What Stalin Knew (59 page)

22. Lure and Kochik,
GRU Dela i Liudi,
91–92.

23. A. G. Pavlov, ‘‘Sovietskaia Voennaia Razvedka Nakanune Velikoy Otechestvennoy

Voiny,’’
Novaia I Noveishaia Istoria,
no. 1, 1995. Unfortunately, there are no archival refer-

ences or indications in the article as to how Golikov reacted to the report’s comments about

deception. They are, however, the most accurate and straightforward description of the

‘‘English invasion’’ phase of German deception seen in reporting by any residency.

24. Ismail Akhmedov,
In and Out of Stalin’s GRU
(Frederick, 1984). See also Lure and

Kochik,
GRU Dela i Liudi,
92.

25. Lure and Kochik,
GRU Dela i Liudi,
75–82.

26. Ibid., 75, 76.

27. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2, 121.

28. Ibid., 179–80.

29. Ibid., 198–99.

30. Ibid., 211.

31. Ibid., 266.

32. Lure and Kochik,
GRU Dela i Liudi,
76.

33. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2, 398.

Chapter ∫: Who Were You, Dr. Sorge? Stalin Never Heard of You.

1. V. M. Lure and V. Ya. Kochik,
GRU. Dela i Liudi
(Moscow, 2002), 234, 355, 389, 395.

2. Sorge case materials, intercepts by Ministry of Communications and government

of Korea under Japanese occupation (turned over to U.S. occupation forces in 1945), 4.

3. Robert Whymant,
Stalin’s Spy: Richard Sorge and the Tokyo Espionage Ring
(New

York, 1998), 104–05.

4. Viktor Anfilov,
Doroga k Tragedii Sorok Pervogo Goda
(Moscow, 1997), 195; Ovidy

Gorchakov, ‘‘Nakanune ili Tragedia Kassandry,’’
Gorizont,
no. 6, 1988, 31.

5. A. G. Fesiun,
Delo Rikharda Zorge: Neisvestnye Dokumenty
(Moscow, 2000). Unless

otherwise indicated, the documents in this publication are declassified portions of the

Sorge File (Delo Zorge) in the GRU archives.

6. Gorchakov, ‘‘Nakanune,’’ 31.

7. Fesiun,
Delo Rikharda Zorge,
documents 136, p. 111; 140, p. 113; 143, pp. 114–15.

8. Ibid., documents 144, pp. 115–16; 146; 147, p. 117.

9. Ibid., document 145, p. 116. This document is reproduced in Aleksandr N. Yako-

vlev, ed.,
1941 god
(Moscow, 1998), book 2, 175, along with an order from Golikov to send it

to the usual recipients but to omit the section on the weakness of the Red Army.

10. Gorchakov, ‘‘Nakanune,’’ 31, 43. In his book
Stalin i Razvedka
(Moscow, 2004),

Igor A. Damaskin, a retired SVR colonel, claims that Sorge’s report on the date of the

282

NOTES TO PAGES ∫π – Ω≥

German attack was falsified during the Khrushchev period (263). However, a report on

‘‘The Sorge Spy Ring’’ by the headquarters of the Far East Command, U.S. Army, released

on February 10, 1949, states that ‘‘Sorge predicted the attack would come on June 20th.’’

According to Vladimir Malevanny, ‘‘Nezakrytoe Delo ‘Ramzaia,’ ’
Nezavisimoe Obozrenie,

no. 40, 2000, the message read: ‘‘Approximately June 20 Germany will begin its attack on

the USSR. The very latest date—around the twenty-third.’’

11. In Soviet military terminology an ‘‘army’’ consists of more than one corps.

12. Fesiun,
Delo Rikharda Zorge,
document 148, pp. 117–18; Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book

2, 252.

13. Gorchakov, ‘‘Nakanune,’’ 57.

14. Fesiun,
Delo Rikharda Zorge,
document 153, pp. 120–21; Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book

2, 380.

15. Fesiun,
Delo Rikharda Zorge,
document 154, p. 121; Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2,

398–99.

16. Whymant,
Stalin’s Spy,
184.

17. Sergei Kondrashev, ‘ Trudny Put Pravdy o Podvige Rikharda Zorge i ego Sorat-

nikov’’ (speech presented at the Second International Symposium on Richard Sorge and

His Comrades in Arms, sponsored by the Institute of Military History of the Russian Minis-

try of Defense and the Japanese-Russian Center for Historical Research, Moscow, Septem-

ber 25, 2000).

18. Fesiun,
Delo Rikharda Zorge,
document 38, pp. 55–56.

19. Ibid., p. 54.

20. Ibid., pp. 48–49. Proskurov’s refusal to permit Sorge to return to Moscow at this

time was twofold. First, he was afraid that Sorge would be arrested and imprisoned and,

second, he knew how valuable an agent Sorge was and how great a loss to Soviet intel-

ligence his return would create.

