∏: Soviet Military Intelligence Residencies in Western Europe

1. Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, ed.,
1941 god
(Moscow, 1998), book 1, 20–26.

2.
Izvestia TsK KPSS,
no. 3, 1990, 220.

3. Petr I. Ivashutin, ‘‘Razvedka Bila Trevogu,’’
Krasnaia Zvezda,
February 2, 1991. See

also Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2, 202, 203.

4. A. Kolpakidi and D. Prokhorov,
Imperia GRU
(Moscow, 1999), book 1, 249. There

were twenty-three reports in all from Berlin, eight of which are contained in
1941 god,

along with their archival citations. The remainder are referred to in articles authored by

retired GRU officers or journalists specializing in military intelligence.

5. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 1, 274.

6. Ibid., 466. General Filipp I. Golikov replaced Proskurov as RU head in July 1940.

7. Ibid., 508, 683.

8. Ibid., book 2, book 2, 113–18. The Western Department is the element within the

RU responsible for administrative support to the Berlin RU residency. In his
Grand Delu-

sion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia
(New Haven, 1999), Gabriel Gorodetsky

states that it was Golikov who ‘‘sought from the military attaché . . . an overall appraisal of

German intentions.’’ There is no indication that Tupikov’s letter was in response to a re-

quest from Golikov. Rather it was the cri de coeur of a man who felt his residency’s report-

ing was being ignored in Moscow.

9. ‘‘Sovietskaia Voennaia Razvedka Nakanune Velikoi Otechestvennoy Voiny,’’
No-

vaia i Noveishaia Istoria,
no. 1, 1995, 55.

10. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2, 366, 383.

11. Ibid., 383.

12. Considerable detail on the RU London residency has appeared in V. M. Lure and

V. Ya. Kochik,
GRU. Dela i Liudi
(Moscow, 2002), and in Vladimir Lota, ‘‘Sekretny Front

Generalnogo Staba,’’
Krasnaia Zvezda,
November 2, 2002.

13. Among the other members of the residency (often serving concurrently as mem-

bers of the Soviet military mission in Great Britain) were Semen D. Kremer; (code names

Aleksandr, Sergei,); assistant air attaché Major Boris F. Shevtsov; assistant army attaché

Major Anatoliy Lebedev; Ivan M. Kozlov (code name Bilton); Major General Aleksandr F.

Sizov, military attaché to the Polish, Czech, and Yugoslav governments in exile; and various

code clerks, chauffeurs, and secretaries.

14. Lure and Kochik,
GRU. Dela i Liudi,
83. It is hard to distinguish between Mor-

avec’s role as an ally engaged in official exchange and the claim that he was secretly re-

cruited and run as an agent. In
Special Tasks
(New York, 1994), 223, Pavel Sudoplatov

claims that Moravec (whom Sudoplatov called Muravitz) was recruited by the NKVD resi-

280

NOTES TO PAGES ∏∫ – π∫

dent in London, Ivan A. Chichaev, who also dealt with representatives of the intelligence

services of allied governments in exile. Leaving aside the question of Moravec’s relations

with the Soviet services, he was without question in continuing and close contact with MI-6

and also the British Special Operations Executive (SOE). See David Stafford,
Churchill and

Secret Service
(New York, 1997), 240–41, and John H. Waller,
The Unseen War in Europe

(New York, 1996), 232, 233, 234, 235.

15. Stafford,
Churchill,
ch. 11.

16. The so-called GRU messages between London and Moscow are only a small part

of the 2,900 Soviet intelligence messages decrypted by American and British cryptologists

and released to the public beginning in July 1995. The project had several different code

words over its lifetime, but its declassified version is known by VENONA.

17. VENONA, ‘‘GRU Messages between London and Moscow,’’ Historical Monograph

5, 4–5.

18. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2, 17. See also Thierry Wolton,
Le Grand Recrutement

(Paris, 1993), 319–71.

19. A. G. Pavlov, ‘‘Sovietskaia Voennaia Razvedka Nakanune Velikoy Otechesvennoy

Voiny,’’
Novaia I Noveishaia Istoria,
no. 1, 1995, 59.

20. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 1, 676.

21. Alexander Rado,
Pod psevdonimom Dora
(Moscow, 1976), 90.

22. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2, 224.

23. Rado,
Pod psevdonimom Dora,
90.

Chapter π: Soviet Military Intelligence Residencies in Eastern Europe

1. Vladimir Lota,
Krasnaia Zvezda,
March 27, 2004, 5.

2. Ibid. Based on textual comparisons, this report from the Lota article is likely the

same as the one dated March 1–2, 1941, from the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense

of the Russian Federation, op. 24119, d. 1, 296–303, and cited in Aleksandr N. Yakovlev’s

1941 god
(Moscow, 1998), book 1, 706, 708.

3. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 1, 768–69, 775–76.

4. Ibid., 788–89, 797.

5. Ibid., 798.

6. Ibid., 805–06.

7. Ibid., book 2, 77–78, 98–99, 107–08.

8. Ibid., 170–71. See also Lota,
Krasnaia Zvezda,
March 27, 2004, 5.

9. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2, 271–72.

10. Ibid. See also Lota,
Krasnaia Zvezda,
March 27, 2004, 5.

11. Lota,
Krasnaia Zvezda,
March 27, 2004, 5. It is not clear why the Belorussian

authorities took an interest in the case of AVS and his family.

12. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 1, 572.

13. Ibid., 650.

14. Ibid., 736. Vladislav Rybnikar (a true name) was the editor of the influential Bel-

grade newspaper
Politika
(V. M. Lure and V. Ya. Kochik,
GRU Dela i Liudi
[Moscow, 2002],

97).

15. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2, 24.

16. Ibid., 24–25. The names of the commanders of the German ‘‘groupings’’ were

evidently mixed up. ‘‘Königsberg’’ would have been Army Group North, and it was com-

manded by von Leeb. ‘ Warsaw’’ would have been Army Group Center, and its commander

was indeed von Bock. ‘‘Crakow’’ was probably Army Group South, and the commander was

NOTES TO PAGES πΩ – ∫π

281

von Rundstedt, not Blaskowitz or List. The report confirmed other information, however,

to the effect that there were three main axes of attack, as first noted by Ariets from Berlin.

17. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 1, 704.

18. Ibid., 710.

19. Ibid., book 2, 112. In a marginal note, Golikov pointed out that there were several

errors in the report but he did not mention the number of parachute divisions.

20. Ibid., 128–29, 150.

21. Ibid., 365. It seems likely that Golikov’s written reaction to this report, which he

knew went counter to Stalin’s views and wishes, was registered for the record only. In any

case, the chief of the Information Department, Dronov, ordered only the first paragraph

included in a special report.