What Stalin Knew (31 page)

the manner in which Proskurov behaved toward him in public. Another

reason might have been the tension between Proskurov and Stalin’s newly

appointed defense commissar, Semen Timoshenko, who had developed

considerable dislike for Proskurov from the Finnish war experience. Timo-

shenko could never forget Proskurov’s inspections of his front opposite the

Mannerheim Line, nor could he forgive Proskurov’s report to Stalin on the

scandalous losses his people suffered. According to Proskurov’s sarcastic

description of Timoshenko’s approach, ‘‘instead of artillery preparations

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for the attacks, it was a ‘calvary charge.’ Instead of bombing strikes by avia-

tion, it was ‘fix bayonets!’ ’ Proskurov made his conclusions and recom-

mendations carefully. He consulted Dimitry M. Karbyshev, a well-known

military engineer, about the Mannerheim Line fortifications. He also pro-

posed setting up airfields on frozen ice, closer to the front.5

In memoirs of retired RU officers who knew Proskurov, the shadow of

Timoshenko is cast in strange ways. One officer recalled Proskurov as ‘‘an

impetuous young man whose rank as deputy defense commissar went to

his head.’’ He noted ‘‘Proskurov’s criticism of Timoshenko for the unsatis-

factory training of intelligence units and groups’’ and observed that ‘‘Pros-

kurov did not know how to get along in the system, and when Timoshenko

became defense commissar he zeroed in on Proskurov and had him dis-

missed from the RU.’’6 Another former intelligence officer recalled that

‘‘Proskurov was assigned to the RU to improve morale and discipline after

the purges, and he was quite successful in this.’’ In the officer’s view, ‘‘the

bad blood between Proskurov and Timoshenko began when Proskurov

arrived in Leningrad during the Winter War and was not met by either

front commander Timoshenko or his deputy. When Proskurov later met

with Timoshenko he apparently made a negative comment on this dis-

courtesy. Timoshenko was not pleased by this and he nursed a grievance

against Proskurov. One of the things he did after becoming defense com-

missar was to relieve Proskurov of his position as chief of the RU.’’7

One reason behind Stalin’s action might have been the June 6, 1940,

report from the RU Sofia residency that Proskurov sent to Stalin, which

suggested that Germany would conclude a separate peace with France and

then, together with Italy and Japan, attack the USSR. The effect of this

report on Stalin can be imagined. No longer able to rely on a prolonged

European war, he was planning new actions in the Baltic to secure that

area for the USSR. Would Hitler actually trash the nonaggression pact and

turn on the Soviet Union? Here again Proskurov was presenting Stalin

with very unpalatable news.8

Was this the reason Proskurov was summoned to see Stalin in the

Kremlin on June 7? Proskurov met alone with Stalin between 5:15 and

6:10 p.m. that day. After he left, a large group assembled in Stalin’s office at

7:20 p.m. It included Timoshenko, Shaposhnikov, Meretskov, Smorodinov,

and Voroshilov, none of whom could have been well disposed toward Pros-

kurov after the unplesantness of the April conference.9

Proskurov was not formally relieved of his duties as head of military

intelligence until July 27, 1940, when he was placed at the disposal of the

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defense commissar.10 The last intelligence reports he signed were dated

June 19 and June 20 and described increases in German troops on the bor-

ders of Lithuania. By July 15 RU special summaries were being signed by

Filipp I. Golikov, Proskurov’s successor. Apparently this change was not

publicized, because on July 22 Fitin, chief of foreign intelligence for the

NKVD, addressed a memorandum to Proskurov reporting movement of

German troops into the Government General. Fitin had not yet received

the word.11

Given the timing, Proskurov’s dismissal could have been related to

Hitler’s July 16 ‘‘Führer Directive No. 16,’’ calling for an attack on England,

code name Sea Lion. When Stalin learned of the directive, he is said to have

asked Proskurov if the Germans could really invade the British Isles. ‘‘An

invasion of this kind,’’ Proskurov explained to his leader, ‘‘depends on four

important conditions: German aviation must first establish air superiority;

ensuring control of the sea, at least in the area of the landing, and securely

pinning down the British Fleet in the Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea; the

availability of sufficient shipping tonnage for the landing; the possibility of

overcoming coastal defenses and the degree of opposition of the English

troops in the interior.’’ Proskurov went on to say that ‘‘only if they meet all

four conditions can the Germans count on success. If they miss only one,

they will not have a chance.’’ He then examined each point, noting the

problems faced by the Germans and predicting that it would take at least

three more months to complete preparations, by which time weather con-

ditions would make the operation impossible. This negative assessment

greatly angered Stalin, and that day Proskurov was relieved of his post.12

Proskurov’s reported answers reflected reality. Admiral Erich Raeder,

commander in chief of the German Navy, said that the plans were unrealis-

tic, that ‘‘the operation entailed the greatest dangers, that there was a

serious possibility that all of the troops engaged in the operation might be

lost.’’ The German naval staff made these points to the supreme command

of the armed forces in a July 19, 1940, memorandum:

a. The French ports . . . were badly damaged in the recent fighting or

are in other ways unsuitable.

b. The part of the Channel selected for the actual crossing presents

great problems because of weather conditions, tides, and rough

water.

c. The first wave of the invasion would have to be landed on the open

English coast, and there are no suitable landing craft for such a

landing.

