What Stalin Knew (19 page)

ment of German troops into the Government General [occupied Poland],

and finally the fact of the transformation of Balkan countries into [Ger-

man] allies do not permit us to exclude the thought of German military

intentions toward our country, the more so if Germany succeeds in estab-

lishing itself on the shores of the Adriatic and Aegean seas.’’ German diplo-

macy seemed to be telling the Balkan countries, ‘‘Keep in mind . . . we are

going to begin a war with the USSR, we’ll be in Moscow in seven days, join

us before it is too late.’’15

That day Samokhin also sent a warning message obtained by RU resi-

dency officer Lebedev stating that ‘‘the Germans are sending troops into

Finland; they are sending a considerable force consisting of ten infantry

and three tank divisions into Hungary via Austria and are planning to attack

the USSR in May. The point of departure for this will be a demand that the

USSR join the Axis and provide economic assistance. . . . Against the USSR

the Germans have three groupings: Königsberg under Rundstedt, Crakow

under Blaskowitz or List, and a third, Warsaw, under Bock.’’16

Understandably, the Belgrade residency predicted that the German

attack on the USSR would begin in April. Given the rapid collapse of

Yugoslav resistance (by April 17 the Wehrmacht had crushed all opposi-

tion), the residency could not have known of Hitler’s decision on April 30 to

postpone the invasion of the USSR by four weeks. Nevertheless, the infor-

mation Samokhin did obtain from Yugoslav sources, while it was still

possible to do so, surely confirmed the outlines of German intentions to-

ward the Soviet Union.

Budapest

The RU residency in Budapest clearly illustrates the problems faced by a

residency that had no resources other than a few agent sources and social

contacts within the diplomatic community and the host government. The

legal resident in Budapest was the military attaché, Nikolai G. Liakhterov

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79

(code name Mars), who arrived in June 1940. He had an assistant, a secre-

tary, and a chauffeur. The residency had only two agent sources, code

names Vagner and Slovak, but virtually nothing is known of their back-

grounds and access. The first report available from this residency is dated

March 1, 1941, and states unequivocally: ‘‘Everyone considers that at the

present time a German offensive against the USSR is unthinkable before

the defeat of England.’’ This came from the military attaché community,

with the Italian attaché stating, ‘‘The Germans are preparing four para-

chute divisions and up to thirty infantry divisions for movement on fast

ships as the advance guard of their invasion of England.’’ Inasmuch as

Germany had only one parachute division, the Seventh, this drivel appears

to have been pure German deception, a cardinal element of which was the

notion that Germany could not and would not fight on two fronts—hence,

there would be no war with the USSR until England capitulated.17

On March 13, 1941, the resident reported this gem obtained from

Hungarian military intelligence, to whose offices he had been invited:

‘‘Among the diplomatic corps false rumors are circulating about the prepa-

rations of Germany, Hungary, and Romania for an offensive against the

USSR, about mobilization in Hungary, and about the sending of large

quantities of troops to the Soviet-Hungarian border. This is English propa-

ganda.’’ Liakhterov was told to visit the Carpathian Ukraine and see for

himself that these rumors were false. When this report was received in

Moscow, Golikov ordered the Information Department to tell the resi-

dency that its report had been disseminated to the leadership. Advising a

residency that one of its reports had been sent ‘‘to the leadership’’ was

unusual. Most disseminations were carried out according to standard dis-

tribution lists to specific addressees. One can speculate that Golikov acted

as he did because he knew the report’s labeling of preparations for a Ger-

man offensive against the USSR as ‘‘English propaganda’’ was how Stalin

would view it.18

A March 15 report was devoted primarily to German troop movements

in the Balkans. On April 24, Liakhterov submitted a breakdown of the Ger-

man army by divisions; the information was obtained from ‘‘colleagues’’ in

the attaché community. There were several errors, as is often the case when

rumors reach the attaché community. For example, the report referred to

‘‘five parachute divisions . . . of which four are stationed in Norway,’’ when

the Germans had only one.19

On April 30, the residency reported on the return to Hungary of Ger-

man divisions that had fought in Yugoslavia. The soldiers stated that after

80

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a short leave they were to be sent to Poland. Rumors continued in Buda-

pest and Bucharest concerning an impending war between Germany and

the USSR. The report also provided information on Hungarian army units

now stationed in eastern Hungary. Although this information was un-

sourced, Golikov ordered that it be included in a May 5 special report,

observing that it was important to discover the destination of German

troops leaving Yugoslavia. A May 1 report noted the movement of German

troops from Belgrade to Poland, while those in Romania were advanced to

the Soviet border. A second section of this report contained this sentence:

‘‘Among German troops rumors are being blown up that in twenty days

England will no longer be considered a military factor and war with the

USSR will be inevitable in the near future.’’ An Information Department

note stated that the first part of the report about the movement of troops

to the Soviet border would be used in special summaries, but not the sec-

ond part about the inevitability of war with the Soviet Union. This shows

how Golikov and those subordinate to him not only slanted reporting to

please Stalin but omitted reporting any views in opposition to Stalin’s

convictions.20

The last report available from the Budapest residency was dated

June 15, 1941; it cited agent Slovak as the source. The first paragraph stated

that German troops from Belgrade were leaving for Poland, while those in

central Romania were moving to the Soviet frontier. In the second para-

graph Slovak stated flatly: ‘‘The Germans will complete their strategic de-

ployment by June 15. It is possible that they will not attack the USSR

immediately, but they are preparing for it. Officers speak openly about it.’’

