What Stalin Knew (51 page)

Filipp I. Goloshchekin, who was complicit in the assassination of Tsar

Nicholas II and his family. Also on the list were Maria P. Nesterenko, Alek-

sandra I. Savchenko, and Zinaida P. Rozova. Five other persons were later

added to the first list of twenty. One of them was Mikhail Sergeevich Ked-

rov, an old Bolshevik born in 1878 who had been arrested in 1939 and now

found himself facing death with this group.13

There is another version of the story. It hardly seems credible yet it

demonstrates the difficulty of establishing the truth about a historical

event of this importance in the absence of archivally accurate, officially

released information. This second version describes a telephone call re-

ceived early on October 26, 1941, by the stationmaster in Barysh, a rail

junction hundreds of kilometers southwest of Kuibyshev city in what was

then Kuibyshevskaya Oblast (now in Ulyanovskaya). The call was from

Senior Major of State Security Boris V. Rodos (one of the most sadistic of

the team investigating the generals): ‘ Tomorrow at 11:25 a classified train,

00/A, will pass through your line on its way to us in Kuibyshev. I order you

to ensure it is given a green light. You’ll answer for this with your head!’’

When the train arrived in Barysh, however, it was stopped and shunted off

to a siding because the station had received a warning of an impending

German air raid. An offer by townspeople to feed the passengers was re-

jected by the NKVD guards. The ‘‘passengers’’ were the generals.

When, many years later, it became known that the prisoners had been

executed in a place called Barysh, a reporter visited and tried to recon-

struct the scene. From the rail siding a path led across the tracks to an

abandoned sandpit some three to five kilometers away. Relatives of the

reporter told him that it had been the favorite play area of a group of boys

who had made their ‘‘headquarters’’ in an abandoned hut. On the night the

train was held at the siding, shots were heard from the sandpit. The next

day, the boys went out to look. They found nothing—not their headquar-

ters, not the homemade catapult and crossbows they had left there the day

before. The place had been flattened. They swore they found many recently

fired cartridge cases on the ground, and thereafter the rumor went around

that people had been executed.14

In 1988 the periodical
Literaturnaia Gazeta
published an article by

Vaksberg about the site at Kuibyshev. The first publicly available informa-

tion on the secret execution, the article caused quite a stir. After it ap-

peared, an editor from Samara Radio and a worker at a local museum

apparently found the place of execution and burial. The former NKVD

dacha compound had been razed and the spot reportedly turned into a

THE FINAL RECKONING

239

children’s park. When workmen dug into the area they found evidence that

bodies had been buried there. A marker was erected—a symbol really,

because no one knew who was buried where. Then in 1991 a Samara

journalist, Viktor D. Sadovsky, apparently working with Memorial, ar-

ranged to honor the victims. Many of their relatives attended. Proskurov’s

only surviving daughter, Lidia Ivanovna, was there, along with Rosa Smu-

shkevich, the daughter of Yakov V. Smushkevich.15

Supporting the contention that Beria would not have ordered the Oc-

tober 28 executions on his own is the action he took with regard to other

prisoners sentenced to death. These were prisoners whose sentences still

required approval of the military collegium of the USSR Supreme Court

and the Central Committee of the party before the NKVD could proceed

with executions. On November 15 Beria sent Top-Secret Memorandum

No. 2865/c to Stalin explaining the situation and asking that the NKVD be

permitted to proceed with the executions of those condemned to death. He

also requested that in the future NKVD special boards (
osobye soveshch-

aniia
) have the right to deal with cases of serious crimes and to pronounce

appropriate sentences up to death. These decisions of the boards would be

considered final. Within two days, Stalin issued a State Defense Commit-

tee decree authorizing virtually word for word the actions requested by

Beria. On January 29, 1942, Beria sent Stalin a list of forty-six persons,

most of whom had been arrested in April–June 1941. Included were Red

Army air force generals who had served in Spain and were closely asso-

ciated with those who had been shot on October 28: Lieutenant General

of Aviation Konstantin M. Gusev, commander of air forces, Far Eastern

Front; Lieutenant General of Aviation Yevgeny S. Ptukhin, commander

of air forces, Kiev Special Military District; Lieutenant General of Avia-

tion Petr I. Pumpur, commander of air forces, Moscow Military District;

and Major General of Aviation Ernst G. Shakht, deputy commander of air

forces, Orlovsky Military District; and others.

To Beria’s request, Stalin replied: ‘‘Shoot all those named in this list.’’

An NKVD special board met on February 13, 1941, passing a sentence

of death on the men, and on February 23, Red Army Day, they were

executed.16

What became of the three principals in the events described in these

pages?

Pavel M. Fitin worked throughout the war as head of NKVD/NKGB

foreign intelligence. His directorate concentrated on the collection of infor-

mation in allied and neutral states rather than in those countries under

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THE FINAL RECKONING

German occupation; its most productive residencies were London, New

York, Washington, and Ottawa. London’s agents were undoubtedly the best

sources on allied planning for the postwar occupation of Germany, already

of major interest to Stalin. They also contributed information on Allied

development of atomic weapons, a topic that by 1944–45 was of increasing

concern to Stalin and that Fitin’s people therefore gave top priority. By

early 1945, according to historian David Holloway, ‘‘Soviet intelligence had

a clear, general picture of the Manhattan Project.’’ In February 1945, Peo-

ple’s Commissar of State Security Merkulov, still Fitin’s boss, reported to

Beria that ‘‘research by leading British and American scientists had shown

that an atomic bomb was feasible.’’ By June 1945, Fitin’s sources provided

details on the plutonium bomb that would soon be tested. It was the suc-

cess of this test in New Mexico in July that convinced Stalin of the strategic

importance of the atomic bomb.17 On June 15, 1946, however, the architect

of the clandestine collection programs that had made this knowledge avail-

able to Soviet scientists, foreign intelligence director Pavel M. Fitin, was

summarily dismissed and placed at the disposal of the Personnel Directo-

rate, USSR Ministry of State Security (MGB).