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141

d. The waters for this crossing can not be made or kept absolutely

free of enemy mines.

e. The vessels in which the troops and their supplies are to be em-

barked can not even be assembled in the embarkation ports until

absolute mastery of the air has been achieved.

f. . . . Up until now the British have never thrown the full power of

their fleet into combat. But a German invasion of England would be

a matter of life or death for the British, and they would unhesitat-

ingly commit their naval forces in an all-out fight for survival.’’13

In September 1940 the Luftwaffe carried out its first raids on London. The

attacks by German bombers were preceded by waves of fighters. On Sep-

tember 15 the raids were turned back with heavy losses, demonstrating

that the RAF could still achieve air superiority. On September 17 Hitler

announced ‘‘the postponement of Sea Lion until further notice.’’

In the final analysis, why was Proskurov fired? The one overriding

reason seems to have been Stalin’s awareness that he could not control the

man. Proskurov would pursue his own views on a subject even if they ran

counter to Stalin’s position. This was evident in the confrontation between

Stalin and Proskurov at the Finnish war conference and in Proskurov’s

insistence on sending him intelligence reports that did not conform to

his views.

To others of his associates in the RU days, Proskurov possessed quali-

ties that would never have endeared him to Stalin. According to one, ‘‘he

was modest, sociable, honest, principled, brave, and very straightforward

in his judgments. He quickly caught on to the work and was a talented

leader. Many of the intelligence operations he started were to last through-

out the war.’’ Another said, ‘‘Proskurov had a sharp mind and a tenacious

memory.’’ He recalled a trip he took to Western Europe at Proskurov’s

request in March–September 1939: ‘‘I reported on the residents I met, that

is, those who were still there [not purged]. I noticed that as I spoke Ivan

Iosifovich squeezed his cheekbones, muscles in his face twitching.’’ Under

Proskurov, moreover, agents were kept on whereas under Golikov a second

wave of repression began; that was why Proskurov would not let Richard

Sorge return to the USSR. And not only Sorge. When officers who were

recalled despite his efforts had their stays in Moscow extended, Proskurov

himself would meet with them, without advertising the fact, calm them

down, and give them the latest news.14

Who was the man who replaced him? Filipp Ivanovich Golikov was

born on July 16, 1900, in the village of Borisovo, near Shadrinsk, in

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Kurganskaia Oblast. His father was a medical practitioner in the village

who passed his socialist beliefs on to his son. Young Golikov won a scholar-

ship to the gymnasium in Kurgan and after the October Revolution joined

the First Krestiansky Rifle Regiment, known as the Red Eagles. He at-

tended military agitator courses in Petrograd, then was assigned to the

Tenth Moscow Rifle Regiment of a special brigade of the Third Army on

the Eastern Front. In August 1919 he became an instructor-organizer in

the Political Department of the Fifty-first Division. His official biography

in the
Soviet Military Encyclopedia,
from which these facts are taken, says

that ‘‘after the civil war, until 1931, he was engaged in party-political

work.’’ Since the civil war in the European part of the country had pretty

much ended after the conclusion of the Polish campaign and the sub-

sequent defeat of Peter Wrangel in November 1920, ten full years of Goli-

kov’s life were devoted to political assignments, the exact nature of which

are still not clear.15 In 1931 he attended an unidentified military school,

becoming commander of the Ninety-fifth Rifle Regiment of the Thirty-

second Rifle Division. From 1933 to 1936 he commanded the Sixty-first

Rifle Division of the Volga Military District. During this time he also pur-

sued correspondence courses with the Frunze Military Academy. He then

commanded the Eighth Separate Mechanized Brigade until 1937, when he

was put in command of the Forty-fifth Mechanized Corps in the Kiev

Military District.16

Then, suddenly, he was made a member of the Military Council of the

Belorussian Military District. There was something very strange about this

assignment. Military councils normally consisted of the commanding of-

ficer, his first deputy, and a political ‘‘member.’’ Depending on the circum-

stances, this member might be a high-ranking political commissar or even

the senior party secretary in the district. Why, after seven years of com-

mand assignments with a rifle regiment, a rifle division, a mechanized

brigade, and finally a mechanized corps, was Golikov sent to this key mili-

tary district as the member of its military council? In any case, it was in

this capacity that he encountered Georgy K. Zhukov, then commanding

the Third Cavalry Corps. Under the direction of Lev Z. Mekhlis, chief of the

Political Directorate of the Red Army and the main scourge of the Red

Army during the purges, Golikov was laying the groundwork for a purge of

the command elements of the Belorussian Military District. Relying on

allegations made by repressed officers under hostile interrogation, Golikov

accused Zhukov of friendships with former enemies of the people and

hostility toward political workers. Zhukov found support in others in the

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Belorussian Military District’s command structure and his command of

the Third Cavalry Corps was confirmed, but he would never forget Golikov

and the way he tried to send him to ‘‘Beria’s basements.’’17

In November 1938 Golikov was given command of the Vinnitsa Army

Group in the Kiev Special Military District, and in 1939 that of the Sixth

Army. This latter assignment was not by chance. The mission of the Sixth

Army was to occupy the city of Lvov and the surrounding area. As noted

earlier (chapter 4), the Lvov area was known to have been of interest to the

Germans, even though the demarcation line agreed on in the secret pro-

tocol to the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact gave it to the Soviets. Stalin

was determined to get there first. Even more important, Lvov was the

center of the Ukrainian independence movement, with thousands of ad-

herents in the area, many of whom had received training from the Abwehr.

To ensure an orderly transition to Soviet rule within the Ukrainian SSR,

the Sixth Army and its Political Department would have to cooperate

closely with the NKVD. Thus, this assignment did not require extensive

combat experience. It required political sensitivity and knowledge of how