What Stalin Knew (23 page)

an attack against the USSR has become obvious. This is evident from the

disposition of German forces concentrated along the Soviet border. The

rail line from Lvov to Odessa is of special interest because it has European-

gauge tracks.’’ On April 2 Starshina described the operations plan pre-

pared by the aviation staff for the attack on the Soviet Union: ‘‘The air force

will concentrate its attack on railroad junctions in the central and western

parts of the USSR, the power stations in the Donetsk basin, and aviation

industry plants in the Moscow area. Air bases near Cracow in Poland are to

be the main departure points for aircraft attacking the USSR. The Ger-

mans consider ground support for its air forces to be a weak point in Soviet

defense and hope by intensive bombardment of airfields quickly to disor-

ganize their operations.’’3

On April 14 Starshina heard from a liaison officer on Göring’s staff that

‘‘German military preparations are being carried out in a deliberately open

fashion in order to demonstrate Germany’s military might. . . . The begin-

ning of military operations must be preceded by an ultimatum to the

USSR to accept a proposal to join the Tripartite Pact. The date for the

implementation of this plan is linked to the end of the war in Yugoslavia

and Greece.’’ The idea that Germany would first issue an ultimatum was an

article of faith for Stalin and his generals (for hadn’t wars always started

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that way?), but it was clearly part of the German deception program. That

Starshina passed on this tidbit should not have cast doubt on his purely

military reporting. For example, on April 17 he noted that German vic-

tories in North Africa caused some to hope that England could still be

beaten; ‘‘however,’’ he went on, ‘‘the general staff is continuing its prepara-

tions for operations against the USSR with its previous intensity, as can be

seen in its detailed designation of bombing targets.’’ On April 30 Starshina

declared that ‘‘the question of the German campaign against the Soviet

Union has been definitely decided, and it can be expected at any time.

Ribbentrop, who up to now has not been a supporter of the idea of war

with the USSR, has joined those who are for an invasion of the USSR

because he is aware of Hitler’s firm resolve in this matter.’’ The NKGB sent

this report to the Central Committee, the Council of People’s Commissars,

and the NKVD.4

Starshina prefaced his May 9 report with this statement, evidently in-

tended for Aleksandr M. Korotkov, his case officer: ‘‘It is necessary to warn

Moscow seriously of all the information pointing to the fact that the ques-

tion of an attack on the Soviet Union is decided, the jump-off is planned for

the near future, and with it the Germans hope to resolve the question

‘fascism or socialism.’ Naturally, they are preparing the maximum possible

forces and resources.’’ After noting that some in the air staff believed

May 20 would be the start of the war, while others thought it would be in

June, Starshina reverted to his earlier statement about an ‘‘ultimatum,’’

saying that it ‘‘will include demands for larger exports to Germany and an

end to Communist propaganda. As a guarantee that these demands will be

met, German commissioners will be sent to industrial and economic cen-

ters and enterprises in the Ukraine, and some Ukrainian oblasts will be

occupied by German troops. The delivery of the ultimatum will be preceded

by a ‘war of nerves’ with a view to demoralizing the Soviet Union.’’ The

report ended with a reference to the diplomatic protest sent by the USSR to

Berlin concerning German overflights: ‘‘Despite the note of the Soviet gov-

ernment, German aircraft continue their flights over Soviet territory for the

purpose of photography. Now the pictures are taken from a height of 11,000

meters and the flights are undertaken with great care.’’5

As a further indication of the seriousness of German preparations for

an invasion, on May 11 Starshina reported that ‘‘The First Air Fleet will be

the main component for operations against the USSR. It is still a paper

organization except for units of night fighters, antiaircraft artillery, and the

training of components specializing in ‘hedge hopping.’ Its status on paper

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does not mean, however, that it is not ready to move, since according to the

plan everything is on hand—the organization is prepared, aircraft can be

moved in the shortest possible time. Up to now the headquarters for the

First Air Fleet was Berlin but it has been moved to the Königsberg area. Its

exact location, however, has been carefully concealed.’’ All airfields in the

Government General (occupied Poland) and East Prussia had been or-

dered to be ready to receive aircraft.

On June 11 Starshina reported, ‘‘On June 18 Göring will move to his

new headquarters in Romania. According to senior officials in the Aviation

Ministry and on the air staff, the question of an attack on the USSR has

definitely been decided. One should consider the possibility of a surprise

attack.’’ In his June 17 report Starshina affirmed that ‘‘all preparations by

Germany for an armed attack on the Soviet Union have been completed,

and the blow can be expected at any time.’’ Presented to Stalin by NKGB

chief Merkulov and First Directorate NKGB chief Fitin, this was the report

that drew his angry rejoinder that Starshina should be sent back to ‘‘his

fucking mother.’’6

In the same report, Korsikanets described plans for the German civil-

ian administration for occupied areas of the USSR, to be led by Alfred

Rosenberg. His enumeration of the other principal administrators ended

with an account of a speech by Rosenberg to his subordinates. In it Rosen-

berg promised that ‘‘the very concept of the Soviet Union will be effaced

from geography maps.’’7

The Berlin residency’s final contribution to this morbid litany was Willy

Lehmann’s last report. Lehmann, who had been a residency source since

1929, reported on June 19 that ‘‘his Gestapo unit had received an order that

Germany would invade the USSR at 3:00 a.m. on June 22, 1941.’’8

The reported timing of the invasion varied, and individual reports

contained what later proved to be elements of German disinformation.

