What Stalin Knew (28 page)

One security component in the Soviet establish-

ment was ideally situated to observe and report on the progress of the

German buildup across the frontier. This was the Chief Directorate of

Border Troops (GUPV), whose forces covered every kilometer of the west-

ern borders of the USSR from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea. Although

the border troops regard May 28, 1918, as their official founding, it was not

until 1939 that a separate directorate was established. Throughout the

1920s and 1930s, the border troops were included administratively with

troops responsible solely for internal security. Their official history main-

tains that throughout these years their main concern was protection of

the Soviet regime against ‘‘spies, saboteurs, and terrorists,’’ whether dis-

patched by anti-Soviet émigré organizations or foreign intelligence ser-

vices. This responsibility extended to interception of smugglers or any

persons attempting to enter the USSR illegally. This is the version featured

in the exhibits and lectures at the Border Troops Museum in Moscow, but

it is hardly an accurate reflection of border troop activities. Nor does it

account for the extensive network of border zones and physical obstacles

patrolled by the border troops inside the Soviet state frontier. The reality is

that the GUPV was just as concerned with keeping Soviet citizens from

leaving the country as it was in apprehending enemy agents infiltrating

border areas.1

THE BORDER TROOPS KNEW

125

The border troops did not escape the 1937–38 purges. With the move-

ment of the Soviet frontier westward in 1939, however, they reorganized

and expanded. Their strength rose by 50 percent during 1939–40; arma-

ments improved and increased. Still, the shift to new western borders

resulted in considerable disruption of routine. It required, among other

things, the creation of new agent nets for coverage of the areas opposite

each of the newly established border troop districts along the Finnish

frontier, on the seacoast borders of the newly acquired Baltic States, in the

new oblasts of western Belorussia and the Ukrainian SSR, and along the

Romanian frontiers of the Moldavian SSR. Arrests of German intelligence

(Abwehr) agents increased from 28 in the first quarter of 1940 to 153 in the

same period in 1941. Similar increases were noted in cross-border move-

ment of groups such as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. In the

period leading up to June 1941, as new Red Army units moved into the

western border areas, new liaison and communications arrangements had

to be established between military units and the border troops. These

arrangements were described in a Politburo directive of June 22, 1939.2

By the end of 1940 there were eight border troop districts (
okruga
) in

the area between the Barents Sea and the Black Sea. These districts were

located within the territories of the five western military districts: Lenin-

grad, Special Baltic, Special Western, Special Kiev, and Odessa. The over-

all strength of border troops in these districts was approximately 100,000.

Almost half the troops were stationed in the Ukrainian and Belorussian

districts. Under the eight Border Troop districts there were forty-nine de-

tachments. Each detachment (
otriad
) had from 1,400 to 2,000 men. Their

organization and armaments followed a standard pattern: a deputy com-

mander for intelligence, an intelligence department, and from four to

five border commands (
komendatury
), each with four or five outposts

(
zastavy
). The district also had a reserve, or maneuver, group of up to 250

men who could be rushed to critical areas if needed. In this connection, it

was the large-scale infiltration of sizable numbers of hostile sabotage and

intelligence teams in the 1940–41 period that caused the border troops

their greatest difficulty and had the most severe impact on the security of

the Red Army’s infrastructure. In the Belorussian and the Ukrainian bor-

der troop districts, the distance between outposts was from eight to ten

kilometers, a bit more in other areas. The border troops had no tanks or

artillery. In 1941 their light weaponry would be upgraded to include more

heavy machine guns, mortars, and antitank rifles.3

Border Troop Locations

FINLAND

Lake

Ehlisenvara

102

Onega

N

5

Ehnso

Petrozavodsk

103

Helsinki

Lake

Ladoga

Rempetti

Tallinn

7

Leningrad

6

8

Kingisepp

10

Rakvere

Khaasalu

9

Yaroslavi

Pskov

12

Liepaia

Riga

Kalinin

11

105

Krasnogorskoe

Kretinga

106

Nevel

83

Moscow

Taurage

Slobodka

107

Vitbesk

EAST

13

Mariampol

Smolensk

PRUSSIA

Vilnius

Orsha

86

Berezino

87

Minsk

Avgustov

Belostok

88

18

Orel

Shepetovo

17

GENERAL

Brest

Zhidkovichi

Gomel

98

GOVERNMENT

GERMANY

Liubomil

Kursk

90

Vladimir-Volynsky

20

91

Slavuta

Rava-Russkaia

BOHEMIA

Kiev

Peremyshl 92

MORAVIA

22

Kharkov

PROTECTORATE

Lisko 93 Lvov

Volochisk

SLOVAKIA

94

Skole

95

23

97

Nadvorna

Lipkany

Chernovitsy

24

HUNGARY

Beltsy

2

Kalarash

26

Kishinev

25

Odessa

Hqs border troops

Kagul

district

79

24

Hqs border troops

ROMANIA

Izmail

detachment

Simferopol

Sevastropol

0

100

200 mi

0

100

200

300 km

BULGARIA

Shows the cities in which the headquarters of the Leningrad, Baltic,

Belorussian, Ukrainian, Moldavian, and Black Sea border troops

districts are located. Their numbered subordinate detachments are

shown along the frontier.

