What Stalin Knew (61 page)

10. Ibid., 54.

11. S. V. Stepashin, ed.,
Organy Gosudarstvennoy Bezopastnosti SSSR v Velikoy Ote-

chestvennoy Voine
(Moscow, 1995), book 1, 189.

12. Zyrianov,
Pogranichnye Voiska SSSR,
302.

13. Sechkin,
Granitsa i Voina,
54–55.

14. Zyrianov,
Pogranichnye Voiska SSSR,
306–07.

15. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 1, 326–27.

16. Zyrianov,
Pogranichnye Voiska SSSR,
364.

17. The material on Starshina’s reporting in this section is taken from Yakovlev,
1941

god,
book 1, 550, 769–70, and book 2, 89–90, 180.

18. In the original report, Oranienburg was said to be ‘‘near Bremen.’’ Actually, it is

just north of Berlin, which makes sense for a photo reconnaissance unit whose product

would be eagerly awaited by photo interpreters in the Air Ministry.

19. Paul Carell,
Hitler’s War on Russia: The Story of the German Defeat in the East

(London, 1964), 60.

20. R. J. Sontag and J. S. Beddie, eds.,
Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941,
353–55;

cited in ‘‘German Prehostilities Air Reconnaissance of Soviet Territory Prior to Invasion of

June 22, 1941,’’ Rand Memorandum RM-1349.

21. Zyrianov,
Pogranichnye Voiska SSSR,
400 –01.

22. A. G. Khorkov,
Grozovoi Iun
(Moscow, 1991), 131–35.

23. Matvie V. Zakharov,
Generalny Shatb v Predvoennye Gody
(Moscow, 1989). Zakha-

rov died in 1972 but his memoirs were not published until 1989. Therefore, he must have

written them during the period of ‘‘stagnation’’ under Leonid I. Brezhnev when efforts were

made to rehabilitate Stalin. This may explain Zakharov’s failure to cite the orders from

Stalin not to interfere with German aerial reconnaissance.

24. John Erickson,
The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin’s War with Germany
(New Haven,

1999), 101.

25.
Pravda,
29 June 1941; cited in David J. Dallin,
Soviet Russia’s Foreign Policy, 1939–

1942
(New Haven, 1942), 365.

290

NOTES TO PAGES ∞π≥ – π∫

Chapter ∞π: German Deception

1. Barton Whaley,
Code Barbarossa
(Cambridge, 1974).

2. Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, ed.,
1941 god
(Moscow, 1998), book 1, 661–64.

3. See the July 13, 1940, telegram from A. A. Shkvartsev, the Soviet ambassador in

Berlin, reporting that Germany was preparing for a large-scale offensive against Britain

(114). On September 10 Amaiak Z. Kobulov, counselor of the embassy (and NKVD foreign

intelligence resident) in Berlin, met with Oskar von Niedermayer, one of Germany’s long-

time Russian specialists and then a consultant to the OKW, who insisted that England was

Germany’s main concern (222–24). A November 4 memorandum, ‘‘The Situation in Ger-

many during the First Year of War,’ prepared by the Soviet embassy in Berlin described a

meeting in Nürnberg devoted to colonial questions. Germany, confident of an early victory

over England, expected to take over its colonies (339–40).

4. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2, 195–96.

5. Oleg V. Vyshlev,
Nakanune: 22 Iiunia 1941 goda
(Moscow, 2001), 149.

6. John Keegan,
The Second World War
(New York, 1989), 171.

7. Vyshlev,
Nakanune,
148.

8. VENONA, ref. no. 3/PPDT/T80, London to Moscow, no. 649, April 3, 1941. See

also David Stafford,
Churchill and Secret Service
(Woodstock, 1997), 197–99. According to

Vasily A. Novobranets, who was dismissed by Golikov and sent to a special RU rest home

near Odessa, many of the officers staying there had been guilty of spreading tales of an

impending German invasion. From time to time, such individuals would disappear, caus-

ing Novobranets to believe that the rest home was but a way station, with the ultimate

destination the GULAG or worse.

9. German intentions were also signaled when Abwehr agents were sent into the

USSR with instructions to bring back samples of Soviet fuel and lubricants to ensure they

could be used in German vehicles (see ch. 13).

10. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 1, 181–93.

