What Stalin Knew (25 page)

string’s home and entered his office, opening his safe, photographing his

documents, implanting microphones throughout the house, and removing

all traces of their visit. Fedotov himself personally devised the operation.

The results meant that from that moment until June 22, Soviet counterin-

telligence received reports of confidential discussions among the Germans

110

LISTENING TO THE ENEMY

themselves. They also received reports of discussions between the Ger-

mans and with their Italian, Hungarian, and Finnish allies.4

These conversations, all of which pointed to the likelihood of a Ger-

man attack on the Soviet Union, were reported to the leadership. On

April 26, for example, there is a record of a meeting between a German

officer and a person who, from his speech and demeanor, appeared to be

an intelligence agent being debriefed by the German. The latter notes: ‘ We

must have information on divisions. We have some, but it is far from

sufficient. . . . As far as Russia is concerned, here we won’t encounter any

great difficulties.’’ The agent then claims that the evening before he enter-

tained Russian naval officers at his home who told him that ‘‘the Germans

will now declare war.’’ The German officer concludes by saying, ‘‘I want to

give you a small task—penetrate directly into Russian units and collect

information.’’5 Then, on May 31, 1941, a conversation took place between

Köstring and the Slovakian minister. Köstring: ‘‘Some kind of provocation

must be carried out here. It must be done in such a way that some German

will be killed, and that way bring on a war.’’ This comment may have

contributed to Stalin’s fear of provocation by the Germans. It is more

likely, however, that Köstring was extrapolating from the manner in which

Hitler orchestrated the onset of the Polish war. In that case, SS troops

donned Polish uniforms and attacked a radio station inside Germany.6

On May 18, however, the German Department published extracts from

coverage of conversations on May 13 and 15 in which German officers

make it unmistakably clear that they expect war with the Soviet Union

soon. One says: ‘‘In the opinion of the Russians, the morale of our troops

had been damaged . . . but they [the Russians] are not thinking about what

we know, what we’re doing. . . . General, we have to begin this war.’’ An-

other comments: ‘ True, many say that Russian offensive plans are very

poorly worked out. That’s their weak point. Therefore, our troops must be

thrown into a swift attack. Then the Russian troops will be crushed. . . . I

think that the Russians will bite their fingernails when we appear sud-

denly.’’ The excerpts end with these remarks: ‘‘The business we are speak-

ing of must remain absolutely secret. . . . The Russians, of course, will be

taken unaware. . . . My visit to the Red Army general staff showed me that

they suspect nothing.’’7

On June 7 the German Department produced transcripts dated June 5

and 6. Both contained comments reflective of German plans to invade the

USSR. The last line of the June 5 transcript read: ‘ We must cut Moscow

LISTENING TO THE ENEMY

111

completely off from Leningrad.’’ On June 6 these remarks were heard: ‘‘If

we use a large quantity of fighter aircraft here, it will take us only eight

weeks.’’ The response: ‘‘The Russians have had a breathing space of almost

two years.’’8

There were, of course, microphones planted in the installations of

other countries. The Finnish transcript of May 12, when taken together

with information reports from the First Directorate residency in Helsinki

(see chapter 9, above), should have left no doubt in the minds of the Soviet

leadership that the Finns would collaborate with the Germans in their war

against the USSR. A Finnish official speaking on May 12 stated: ‘ We must

stand on the side of Germany because it is the only great power that is close

to us.’’9

Microphones continued to provide timely information, supplemented

by agent reports on the evacuation of embassy staffs as war drew near. On

June 11 an agent of the Third, or English, Department of the Second Direc-

torate reported that the British embassy had received a telegram from

the Foreign Office in London ordering the embassy to prepare for evacua-

tion within seven days. On the evening of the eleventh, the burning of

documents was said to be under way in the basement of the embassy. On

June 18 additional information was received concerning the evacuation of

members of the British embassy and their families, as well as thirty-four

members of the German embassy. Reports of another wave of departures

from the German, Italian, Romanian, and Hungarian embassies noted

that the diplomats violated rules by going directly to Inturist, thereby by-

passing approved channels. The overheard requests stipulated that all de-

partures take place no later than June 19.10

On June 19 the Fourth, or Italian, Department provided information

on the situation in the Italian embassy. Ambassador Augusto Rosso visited

Ambassador Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg of Germany, who said

that, although he had no concrete information, he thought that war was

inevitable. After returning to his own embassy, Rosso first sent a telegram

to his wife in Tokyo, telling her to delay her return to Moscow. He then

dictated a telegram to Rome asking what Italy would do in the event of a

conflict between Germany and the USSR. He also asked for instructions on

what to do with Italian property and documents. While American officials

were not sure there would be a war, they confirmed to Italian diplomats the

American embassy’s plans for evacuation. A journalist and correspondent

for
Collier’s,
Alice Leone-Moats, reported that the wife of the American

112

LISTENING TO THE ENEMY

ambassador, Laurence Steinhardt, was preparing a dacha that, in her

words, would serve as a shelter for those foreign diplomats who would

remain in Moscow during a war in the USSR.11

Three transcripts prepared by the German Department covered dis-

cussions held on June 20 that all reflected Germany’s intention to attack

the Soviet Union. The first noted the puzzling lack of preparedness evident

in the city of Moscow: ‘‘They are doing nothing, even though they have

heard rumors and know of the evacuation of the diplomatic corps.’’ An-

other contained remarks such as: ‘‘It would be very good to begin to fight

now. . . . The Russians are afraid of us.’’ A discussion follows about the

condition of the road system in various parts of the European USSR. The

last transcript involved the call a visiting lieutenant general paid on De-

fense Commissar Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff Zhukov. He

was received most graciously, but no military topics were touched on.