THE BORDER TROOPS KNEW

127

As early as March 1939, border troop units received orders to create

additional intelligence posts so as to improve the level of cross-border

intelligence activity. On October 25, 1940, an order was given to estab-

lish new intelligence posts within the ten-kilometer border zone along the

frontier between the USSR and German-occupied Poland. They were to

consist of three officers and were to be located in large population centers;

their basic activity was to be daily operational work directed at uncovering

illegal border crossers and their accomplices.4

Between the summer of 1940 and June 1941, intelligence on the armed

forces of Germany and its allies concentrated on the Soviet border pre-

sented a major concern for the border troops. It was imperative to collect

information on German ‘‘force structure’’ and preparations for offensive

operations. It was also imperative to collect information on the Abwehr’s

plans for infiltrating Soviet frontier areas with agents or teams of agents

and then to intercept and apprehend them.

The border troops relied on observation by moving patrols and from

fixed towers or camouflaged observation and listening posts (the listening

posts were particularly effective at night). Regular patrols meant the troop

outposts became totally familiar with the physical features and human

activity in the areas across the border from them. Further information

came from the debriefing of deserters and refugees from the German oc-

cupation and from interrogation of spies and saboteurs, many of whom

were recruited by the Abwehr from the local population. Border troops

obtained specifics on the missions of these people and these often reflected

German operational plans; the debriefings and interrogations also sup-

plied general data on conditions in occupied Poland and East Prussia and

on German military activities.

Although it is known that it was not until July 31, 1940, that Hitler

advised his generals of his decision to attack Russia, on July 15 of that year

Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, and Timoshenko received a startling report

signed by Beria.5 It was based on a special report from Ivan I. Maslennikov,

deputy people’s commissar of internal affairs for troops. According to the

Belorussian border troop district, between July 1 and July 7 seven German

divisions arrived in Warsaw and its vicinity and were installed in towns

and villages within a sixty-kilometer radius of the city. In most cases, the

report provided regimental numbers. These troop movements caused an

interruption of passenger service between Warsaw and Lublin. Infantry,

artillery, and tanks moved in march formation from Lublin toward the

Soviet frontier. Responsibility for guarding the German side of the border

128

THE BORDER TROOPS KNEW

had been taken over from German border police by field units of the Ger-

man army. In addition, the border troops of the Ukrainian SSR had regis-

tered the arrival of German infantry and tank units in the border areas in

the direction of Peremyshl. Border troop detachments reported that in

areas opposite them, ‘‘German troops are engaged in constructing defen-

sive positions, placing mines, and improving highways.’’6

There was no special reaction from the top leadership to this report,

probably because on July 9, acting on orders from Defense Commissar

Timoshenko, Deputy Chief of the General Staff I. V. Smorodinov held a

meeting with Ernst Köstring, the German military attaché. Köstring ex-

plained that the large numbers of German troops were simply replace-

ments, now that significant contingents of troops were no longer needed in

the west.7 An untrue explanation, of course, but accepted by Stalin and his

lieutenants. Another factor that may have had a calming effect was the

signing on June 10, 1940, of a Soviet-German convention creating an ‘‘In-

stitute of Representatives for Border Affairs’’ to resolve conflicts. The So-

viet representatives were normally border troop officers from the detach-

ment nearest to a specific incident. Between January 1, 1940, and June 10,

1940, there were 22 incidents; between June 10, 1940, and January 1, 1941,

there were 187, most of which were resolved in the Soviets’ favor. It seemed

that as the Germans massed their forces along the border, they were ready

to accommodate their Soviet counterparts’ wishes. On February 13, 1941,

the deputy chief of the border troops of the Ukrainian NKVD, Ivan A.

Petrov, reported that ‘‘the Germans made a show of ostentatious politeness

but in reality they maintained a rather stubborn, well-thought-out line in

dealing with these incidents. They preferred to elevate them to the diplo-

matic level rather than react negatively.’’8

A turning point seems to have been reached in late July 1940, when

the commanding officer of the Ninetieth Border Troop Detachment, at

Vladimir-Volynsk, received a letter from the German side announcing the

arrival of the governor of occupied Poland, Hans Frank, to inspect the

frontier in the vicinity of the town of Grubeshev. ‘‘Frank and his retinue

of about thirty individuals arrived in a convoy of fourteen automobiles,

moved up and down along the frontier, and observed the Soviet side of the

border through field glasses,’’ reported the chief of staff of the Ninetieth

Detachment, who was also a ‘‘border representative.’’ After Frank’s visit,

the buildup of German forces and military construction projects in east-

ern Poland seemed to increase. German authorities explained that troops

‘‘from the French front had arrived in this ‘quiet zone’ for rest and reorga-

THE BORDER TROOPS KNEW

129

nization.’’ During July and August, ‘‘an army headquarters was established

in Warsaw, an army corps in the suburbs, as well as eight infantry division

headquarters.’’9 Undoubtedly as a result of this activity, on December 21,

1940, Beria called for retention in service of 7,000 individuals in the bor-

der troops whose terms of service would normally have expired on Janu-

ary 1, 1941.10

A report from the Ukrainian border troop district dated January 16,

1941, described a visit on December 9, 1940, by ‘‘German army commander

Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch to troops stationed in the area of

Sanok. Sanok is a town in southeast Poland on the river San, approxi-