11. Ibid., 288–90.

12. See, for example, a report of January 15, 1941, in Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 1, 538,

and a May 30, 1941, report in A. P. Belozerov, ed.,
Sekrety Gitlera Na Stole u Stalina
(Mos-

cow, 1995), 135–36. These reports and others in the same period contained valid informa-

tion (as most such deception did) to which the bit about Ukraine was added. The sources

were often unaware that they were passing on deception.

13. Matvei V. Zakharov,
Generalny Shtab y Predvoennye Gody
(Moscow, 1989), 214–19.

14. Vyshlev,
Nakanune,
153–60. The rumor illustrates how well the Germans coordi-

nated their deception efforts; a visit by Stalin to Berlin was also a feature of Hitler’s Decem-

ber 1940 and May 1941 letters to Stalin (see ch. 18).

15. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2, 180–81.

16. Belozerov,
Sekrety Gitlera,
148; Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2, 342–43, 382–83.

17. Whaley,
Code Barbarossa,
171.

18. James Barros and Richard Gregor,
Double Deception: Stalin, Hitler, and the Inva-

sion of Russia
(Dekalb, 1995), 52–57. According to Ponschab’s assistant, Georg Korter, these

materials were furnished by a Baltic journalist, Ivar Lissner (born Hirschfeld), who had

been recruited by the Abwehr in return for its allowing his Jewish parents to leave Germany.

Ostensibly, he obtained the documents from his contacts in the White Russian community,

who in turn had sources in the Soviet consulate, then the largest in Harbin. There is no

indication these documents were the result of code breaking by Ponschab or his staff, none

of whom had the requisite expertise. When turned over to Ponschab, they were in German

and appeared to be translations from Soviet diplomatic traffic in the Russian language.

NOTES TO PAGES ∞π∫ – ∫∞

291

19. Barros and Gregor,
Double Deception,
171–73. In all, some twenty-four messages

were found in the Weizsäcker file in German archives dating from March 6 to June 12, 1941.

The contents were a mixture of truth, items invented out of whole cloth, and the occasional

bit of apparently good information from Soviet intelligence sources—for example, a circular

message from Moscow dated May 8 and forwarded by Ponschab on May 11 that spoke of

British preparations to invade and occupy Syria, then under Vichy French control.

20. Barros and Gregor,
Double Deception,
170–73. I asked Boris N. Labusov, head of

the Public Affairs Bureau of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), about the

details of the operation in October 2002. As of June 2003, when I again visited Moscow, no

answers were forthcoming. I know from retired Lieutenant General Sergei A. Kondrashev,

a former head of the KGB’s disinformation service, that while the KGB (and its successor,

the SVR) will speak in general terms about disinformation, it is extremely reluctant to

discuss the success or failure of individual operations.

21. Barros and Gregor,
Double Deception,
172–73. The ‘‘threat’’ to the Siberian rail-

road could have been related to the German practice of sending shipments of natural

rubber to Germany from Far Eastern ports by rail. As the date for the invasion grew nearer,

however, such shipments were halted.

22. William J. Spahr,
Zhukov: The Rise and Fall of a Great Captain
(Novato, 1993),

42, 47.

23. This examination is based primarily on pp. 586–813 of book 1 of
1941 god
and

pp. 9–424 of book 2. This collection contains reports from NKGB and RU residencies

abroad and from border troops, as well as RU Moscow periodical summaries. Timoshenko

and Zhukov may have received more than are accounted for, but this could not be deter-

mined because many individual reports in
1941 god
are annotated ‘
Rassylka ne ukazana
’’

(Dissemination not indicated).

24. L. M. Chizhova, ‘‘Neslyshannye Signaly Voiny,’’
Istorichesky Arkhiv,
no. 2, 1995.

25.
1941 god,
book 1, 708.

26. Ibid., book 2, 175.

27. Ibid., 289–90.

28. Viktor Suvorov is the literary pseudonym of Vladimir B. Rezun, a GRU officer who

defected in 1978. His book first appeared in Paris in 1988 and has since been published in a

second Russian edition (Moscow, 1992) and in German and English editions.

29. The historical novelist Igor Bunich draws on the Suvorov thesis in a fictional

account in which Stalin accepts Hitler’s promise that he will attack England in mid-July

1941, withdrawing forces from the Soviet border for this purpose. Stalin, whose own attack

would ostensibly have begun in early July, is deceived by Hitler, who invades the USSR on

June 22nd (
Groza: Piatisotletniaia Voina v Rossy
[Moscow, 1997]).

