What Stalin Knew (62 page)

1. RGVA, NKO Order of July 27, 1940, f. 37837, op. 4, d. 381, 51.

2. E-mail from Vyacheslav M. Lure, April 23, 2003.

3. RGVA, NKO Order of October 23, 1940, f. 37837, op. 4, d. 401, 381.

4. Alexandr N. Yakovlev, ed.,
1941 god
(Moscow, 1998), book 1, 285.

NOTES TO PAGES ∞Ω≥ – ≤≠≠

293

5. Ibid., 342–47.

6. Alexander O. Chubaryan and Harold Shukman,
Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War,

1939–1940
(London, 2002), 39–45, 122–27.

7. Smushkevich had been the senior Soviet air forces adviser in Spain and, despite

Moscow’s admonition that he was sent to Spain to lead not to fly, managed to shoot down a

few German Messerschmidts. The name he used in Spain, ‘‘General Douglas,’’ was well

known to those from Göring’s level down to kids in the streets of Madrid. When he returned

from Spain, he was greeted as a hero. But Stalin and Voroshilov thought his patronymic,

Vulfovich, was a bit too Jewish for a senior Soviet military leader. (Smushkevich was

indeed Jewish, the son of a village tailor). The patronymic was accordingly changed to

Vladimirovich. After performing to Zhukov’s satisfaction at Khalkin Gol, he returned to

Moscow to become head of the Red Army’s air forces.

8. Rychagov distinguished himself as a fighter pilot in the Spanish civil war, then led

a Soviet air unit in China against the Japanese. In the summer of 1938 he headed the air

forces of the Far Eastern Front in their battles with the Japanese at Lake Khasan. In the

Finnish war he commanded the air forces of the Ninth Army, after which he became chief

of the Main Directorate of Aviation of the Red Army. Of course, his rapid rise to that

position at the tender age of twenty-eight did not endear him to many of his contempo-

raries, but those who had served with him in Spain and China held him in special esteem.

9. Vyacheslav Rumiantsey, ed.,
Khronos,
http:/ www.hrono.ru/biograf/rychagov.html

(accessed October 13, 2004).

10. Chubaryan and Shukman,
Stalin,
140, 144.

11. A. Ostrovsky, ‘‘Sov. Sekretno. Osobo Interesno,’’
Sovietsky Voin,
September 1990,

65–71.

12. Stanislav Gribanov,
Zalozhniki Vremeni
(Moscow, 1992), 159.

13. I. I. Basik et al., eds.,
Glavny Voenny Soviet
(Moscow, 2004), 202–49, 423.

14. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2, 54–56.

15. Dmitri Volkogonov,
Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy
(Rocklin, 1996), 375. The pho-

tocopy of the Timoshenko memorandum to Stalin between pp. 260–61 is unusually clear

and sharp.

16. O. F. Suvenirov,
Tragedia RKKA, 1937–1938
(Moscow, 1998), 381.

17. A. A. Pechenkin, ‘ Vozdushny As, Nachalnik Voennoi Razvedki, ‘Zagovorshchik,’ ’

Voenno-Isorichesky Zhurnal,
no. 1, 2004, 32.

18. Aleksandr Bondarenko, ‘ Aviatsia Prodolzhaet Otstavat’, ’
Krasnaia Zvezda,
Febru-

ary 19, 2002.

19. Pechenkin, ‘ Vozdushny As,’’ 32.

20. Suvenirov,
Tragedia RKKA,
398.

21. AP RF, op. 24, d. 378, 203.

22. Ibid., 202.

23. Http://stalin.memo.ru/spiski/pg15202.htm.

24. AP RF, op. 24, d. 378, 199.

25. A. A. Pechenkin, ‘‘Cherny Den Krasnoy Army,’’
Novoe Voennoe Obozrenie,
Febru-

ary 21, 2003. Mikheev had served in the special departments of the NKVD before a military

counterintelligence directorate was established within the Defense Commissariat. The ar-

rangement lasted until July 1941, when military counterintelligence was returned to the

NKVD. Mikheev was killed in action with the Southwest Front in September 1941. See S. V.

Stepashin,
Organy Gosudarstvennoy Bezopastnost: SSSR V Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voine

(Moscow, 1995), book 1, 231.

26. Pechenkin, ‘‘Cherny.’’ See also Suvenirov,
Tragedia RKKA,
81.

27. AP RF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 378, 201, 199, 204, 203.

294

NOTES TO PAGES ≤≠≠ – ≠∫

28. Ibid., 199.

29. Suvenirov,
Tragedia RKKA,
376. See also Aleksandr Utkin, ‘‘Vse Nachalos s Avi-

audarov,’’
Novoe Voennoe Obozrenie,
no. 2, 2001, 1, and Vyacheslav Rumiantsev, ed.,
Khro-

nos,
http://www.hrono.ru/biograf/shtern.html (accessed October 13, 2004).

