What Stalin Knew (54 page)

maintained contact with those particularly valuable agent sources who, for se-

curity reasons, could not meet with members of the Soviet mission. Illegal resi-

dents were generally trained and experienced people documented as non-Soviet

foreigners living and working under commercial or other cover they had them-

selves devised.

Communications between RU Moscow and legal residencies abroad were

the responsibility of the operational departments, which used radio, commercial

telegraph, and the diplomatic pouch. The messages dealt with administrative

matters concerning the residency’s activities and its agent assets. Many of the

personnel problems had to be resolved by the RU chief himself. For example, in

June 1939 Proskurov became involved in deciding whether the famous illegal

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APPENDIX ∞

resident in Tokyo, Richard Sorge, would return to Moscow or remain in Japan; he

also had to approve an extraordinary monetary award to Sorge and members of

his group.2 Most of the traffic between Moscow and the field concerned intel-

ligence requirements and information reports from individual sources. When

these reports were received, they were examined by the appropriate country

desk, which had to be ready to respond to questions about them from the Infor-

mation Department or from the RU chief himself. The chief might then deter-

mine the dissemination. An important aspect of report production and dissemi-

nation was the need to protect the identity and security of the agent source. If the

source description was too vague or the reliability of the source not properly

indicated, the impact of a report could be lessened. Case in point, the first word of

Hitler’s decision to invade the USSR in the spring of 1941 came to the RU on

December 29, 1940, from a source who ‘‘heard from well-informed circles’’ that

Hitler had given the order to prepare for war against the USSR. The report was

disseminated to the defense commissar and the chief of the general staff but

made little impression. This was unfortunate for the Soviets because the agent

was highly placed in the German Foreign Office, had good contacts among the

German military, and had been a productive RU source since the mid-1930s. He

followed up with reports on January 4 and March 20, 1941, that reinforced his

initial information. To some degree, the failure to recognize the importance of

this report may be related to the changes of personnel at the head of the RU and

also in the Information Department brought about by the purges. But the princi-

pal culprit was Golikov, who had no background in intelligence and was normally

disposed to doubt sources predicting an invasion, in deference to the views of the

Boss.3

Another RU collection capability rested in the intelligence points (
razved-

punkty
) of the intelligence departments of the military districts located on the

Soviet frontier. There were a number of these points within each military district,

and their purpose was the creation of agent networks in areas across the state

frontier for which the military district was responsible. Information from these

agent sources was forwarded to the military district intelligence departments,

where it was incorporated into the intelligence summaries prepared by the de-

partments and forwarded to the RU. Some have argued that the level of agents

acquired by the intelligence points was too low for them to have obtained the

information needed to persuade the Soviet leadership of the German danger.4 For

example, none of the agents were able to obtain documentary evidence from the

headquarters of the German units along the frontier. The problem was that many

officers in military district intelligence departments, aware that Stalin would

reject reports predicting a German invasion, refused to accept information of this

kind from intelligence points. After the German attack, some intelligence point

officers reported the problem to NKVD Special Department investigators.5

Analysis of incoming reports, the production of finished intelligence sum-

maries and special reports, and the preparation of intelligence requirements was

the responsibility of the RU Information Department. Within the department

various sections dealt with individual countries or groups of countries, the First

Section with Germany; the Second with Poland, the Baltic States, and Romania,

and so forth. Despite the importance of this department and the obvious need for

continuity, there were frequent changes during Proskurov’s time as chief. Grigory

P. Pugachev apparently headed the Information Department from 1939 to De-

cember 1940, when he was replaced by Nikolai I. Dubinin, who was in turn

SOVIET MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

255

temporarily succeeded by Vasily A. Novobranets, whom Proskurov had brought

into the department as deputy chief for the Far East.6 The RU chief was person-

ally involved in decisions on dissemination of important individual reports. After

receiving a report, the chief might request clarification from the operational

department on certain aspects before sending it on. He invariably signed the

reports himself. When Proskurov was chief, he sometimes sent two or three

reports to Stalin under a single letter of transmittal.

Apart from such standard components as personnel, finance, logistics, com-

munications, and cipher security, the RU had an important Third, or Military-

Technical, Department encompassing specialities such as artillery, tanks, avia-

tion, communications technology, and chemical and bacteriological techniques.