30. Mikhail I. Meltiukhov,
Upushchenny Shans Stalina, Sovietski Soiuz I Borba za

Evropu
(Moscow, 2002), 412; Boris Shaptalov,
Ispytanie Voinoy
(Moscow, 2002), 15, 20.

Meltiukhov writes: ‘‘Political conditions for an attack against Germany by the USSR were

sufficiently favorable. Unfortunately, Stalin, fearing an Anglo-German compromise, put off

for at least a month the attack on Germany, which, as we now know, was the only chance to

thwart the German invasion. This decision was probably Stalin’s greatest historical mis-

calculation, forfeiting as it did the opportunity to destroy the strongest European power

and, by reaching to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean, to eliminate the ancient Western

threat to our country. As a result of it, the German leadership was able on June 22, 1941, to

launch Operation Barbarossa, which, owing to the inability of the Red Army to defend

itself, led to the tragedy of that year.’’ Meltiukhov also criticizes Soviet intelligence for not

having provided Stalin with precise information on Germany’s intention to invade and the

exact date of the invasion.

292

NOTES TO PAGES ∞∫≥ – Ω≥

31. William J. Spahr,
Stalin’s Lieutenants: A Study of Command under Duress
(Novato,

1997), 250.

32. E. M. Primakov and V. A. Kirpichenko, eds.,
Ocherki Istory Rossyskoy Vneshnei

Razvedki
(Moscow, 1997), vol. 3, 449–470.

33. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 1, 469–70.

Chapter ∞∫: Secret Letters

1. Konstantin M. Simonov, ‘‘Zametki K. M. Simonova k Biografy G. K. Zhukova,’’

Voenno-Istorichesky Zhurnal,
no. 9, 1987, 50–51. Another reference to this correspondence

is in William J. Spahr,
Zhukov: The Rise and Fall of a Great Captain
(Novato, 1993).

2. Aleksander N. Yakovlev, ed.,
1941 god
(Moscow, 1998), book 2, 183–84.

3. Ibid., 193. In his
Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia
(New

Haven, 1999), Gabriel Gorodetsky interprets the instructions given to Dekanozov by Stalin

and Molotov (and written out in the latter’s hand) as an indication of Stalin’s desire to enter

into correspondence with Hitler. In the event, von Schulenburg did not pursue the matter

further, probably because he suspected Hitler had already made a firm decision to attack

the Soviet Union and would have had little interest in a serious exchange of views with

Stalin.

4. Lev Bezymensky,
Gitler i Stalin Pered Skhvatkoi
(Moscow, 2000), 470–73. Bezy-

mensky’s meeting took place at Zhukov’s dacha. According to Bezymensky, Zhukov re-

ceived him because he had served on Zhukov’s staff in the spring of 1945 and was recom-

mended by Zhukov’s friend Konstantin Simonov.

5. Igor Bunich,
Groza: Piatisotletniaia Voina v Rossii
(Moscow, 1997), 356–58.

6. Marina Eliseeva, ‘‘Ofitsersky Korpus Politicheskoi v Politicheskoi Zhizni Rossy—

Sbornik Dokumentov,’’
Krasnaia Zvezda,
November 26, 2003, 4. This is a review of volumes

5 and 6 of the document collection
Ofitsersky Korpus v Politicheskoi Zhizni Rossii
(Moscow,

2003), ed. Anatoli Pavlov. The Hitler letter appears in this work.

7. Bunich,
Groza,
494–96.

8. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn,
V Kruge Pervom
(New York, 1969), 96; cited in Spahr,

Zhukov,
47.

9. This paragraph of the Hitler letter appears on p. 496 of Bunich’s
Groza.

10. Ibid., 492, 493.

11. Pavel Sudoplatov,
Special Tasks
(New York, 1994), 121.

12. L. G. Pavlov, ‘‘Ot ‘Yunkersa’ 1941 k Tsessne 1987’’ [From a Junkers in 1941 to a

Cessna in 1987],
Voenno-Istorichesky Zhurnal,
no. 6, 1990, 43–46. This article contains the

full text of Order No. 0035.

13. Ibid.

14. O. F. Suvenirov,
Tragedia RKKA, 1937–1938
(Moscow, 1998), 328, 376, 400.

15. See Dmitri Volkogonov,
Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy
(Rocklin, 1996), 277–79, for a

description of Stalin’s relations with others.

Chapter ∞Ω: The Purges Revived