21. S. S. Smirnov,
Marshal Zhukov: Kakim My Ego Pomnin
(Moscow, 1988), 165–66.

22. Fesiun,
Delo Rikharda Zorge,
document 163, pp. 125–26.

23. Ibid., documents 176, 177, p. 132.

24. John Erickson,
The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin’s War with Germany
(New Haven,

1999), 239.

25. Interview with Professor Shirai,
Moscow News,
October 11, 2000. Excerpt from

‘‘Richard Sorge: Hero of the Soviet Union,’’ unclassified study by the CIA Counterintelli-

gence and Security Program.

Chapter Ω: NKVD Foreign Intelligence

1. The date December 20 is still commemorated by the Russian Intelligence Service

with banquets and speeches to demonstrate the continuity between the present-day service

and its predecessors.

2. E. M. Primakov and V. A. Kirpichenko,
Ocherki Istorii Rossyskoy Vneshnei Raz-

vedki
(Moscow, 1997), vol. 3, 16–17.

3. A. Kolpakidi and D. Prokhorov,
Vneshnaia Razvedka Rossii
(Moscow, 2001), 112,

113. See also T. V. Samoilis, ed.,
Veterani Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii: Kratky Biografichesky

Spravochnik
(Moscow, 1995), 154, 155.

4. Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, ed.
1941 god
(Moscow, 1998), book 2, 391.

5. Interview with Sergei Kondrashev, Moscow, October 8, 2002.

6. A. I. Kokurina, N. V. Petrova, and R. G. Pikoia, eds.,
Lubianka: VchK-OGPU-

NOTES TO PAGES Ω∂ – ∞≠∂

283

NKVD-NKGB-MGB-MVB-KGB, 1917–1960. Spravochnik
(Moscow, 1997), 24–26. See also

Kolpakidi and Prokhorov,
Vneshniaia,
34.

7. Kolpakidi and Prokhorov,
Vneshnaia,
34–35.

8. Data on reports signed by Bogdan Z. Kobulov for Merkulov in June 1941 taken

from Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2, 335–37, 349.

9. Ibid., book 1, 134–35. See also
Novaia I Noveishaia Istoria,
no. 4, 1997, 95–96.

10. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2, 250–51.

11. Ibid., 327–33.

12. Adam Ulam,
Stalin
(New York, 1973). Stalin was apparently so little affected by

his April 1907 visit to London that he never mentioned it to Churchill during their several

World War II meetings.

13. David Stafford,
Churchill and Secret Service
(New York, 1997), 222. Describing the

pitfalls in Stalin’s approach to intelligence analysis, David Stafford comments: ‘‘Paranoid

about Western intentions, threatened by demons of his own creation, his hands still blood-

ied by his massive purges, Stalin sleepwalked his fatal path to the biggest intelligence

disaster of the Second World War.’

14. Kolpakidi and Prokhorov,
Vneshniaia,
150–51.

15. Ibid., 342–44.

16. Primakov and Kirpichenko,
Ocherki,
452.

Chapter ∞≠: Fitin’s Recruited Spies

1. E. M. Primakov and V. A. Kirpichenko,
Ocherki Istory Rossyskoy Vneshnei Raz-

vedki
(Moscow, 1997), vol. 3, 414–43. See also Teodor Gladkov,
Korol Nelegalov
(Moscow,

2000), 178, 191, 199–202, 229, 327–28.

2. Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, ed.,
1941 god
(Moscow, 1998), book 2, 400–01.

3. Ibid., 402.

4. Ibid., 403, 89, 130.

5. Ibid., 130–31, 405–06.

6. Ibid., 382, 383.

7. Ibid., 382–83.

8. A. Kolpakidi and D. Prokhorov,
Vneshniaia Razvedka Rossii
(Moscow, 2001), 454.

For additional background on Lehmann and the circumstances surrounding the June 19,

1941, report, see ch. 20, below.

9. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
403, 89, 130.

10. Donald Hiss, the brother of Alger Hiss, was reported by Whittaker Chambers to

have been a member of the CPUSA. See Allen Weinstein,
Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case,

rev. ed. (New York, 1997).

11. Kolpakidi and Prokhorov,
Vneshniaia,
130–31, 405–06.

12. Ibid., 406, 407.

13. Ibid., 382–83.

14. Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev,
The Crown Jewels: The British Secrets at the Heart of the

KGB Archives
(New Haven, 1999), 174–77.

15. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2, 200, 248–49. The shock felt in Fitin’s directorate can

be seen in the following note from the chief of the German Department, Pavel M.