Why? By mid-1946 Fitin had become a highly experienced and effec-

tive intelligence chief. His contributions during and at the end of the war

had been outstanding. He had never become involved in political power

plays that could have irritated Merkulov, Beria, or Stalin. He knew his

position and accepted it as a good Stalinist bureaucrat. Nevertheless, in

the weeks before the German invasion he had undoubtedly become a burr

under the saddles of both Beria and Stalin. Thus, in March 1946 when the

USSR abandoned the proletarian designation ‘‘people’s commissariat’’ and

created new ‘‘ministries’’ in the Western fashion, they probably saw their

chance. It seemed logical that the former head of military counterintel-

ligence, Viktor S. Abakumov, who was now the minister of state security,

should have the right to choose his own team, including a new chief of

foreign intelligence. Out went Fitin. It was claimed that his personal life

was not suitable for a chief of intelligence—he had begun living with a

much younger woman, a well-known sports figure. (They were married in

1963 and remained so until Fitin’s death in 1971.)18 A friend recalls that

after his dismissal (which also involved the loss of his official apartment

and dacha) he sorely missed being at the heart of the action and lived in

straitened circumstances.19

Fitin’s next assignment, from September 1946 until January 4, 1947,

was as deputy MGB representative in Germany. The reason for the assign-

THE FINAL RECKONING

241

ment is unknown.20 In January 1947 he was sent to Sverdlovsk as the

deputy chief of the MGB oblast directorate, serving there until September

1951. This was a distinct demotion. Beria reportedly ordered him fired

from State Security without a pension ‘‘because he lacked sufficient years

of service,’’ but Fitin managed to be assigned to the MGB ministry in

the Kazakh SSR. When Stalin died in March 1953 and Beria once more

headed the security services, he lost the Kazakh ministerial post and was

sent back to Sverdlovsk, where he remained until July 1953. By that time

Beria had been arrested. For some reason, Fitin was dismissed from the

MGB in November 1953 as ‘‘unsuitable for the service.’’21

In 1954 Fitin did what many others before and after him did when

forced out of the service at an early age: he obtained a position with the

Soviet system of state control, where he served until 1959. Then he became

director of a photographic
kombinat
(combine) under the Union of Soviet

Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

He probably got the first job through the intercession of friends; the second

job suggests intelligence connections. Of the three principal characters,

Fitin represents a type most common to Soviet society. He did his job as

well as or even better than expected and insisted on sending reports to

Stalin that consistently predicted a German invasion. When rebuffed, he

kept quiet.

Filipp I. Golikov belonged to another group, one that would do any-

thing to remain in the good graces of the leader. As chief of the RU, Golikov

suppressed or altered analyses of the German threat to fit Stalin’s mistaken

ideas. In addition to the RU assignment, Golikov carried out a number of

tasks for the political leadership. Not only did he serve Stalin, but he man-

aged to hang on under Khrushchev.

In July–September 1941 Stalin had Golikov visit London and Wash-

ington to assess the extent of Anglo-American assistance and cooperation.22

The trips were relatively brief, intended not to delve into the details of Brit-

ish and American plans to assist the Soviet Union (America was not yet in

the war) but to gauge how serious these capitalist countries were about pro-

viding help to a Communist country. Golikov’s trip to London on July 8–13

suggested the British were not sanguine about Soviet chances against the

Germans. Stalin hoped for greater success in dealing with the Americans so

on July 26 Golikov flew to the United States, where he was received by

President Roosevelt. He doubtless reported very positively on the meeting.

After his return from his trips, Golikov asked Stalin for a field com-

mand, which he received. The descriptions of his actions in various

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THE FINAL RECKONING

command positions that appear in his official biography in the
Soviet Mili-

tary Encyclopedia
do not always correspond to reality. He was relieved

of virtually every combat assignment he was given or found another by

appealing to Stalin. When he was deputy commander of the Stalingrad

Front, for example, he was accused of cowardice by Nikita Khrushchev,

then political member of the front’s Military Council. In October 1942

Golikov was given command of the Voronezh Front but was relieved in

March 1943 at Zhukov’s urging. In April 1943 Stalin made Golikov head of

the Defense Commissariat’s Chief Personnel Directorate and started him

on the hunt for prisoners of war and displaced persons.23

In October 1944 he was appointed plenipotentiary of the Council of

People’s Commissars for Repatriation Affairs but retained his position as

head of Red Army personnel. Many thousands of Soviet citizens were now

in Allied hands, and the number was growing daily. These people—former

prisoners of war and individuals who had been sent to Germany as la-

borers during the war—were not all eager to be repatriated. Many of them

refused to return to their homeland. This intransigence was anathema to

Stalin, which is probably why he directed Golikov to supervise the ac-

tivities of the Soviet repatriation missions in Germany, the United King-

dom, and elsewhere in Western Europe. The VENONA project recovered

the texts of some of Golikov’s telegrams to these missions. In one he ad-

monishes his people not to ‘‘slip into accepting the American, British, and

French’’ definition of Soviet citizens as ‘‘refugees.’’ He urges them to dis-