This department maintained elements in the larger residencies in scientifically

advanced countries. Its chief, Aleksei A. Konovalov, had served in military-

technical elements since 1935, untouched by the purges. The External Relations

Department maintained contact on behalf of the Defense Commissariat with

foreign military attachés in Moscow both for administrative purposes and for the

obtaining of whatever intelligence it could from these relationships. A good exam-

ple is the June 21, 1940, report on Franco-German armistice arrangements ob-

tained from German military attaché General Ernst Köstring by the chief of the

External Relations Department, Colonel Grigory A. Osetrov.7

We know that the RU had a radio intercept capability in the immediate

prewar period. On October 26, 1939, for instance, RU chief Proskurov sent a

report to the defense commissar based on the intercept of radio communications

between the chief of staff of the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria and the

Personnel Department of the War Ministry in Tokyo. The subject was the Khalkin

Gol fighting, the panic caused among Japanese officers by the Red Army’s at-

tacks, and the fact that Japanese unit losses were so heavy some units had to be

reactivated.8

The RU was able to obtain the results of British code breaking from sources

within its London residency as early as 1940, and as of 1942 it initiated its own

decryption of German code, having obtained the ENIGMA code machine on the

battlefield.9

A P P E N D I X

≤

Hitler’s Letters to Stalin

December ≥∞, ∞Ω∂≠

Dear Mr. Stalin,

I am using the occasion of sending New Year’s greetings and my wishes for

success and prosperity to you and the people of Soviet Russia to discuss a series

of questions that were raised in my conversations with Mr. Molotov and Mr.

Dekanozov.

The struggle with England has entered a decisive phase, and I intend not

later than the summer of the coming year to put an end to this rather drawn-out

question by seizing and occupying the heart of the British Empire—the British

Isles. I am aware of the difficulty of this operation but believe that it can be

carried out, for I see no other way of ending this war.

As I wrote you earlier, the approximately seventy divisions that I must keep

in the Government General are undergoing reorganization and training in an

area inaccessible to English aviation and intelligence. I understood from my

discussions with Messrs. Molotov and Dekanozov that this has aroused in you

understandable anxiety. Beginning in approximately March, these troops will be

moved to the Channel and the western coast of Norway, and in their place new

units will be assembled for accelerated training. I wanted to warn you of this

in advance.

In addition, I intend to use these troops to force the English out of Greece,

and for this it will be necessary to move them through Romania and Bulgaria.

Those troops that will carry out the invasion of England from Norwegian terri-

tory will continue to utilize transit rights through Finland. Germany has no inter-

ests in Finland or Bulgaria, and as soon as we achieve our goals in this war, I will

immediately withdraw my troops. . . .

I especially want to warn you of the following. The agony of England is ac-

companied by feverish efforts to save it from its inevitable fate. For this purpose

HITLER’S LETTERS TO STALIN

257

they are fabricating all possible foolish rumors, the most important of which can

be crudely divided into two categories. These are rumors of planned invasions by

the USSR into Germany and by Germany against the USSR. I do not wish to

dwell on the absurdity of such nonsense. However, on the basis of information in

my possession, I predict that as our invasion of the [British] Isles draws closer,

the intensity of such rumors will increase and fabricated documents will perhaps

be added to them.

I will be completely open with you. Some of these rumors are being circu-

lated by appropriate German offices. The success of our invasion of the Isles

depends very much on the achievement of tactical surprise. Therefore, it is useful

to keep Churchill and his circles in ignorance of our precise plans.

A worsening of the relations between our countries to include armed con-

flict is the only way for the English to save themselves, and I assure you that

they will continue efforts in this direction with their characteristic slyness and

craftiness. . . .

For a final solution of what to do with this bankrupt English legacy, and also

for the consolidation of the union of socialist countries and the establishment of

a new world order, I would like very much to meet personally with you. I have

spoken about this with Messrs. Molotov and Dekanozov.

Unfortunately, as you will well understand, an exceptional workload pre-

vents me from arranging our meeting until the smashing of England. Therefore, I

propose to plan for this meeting at the end of June–beginning of July 1941 and

would be happy if this meets with your agreement and understanding.

Sincerely yours,

Adolf Hitler

May ∞∂, ∞Ω∂∞

Dear Mr. Stalin,

I am writing this letter at the moment of having finally concluded that it will

be impossible to achieve a lasting peace in Europe, not for us, not for future

generations, without the final shattering of England and her destruction as a

state. As you well know, I long ago made the decision to carry out a series of

military measures to achieve this goal.

The closer the hour of a decisive battle, however, the larger the number of

problems I face. For the mass of the German people, no war is popular, especially

not a war against England, because the German people consider the English a

fraternal people and war between them a tragic event. I will not conceal that I

have felt the same way and have several times offered England humane peace

terms, taking into consideration England’s military situation. However, insulting

replies to my peace proposals and the continuing expansion by the English of the

field of military operations with the obvious intention of drawing the entire world

into war persuade me that there is no other way out of this situation except for an

invasion of the Isles and the decisive destruction of that country.

English intelligence, however, has very cleverly begun to use the concept of

‘‘fraternal peoples’’ for its own purposes, applying it to its own propaganda, not

without success.

Consequently, opposition to my decision to invade the Isles has drawn in

many elements of German society, including individual members of the higher

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APPENDIX ≤

levels of state and military leadership. You are certainly aware that one of my

deputies, Mr. Hess, in a fit of insanity, I suppose, flew to London, taking this

unbelievable action, to the best of my knowledge, to awaken the English to com-

mon sense. Judging by information in my possession, similar moods have struck

several generals of my army, particularly those who have distinguished relatives

in England descending from the same ancient, noble roots.

In this connection, a special warning is raised by the following circumstance.