Golikov’s written reaction: ‘‘Let’s discuss it.’’ From marginal comments by

the Information Department, it seems that only the first paragraph was

disseminated to Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Timoshenko, and Zhukov.21

Prague

After the Germans occupied Prague in March 1939 and made Czech lands

a German protectorate (Slovakia was given its ‘‘independence’’ as a Ger-

man satellite), the Soviet embassy in Prague became a consulate general.

The legal RU resident in Prague from 1939 to 1941 was Leonid A. Mikhai-

lov (code name Rudolf), who worked in the office of the consulate general

under the alias Leonid E. Mokhov. The residency was extremely active in

running various RU agent nets and maintaining contacts with the Czech

resistance.22 Two reports, however, bore directly on the impending Ger-

RESIDENCIES IN EASTERN EUROPE

81

man invasion. On April 15, 1941, the Prague residency reported that ‘‘ac-

cording to an individual in the circle of persons close to German Foreign

Minister Ribbentrop, it is known that in the leadership of Germany there

has been a discussion of an invasion of the USSR. The date has been

provisionally set for May 15th. Preparation for the aggression will be

masked as large-scale preparations for a decisive blow against England.’’23

On April 17, 1941 the RU legal resident in Prague forwarded this report

from a source in the Skoda firm who was said to have cooperated with the

RU out of patriotism following the occupation of his country: ‘‘The German

high command has ordered an immediate halt to the manufacture of Soviet

heavy armaments at the Skoda plants. Senior German officers stationed in

Czechoslovakia have told friends that German divisions are concentrating

on the western borders of the USSR. It is believed that Hitler will attack the

USSR in the second half of June.’’ The source for the report was probably

RU residency agent Vladimir Vrana, who was employed in the export divi-

sion of Skoda soon after the occupation by the Germans. Three days after

the report was sent to Stalin, Golikov received it back with Stalin’s com-

ments written on it in red ink: ‘‘English provocation! Investigate!’’24

Sofia

In the extent and level of its agent networks, the RU residency in Bulgaria

owed much to the traditional ties of language and religion between Russia

and Bulgaria. The description of these networks in recently published liter-

ature on the RU lists an impressive number of agents and their sources in

Bulgarian officialdom and in the country’s military forces. At one time

Sofia served as the main RU center in the Balkans. One of the best sources

was Vladimir Zaimov (code name Azorsky), who had retired as a major

general and inspector of artillery in 1936. Zaimov had extensive contacts

throughout the Bulgarian armed forces who cooperated with him because

of their pro-Russian, anti-German views. In early April 1941, Zaimov re-

ported to Yakov S. Savchenko, the legal residency officer who was his

regular contact, that Germany planned to attack the USSR in June. Given

the existence of this source and others (some described below), it comes as

a surprise that only a small number of reports from the Sofia residency

appear in Aleksandr N. Yakovlev’s
1941 god.
25

The resident and military attaché in Sofia from October 1939 to March

1941 was Colonel Ivan F. Dergachev. His deputy was Leonid A. Sereda

(code name Zevs), who arrived in December 1940 and served as acting

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RESIDENCIES IN EASTERN EUROPE

resident from March to June 1941.26 The earliest report available from

Sofia is a statement on April 27, 1941, by a German general to a Bulgarian

prelate that ‘‘the Germans are preparing a strike against the USSR. . . . All

officers with a knowledge of Russian are ordered to Berlin for special

training, after which they will be assigned to the Soviet frontier area. They

will be assisted by White émigrés who know the Ukraine.’’27

One of the most startling aspects of later residency reporting is the in-

sistence on a German army presence in Turkey. On May 9 agent Margarit re-

ported that ‘‘German troops from western Macedonia are moving through

Turkey in officially sanctioned columns to Iraq!’’ The report then reverted to

information on Soviet-German relations: ‘‘Germany is preparing to open

hostilities against the USSR in the summer of 1941 before the harvest. In

two months, incidents will begin along the Soviet-German border. The blow

will come from Polish territory, by sea against Odessa and from Turkey

against Baku.’’ The resident added that the information on the presence of

German troops in Turkey came from agent Boevoy, one of whose sources

was Zhurin, head of the Military Justice Department of the Bulgarian

Defense Ministry and a member of the High Military Council. Golikov

appended this comment in the margin: ‘‘Sofia has twice reported that Ger-

man troops are moving officially through Turkey to Iraq. Is this true?’’28

On March 14, 1941, source Belvedere provided very good information

on a meeting between Tsar Boris and Field Marshall Walther von Brau-

chitsch and on the Germans’ use of flamethrowing tanks in their campaign

in Yugoslavia. ‘‘There are at least three or four divisions in Turkey en route

to Syria,’’ he added. The resident, responding to a Moscow message, stated

that he did not ‘‘insist on the veracity of these reports’’ but considered it

‘‘necessary to relate that I have received reports of the movement of Ger-

man troops through Turkey from a third source. The neighbors [here the

resident speaks of the NKGB residency] working on the same problem

have analogous information.’’ The issue must have somehow been re-

solved because this is the last time it is mentioned in the available report-

ing. How it arose is difficult to say. Turkey was not part of the February 15,

1941, German deception program, but Moscow was very concerned about

German influence in Turkey. Thus, requests from Moscow for information

on German activity affecting Turkey, once transmitted down the line to

Sofia residency sources, could have stimulated them to provide the re-

quired answers, true or not. In any case, sources Boevoy and Zhurin both