30. Boris L. Vannikov, ‘‘Zapiski Narkoma,’’
Znamia,
1988, nos. 1 and 2.

31. Suvenirov,
Tragedia RKKA,
381. See also Nadezhda Shunevich, http://www.facts

.Kiev.ua/April2002/1604/05.htm, and N. G. Kuznetsov, ‘‘Krutye Povoroty: Iz Zapisok Admi-

rala,’’ http://glavkom.narod.ru/kruto10.htm.

32. Basik et al.,
Glavny,
345–54.

33. AP RF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 378, 197; Suvenirov,
Tragedia RKKA,
376.

34. A. Ostrovsky, ‘‘Sov. Sekretno. Osobo Interesno,’’
Sovietsky Voin,
September 1990, 71.

35. RGVA, f. 37976, op. 1, d. 523, 74.

36. Pechenkin, ‘‘Cherny.’’

Chapter ≤≠: On the Eve

1. A. Ostrovsky, ‘‘Sov. Sekretno. Osobo Interesno,’’
Sovietsky Voin,
September 1990, 71.

2. Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, ed.,
1941 god
(Moscow, 1998), book 2, 383.

3. Vladimir Petrov,
June 22, 1941
(Columbia, 1968), 204.

4. Harrison E. Salisbury,
The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad
(New York, 1969), 15.

5. F. Volkov, ‘‘The Coded Messages Sat in the Archives,’’
Krasnaia Zvezda,
Decem-

ber 23, 1989, 4.

6. S. V. Stepashin, ed.,
Organy Gosudarstvennoy Bezopastnosti SSSR v Velikoy Ote-

chestvennoy Voine
(Moscow, 1995), book 2, 252–53. See also V. A. Zolotarev and G. N.

Sevostianov, eds.,
Velikaia Otechestvennaia Voina, 1941–1945
(Moscow, 1998), book 1, 114.

7. A. N. Mertsalov and L. A. Mertsalova,
Stalinizm i Voina
(Moscow, 1994), 247.

8. Ostrovsky, ‘‘Sov. Sekretno,’’ 71. As a result of Proskurov’s order, none of the Sev-

enth Army’s aircraft were damaged when the Germans attacked.

9. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2, 382–83.

10. Ibid., 298–301. See also Roy A. Medvedev, ‘‘I.V. Stalin v Pervye Dni Velikoy Ote-

chestvennoy Voiny,’’
Novaia I Noveishaia Istoria,
March–April 2002, 118.

11. Stepashin,
Organy,
249–50.

12. Eduard Sharapov, ‘‘One Hundred Hours until War,’
Krasnaia Zvezda,
June 22,

1994. See also E. M. Primakov and V. A. Kirpichenko,
Ocherki Istory Rossyskoy Vneshnei

Razvedki
(Moscow, 1997), vol. 3, 452.

13. Primakov and Kirpichenko,
Ocherki,
vol. 3, 452. It is doubtful that Yelena Modr-

zhinskaia was in this group. She was in Warsaw with her husband, Petr I. Gudimovich,

NKGB resident under Soviet property official cover. They did not return to Moscow until

after the war began.

14. Ibid.

15. Stepashin,
Organy,
254–64. See Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2, 333, for Merkulov’s

instructions to Fitin for using a June 5, 1941, Belorussian NKGB report in a summary

information report to the CC VKP(b).

16. Primakov and Kirpichenko,
Ocherki,
338–54. Among the other advances by Ger-

many’s defense industries on which Lehmann reported were tank transporters, self-

propelled artillery, production of all-metal fighters on conveyor belts, and large-scale pro-

duction of submarines (Teodor Gladkov, http:/ www.avtoradio.ru/?an=arweek&uid=26016

[accessed June 15, 2004]).

17. Primakov and Kirpichenko,
Ocherki,
348. The SVR history is silent on what hap-

NOTES TO PAGES ≤≠Ω – ≤≠

295

pened to this report. The statement that Lehmann’s report was considered ‘‘false and a

provocation’’ appears p. 454 of A. Kolpakidi and D. Prokhorov’s
Vneshniaia Razvedka Rossii

(Moscow, 2001). The Lehmann report does not appear in
1941 god,
which means that it was

not among the documents Russian intelligence and security archivists gave the compilers.

According to Igor A. Damaskin, a retired SVR colonel, because the report was sent via

Ambassador Dekanozov’s channel, it is not in SVR archives and either had been lost or was

destroyed by Beria (
Stalin i Razvedka
[Moscow, 2004], 263, 264]).