Later in the transcript one person says, ‘‘The Russians neither want to fight

nor are capable of fighting.’’ ‘ Yes,’’ someone replies.12

One of the last and perhaps most poignant transcripts from the micro-

phones in General Köstring’s home, was a conversation on June 20 be-

tween Ambassador von Schulenburg and Köstring. Von Schulenburg be-

gan by saying: ‘‘I am in a very pessimistic mood, and while I know nothing

concrete, I think Hitler will start a war with Russia. I saw him privately in

April and said completely openly that his plans for war with the USSR

were sheer folly, that now was not the time to think about war with the

USSR. Believe me, because of this frankness, I have fallen into disgrace. I

am risking my career and perhaps I’ll soon be in a concentration camp.’’

Köstring did not share the ambassador’s pessimism with regard to vic-

tory over the USSR. Bogdan Kobulov, acting for Merkulov, sent this pa-

thetic report to Stalin, Molotov, and Beria.13 It is not known if it evoked

a response.

The Second Directorate continued to receive reporting from its agents

in various foreign embassies. Among the very interesting reports are those

provided by the late Russian writer Ovidy Gorchakov. He described an

agent (code name Yastreb) who was cultivating a senior officer of the

German embassy identified only as ‘ Von B.,’’ treating him to sumptuous

dinners and providing him with female companionship, courtesy of the

Second Directorate. The purpose of the relationship was his eventual re-

cruitment. But until then, the goal was to elicit as much as possible about

the current activity and personnel at the German embassy. Von B. claimed

to have been involved in the negotiations for the 1939 nonaggression pact.

LISTENING TO THE ENEMY

113

He described the scene at the Moscow airport on August 23 when Ambas-

sador von Schulenburg and leading members of the German embassy

greeted Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and the German delegation. Among

the other informative tidbits provided by Von B. was his contention that

German intelligence was aware that after the June 14, 1941, TASS com-

muniqué claiming there would be no war, Beria ordered Lev Z. Mekhlis,

head of the Red Army Political Directorate, to spread the word.14

Another informant in the German embassy (code name Ernst) might

have been a lower-level member of the embassy’s administration or a So-

viet employee. The information provided by Ernst, while prosaic, made

clear that the embassy was preparing for a serious eventuality. On May 19

he reported on a meeting between the Soviet ambassador in Berlin, Vla-

dimir G. Dekanozov (accompanied by his interpreter, V. P. Pavlov), and

Ambassador von Schulenburg, who was accompanied by his close friend

Gustav Hilger; embassy secretary Gebhardt von Walther was also in atten-

dance. Von Schulenburg tried to warn Dekanozov of Hitler’s intention of

starting a war with the USSR, but Dekanozov said he was not authorized to

listen to such statements and that only Molotov should be involved. Ac-

cording to Ernst, Dekanozov then reported the conversation to Beria, who

said that Germany was trying to blackmail the USSR. On June 2 and 3

Ernst passed on conversations with German assistant military attaché

Hans Krebs in which Krebs praised Stalin’s adherence to the nonaggres-

sion pact and the decision by the Soviet Military Council not to call for a

higher state of alert. This, of course, seems to have been a furtherance of

German disinformation. On June 11, Ernst reported that the German em-

bassy had received orders from Berlin to be ready to evacuate in seven

days. The burning of documents had already begun in the basement. As for

the June 14 TASS announcement, Ernst said that Molotov had given von

Schulenburg a copy before publication. Von Schulenburg expressed the

view to many that the communiqué was a wise step.15

Another agent (code name Gladiator) covered the Italian embassy. On

June 12 he reported that everyone there spoke openly about the forthcom-

ing German invasion. Ambassador Rosso was concerned about his wife,

who planned to return to Moscow from a Far East trip (he later decided it

made no sense for her to return). On June 20 Gladiator reported that the

ambassador intended to leave that day and had made a farewell speech to

the Soviet employees.16

The American embassy seemed to have had a large quota of Soviet

servants reporting to counterintelligence. One (code name Karmen) spoke

114

LISTENING TO THE ENEMY

English and was apparently a personal interpreter and assistant to the wife

of the ambassador. On May 4 Karmen reported on the decision by the

ambassador ‘‘to lease a large dacha near Moscow.’’ He did this ‘‘because he

is convinced that the Germans will attack Russia soon, this summer.’’ The

renting of the dacha was also reported in a Fourth (Italian) Department

transcript on June 19. On May 5 the ambassador’s wife told Karmen to see

to the packing of the silver, expensive tablecloths, and bed linens for ship-

ment to America.17

On June 6 Karmen reported that it was common knowledge in the

embassy that U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull had sent copies of tele-

grams from the U.S. ministers in Bucharest and Stockholm to Ambas-

sador Steinhardt. On June 8 Karmen overheard the American journalist

Alice Leone-Moats describe a drive to the German embassy’s dacha in

which Gebhardt von Walther, the embassy secretary, told her the Germans

would attack Russia on June 17. According to Karmen, on June 19 Alice

Leone-Moats told everyone in the American embassy that von Walther had

corrected his earlier statement; he now asserted that the attack would

come on June 21, and Leone-Moats felt he expected her to alert the Ameri-

cans. Looking directly at Karmen, she said, ‘ We are all tired of warning the

Russians.’’18