Taken together, however, the information from these sources should have

left no question in Stalin’s mind that the German Reich and its formidable

war machine were preparing for a massive invasion of the USSR.

Aleksandr M. Korotkov, the officer who reestablished contact with

Korsikanets in 1940, went out of channels to write a lengthy letter to

Beria dated March 20, 1941. Korotkov reviewed the intelligence pro-

vided by Korsikanets and others, including the military intelligence resi-

dency, and concluded that Germany was indeed preparing to attack the

USSR. Recognizing that trust in Korsikanets was a key element in evalu-

ating his information, he suggested that resident Amaiak Kobulov meet

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Korsikanets. Korotkov apparently hoped that by recommending this step

he would be ensuring that the Korsikanets material had greater impact.

Korotkov knew that Kobulov was ‘‘a creature of Beria.’’ But while he wrote

about Kobulov respectfully, he knew that Beria would never engage Kobu-

lov in a serious discussion of intelligence matters. Alas, Korotkov seems

not to have understood that neither Beria nor Kobulov would ever risk

crossing Stalin on the question of Germany’s intentions. Kobulov did meet

Korsikanets but there is no indication the meeting changed Stalin’s mind

about intelligence from this or other Berlin sources. In late October 1940

when Korsikanets reported that Germany would go to war against the

USSR in the beginning of 1941 and that the first phase would be the Ger-

man occupation of Romania, Stalin summoned Beria. Knowing Stalin’s

negative opinion on the issue, Beria announced to him: ‘‘I will drag this

Korsikanets to Moscow and jail him for disinformation.’’9

The Berlin residency also had a source, code name Yun, covering the

American embassy there. Little is known of this source except that he was

in contact with Donald R. Hiss, embassy first secretary; L. M. Harrison,

second secretary; J. Patterson, first secretary; and Colonel B. P. Payton, air

attaché. On April 9 and 10 he reported that these officers were convinced

that, soon after the end of the war with Yugoslavia, Germany would invade

the USSR.10

London

The London residency met the immediate prewar period ready to reap the

harvest made possible by the Cambridge Five, whose recruitment and

development during the 1930s was a masterpiece of intelligence opera-

tions. The intelligence and operational potential of the positions occupied

by these sources was breathtaking. John Cairncross (code name List) had

managed to become personal secretary to Sir Maurice Hankey, through

whose office flowed a bonanza of British government policy and intelli-

gence documents. Case in point, as early as September 1940 List provided

the document ‘‘Estimate of the Possibilities of War,’ indicating that Hitler

would not be able to invade the British Isles. Because Stalin was convinced

that the Germans would not invade the USSR until they had dealt with the

British, this report must have been rejected by the Boss. Other items pro-

vided by List probably reflected the lack of consensus within the British

Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). There was disagreement as to whether

the obvious German deployments along the Soviet frontier presaged inva-

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sion or were there to pressure Stalin into new concessions. The apparent

JIC belief that the Germans were seeking to force the Soviets into negotia-

tions also fitted Stalin’s preconception that war would begin only after an

ultimatum. It was just ten days before the attack that the JIC decided that

Hitler would in fact invade.

Even if the NKGB had an analytical capability, it seems doubtful that

it could have succeeded in comprehending the political forces at work

within the British government at this critical time.11 Some of the List re-

porting included copies of telegrams sent by Ambassador Stafford Cripps

and responses from Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, as well as extracts

from various British intelligence reports. Because, on the one hand, the

List reporting contained very precise British information on German prep-

arations for war but, on the other hand, also reflected continuing British

concerns about new German-Soviet negotiations, it probably reinforced

Stalin’s conviction that war was unlikely.

Reporting from Anthony Blunt (code name Tony), who managed to

enter the British counterintelligence organization, MI-5, where he served

as liaison officer with a variety of offices, such as the SIS (MI-6), the Foreign

Office, and the War Office must have been of exceptional operational inter-

est to the NKGB residency.12 Little is available, however, on Tony’s report-

ing on the approaching crisis. What is available presented the same prob-

lems of analytical interpretation as that from other Cambridge sources.

They can be seen in a report based on the ‘‘Soviet Russia’’ section of a War

Office intelligence summary for April 16–23, 1941, that said that ‘‘German

preparations for war with the USSR continue but so far there is absolutely

no proof that the Germans intend to attack the USSR in the summer of

1941.’’ Another Tony report, based on an intercepted telegram to the Japa-

nese Foreign Ministry, would have been of interest to NKGB code breakers

as they were already decoding some Japanese diplomatic traffic.13 Two of

Tony’s reports related to Finland and foretold Finnish involvement in a war

against the USSR on the German side. When compared with reports from

the NKGB Helsinki residency (see below), they should have been clear that

the Germans had persuaded the Finns to join in the invasion.

Guy Burgess (code name Mädchen) was employed primarily as a ‘‘tal-

ent spotter and recruiter’’ and produced little of value in the critical months

leading up to June 22, 1941. His great value would come in the post-

war period when he became personal secretary to Hector McNeil in the

Foreign Office.14 Kim Philby (code name Söhnchen), for all his notoriety

in penetrating the British Secret Intelligence Service, contributed little

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to Soviet knowledge of German preparations for invasion of the USSR.

Söhnchen did not actually enter the SIS until September 1941. Before that

he was in Special Operations Executive (SOE), the British service estab-

lished to support resistance movements in German-occupied Europe. Des-