18. Memorandum, Hqs Region XI CIC to Hqs 66th CIC Detachment, November 28,

1949. Declassified April 28, 2004, under Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, PL 105-246.

19. Aleksandr Chudodeev, ‘‘Chelovek iz ‘Gruppy Ya,’ ’
Itogi,
July 5, 2001.

20. Primakov and Kirpichenko,
Ocherki,
366. See also p. 423 for a June 22 NKGB

report from London, the source of which was probably a member of the Cambridge Five

with access to British intelligence. The report confirmed the Ostvald report and noted the

presence of two German infantry divisions in the Rovaniemi area, with a third en route

from Oslo.

21. Primakov and Kirpichenko,
Ocherki,
380.

22. Ibid., 398–99.

23. Golikov’s article appeared in
International Affairs,
October 10, 1969.

24. Primakov and Kirpichenko,
Ocherki,
399.

25. David M. Glantz,
Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War

(Lawrence, 1998), 25, 26. See also Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2, 215–20, 280.

26. Glantz,
Stumbling Colossus,
103.

27. Primakov and Kirpichenko,
Ocherki,
341, 346.

28. Medvedev, ‘‘I. V. Stalin,’’ 118.

29. Zolotarev and Sevostianov,
Velikaia,
120.

30. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2, 376–77.

31. Ibid., 387–88; 392–93.

32. Ibid., 413–14. See also William J. Spahr,
Zhukov: The Rise and Fall of a Great

Captain
(Novato, 1993), 53–54.

33. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2, 422.

34. Ibid., 495–96. Mikoyan’s account offers another example of the problem of ac-

cepting the Kremlin visitor lists as wholly accurate. The log for June 21 does not include

Mikoyan yet it is quite evident that he was present with other Politburo members that

evening.

35. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2, 604.

36. Zolotarev and Sevostianov,
Velikaia,
129.

37. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2, 423.

38. Ibid., 300.

Chapter ≤∞: A Summer of Torture

1. ‘‘Moskve Krichali o Voine,’’
Voenno-Istorichesky Zhurnal,
June 1994, 24.

2. Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, ed.,
1941 god
(Moscow, 1998), book 2, 432.

3. John Erickson,
The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin’s War with Germany
(New Haven,

1999), 124. See also Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2, 431; for reasons unknown, this version of

Directive No. 2 omits the sentence in the first paragraph ordering troops not to cross the

frontier without special authorization.

4. Viktor Anfilov,
Doroga k Tragedii Sorok Pervogo Goda
(Moscow, 1997), 244–45.

5. Yakovlev,
1941 god,
book 2, 495–96.

296

NOTES TO PAGES ≤≤≠ – ≤π

6. P. N. Kryshevsky, ed.,
Skrytaia Pravda Voiny: 1941 God
(Moscow, 1992), 51–58.

7. William J. Spahr,
Zhukov: The Rise and Fall of a Great Captain
(Novato, 1993), 53–56.

8. Kryshevsky,
Skrytaia Pravda Voiny,
149.

9. Dmitri Volkogonov,
Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy
(Rocklin, 1996), 190. See also

Mikhail Boltunov, ‘‘Komandarma Arestoval Ofitsera GRU,’’
Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obo-

zrenie,
No. 43, 2003, 7. This article is based on notes made by the late Colonel General

Khadzhi-Umar Dzh. Mamsurov, a GRU sabotage specialist who had served in Spain and

was ordered by Voroshilov in July 1941 to arrest Pavlov. Boltunov suggests that Pavlov

was not a ‘‘victim of circumstances’’ or ‘‘scapegoat’’ for ‘‘Stalin’s shortsightedness with

regard to the Fascist regime,’’ that his fate was due to his own shortcomings. The article

reflects the continuing controversy in Russia over Stalin’s responsibility for Soviet losses in

the war.

10. V. A. Zolotarev and G. N. Sevostianov, eds.,
Velikaia Otechestvennaia Voina, 1941–

1945
(Moscow, 1998), book 1, 137. See also Anfilov,
Doroga,
226. As for the reasons for

Kopets’s suicide, it should be remembered that he was a Spanish civil war volunteer who

appeared to be close to the leadership and on his way up. He was the head of the April 1940

discussion session on the Finnish campaign in which Ivan I. Proskurov and Stalin clashed.

He must have been aware of the recent arrests of air force officers with Spanish civil war

service, and he may well have feared retribution by Stalin and Beria. His replacement, A. I.

Taiursky, is reported to have been arrested along with other air force officers. See L. L.

Batekhin,
Vozdushnaia Moshch Rodiny
(Moscow, 1988), 204.

11. Anfilov,
Doroga,
225–26. Chernykh was also a Spanish civil war volunteer pilot.

12. See Volkogonov,
Stalin,
193.

13. Spahr,
Zhukov,
54. See also Zolotarev and Sevostianov,
Velikaia,
146.

14. Zolotarev and Sevostianov,
Velikaia,
149.