Zhuravliev to his assistant, Zoia Rybkina: ‘ Telegraph Berlin, London, Stockholm, America,

Rome. Try to clarify the details of the proposal.’’ Perhaps the most accurate accounts of

various aspects of the Hess affair can be found in David Stafford, ed.,
Flight from Reality:

Rudolf Hess and His Mission to Scotland, 1941
(London, 2002).

284

NOTES TO PAGES ∞≠∑ – ∞∞≥

16. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2, 120–21, 177, 186; A. P. Belozerov, ed.,
Sekrety Gitlera

Na Stole U Stalina Razvedka I Kontrrazvedka O Podgotovke Germanskoy Agressii Protiv

SSSR. Mart-liun 1941
(Moscow, 1995), 140, 151–53, 156–57. See also Ye. Sinitsyn,
Rezident

Svidetelstvuet
(Moscow, 1996).

17. Kolpakidi and Prokhorov,
Vneshniaia,
216, 296–97.

18. It is ironic that after her Warsaw tour Modrzhinskaia returned to the center and

by October 1942 had become the chief of the British Section of the Third Department. In

this position she set out to prove that ‘‘the entire Cambridge ring was nothing but an

exercise in disinformation.’’ See West and Tsarev,
Crown Jewels,
159.

19. Primakov and Kirpichenko,
Ocherki,
vol. 3, 293–94.

20. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2, 154–55.

Chapter ∞∞: Listening to the Enemy

1. Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, ed.,
1941 god
(Moscow, 1998), book 1, 598. See also Vik-

tor M. Chebrikov, ed.,
Istoria Sovietskikh Organov Gosudarstvennoy Bezopastnosti
(Mos-

cow, 1977), 313.

2. Oleg Matveyev and Vladimir Merzliakov, ‘‘Akademik Kontrrazvedki,’’
Nezavisimoe

Voennoe Obozrenie,
no. 15, 2002, 7. Although in appearance a bespectacled academician,

Fedotov was a very competent Chekist. He remained in counterintelligence until the ar-

rival of Aleksandr N. Shelepin as KGB chairman in December 1958. Fedotov was fired

and expelled from the party as part of Shelepin’s purge of Stalin-era generals of state

security.

3. Ibid.

4. Aleksandr Pronin, ‘‘Nevolnye Informatory Stalina,’’
Novoe Voennoe Obozrenie,
no.

45, 2001, 1–2.

5. A. P. Belozerov, ed.,
Sekrety Gitlera Na Stole U Stalina. Razvedka i Kontrrazvedka O

Podgotovke Germanskoy Agressy Protiv SSSR. Mart-liun 1941
(Moscow, 1995), 52–55. At the

point at which the unidentified agent claims to have entertained Russian naval officers, a

note is inserted, apparently by the German Department officers preparing the transcript:

‘‘Information from continuing surveillance of [the agent] shows that when speaking of his

meeting with ‘Russian officers’ he lies; in reality no such meetings took place.’’ Even coun-

terintelligence officers had to protect themselves.

6. Matveyev and Merzliakov, ‘‘Akademik Kontrrazvedki,’’ 7.

7. Belozerov,
Sekrety Gitlera,
109–12.

8. Ibid., 144–47.

9. Ibid., 83–86.

10. Ibid., 150–51, 163–66, 168–69.

11. Ibid., 171–72.

12. Ibid., 178–79.

13. Ibid., 169–70.

14. Ovidy Gorchakov, ‘‘Nakanune, ili Tragedia Kassandry: Povest v dokumentakh,’’

Gorizont,
no. 6, 1988, 33–37. Gorchakov’s contribution is puzzling. When Lieutenant Gen-

eral (retired) Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Zdanovich of the Federal Security Service (FSB)

recently reviewed Gorchakov’s articles, he told the author that Gorchakov had never served

in Soviet counterintelligence nor was he ever given official access to FSB archives. Zdano-

vich does not know where Gorchakov got the ideas for the articles or who helped him write

them. The code names were never in FSB archives and Zdanovich believes it would have

NOTES TO PAGES ∞∞≥ – ≤≥

285

been difficult for counterintelligence to have handled this many sources, given losses suf-

fered during the purges. In October 2002, when the author spoke with Zdanovich, he had

not been able to find collateral information on Second Directorate prewar operations.

However, the top-secret 1977 KGB history showed that in 1940–41 the directorate was very

active indeed in working with human sources. On the other hand, there are strange errors

in Gorchakov’s report, of some of Vladimir Dekanozov’s messages. In a June 21 radiogram

to NKVD Moscow, for example, Dekanozov refers to Ismail Akhmedov as ‘‘NKVD’’ when he

knew him as ‘‘GRU.’’ Gorchakov himself refers to Akhmedov’s chief as ‘‘B. Kobulov,’’ but