What Stalin Knew (35 page)

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for ammunition. Hungary has permitted Germany to use part of its

airfields. All of Romania’s troops and military equipment have been

placed at the disposal of the German command.

c. A Yugoslav military attaché declares that, after solving the Balkan

question, it is difficult to know where the Germans will direct their

attacks, but he is personally convinced that this will precede an inva-

sion of the USSR. The very fact that the Germans are now at the

Dardenelles is a direct act against the USSR. In general, Hitler has

never changed his program, outlined in the book
Mein Kampf,
and

that program is his basic goal for war. Hitler uses friendship as a

means of attaining the possibility of solving the task of reconstruct-

ing Europe.

d. From the reporting of our military attaché on March 14, there are

persistent rumors circulating in Romania that Germany has changed

its strategic war plan. A German major said to our source, ‘ We are

completely changing our plan.
We are moving east, to the USSR. We

will take from the USSR grain, coal, oil.
Then we will be invincible and

can continue war with England and America.’’ Colonel Rioshanu, a

friend of the Romanian defense minister told our source in a personal

conversation that the
main staff of the Romanian army, together with

the Germans, is busy working out a plan for war with the USSR, the

beginning of which should be expected in three months.
The Germans

are afraid of an action by the USSR the moment they go into Turkey.

Wishing to prevent danger from the USSR, the Germans want to take

the initiative and strike the first blow, seizing the most important

economic regions of USSR. The first of these is the Ukraine.

e.
According to a report from our military attaché in Berlin, from in-

formation of a fully trustworthy source, the beginning of military

operations against the USSR should be expected between May 15 and

June 15, 1941.

These points were followed by two conclusions: ‘‘1. On the basis of all

of the opinions cited above and possible versions of actions in the spring of

this year, I consider that the most likely date for the beginning of actions

against the USSR will be the moment of victory over England or the con-

clusion of an honorable peace for Germany. 2. Rumors and documents

speaking of the inevitability of war this spring against the USSR must be

rated as disinformation coming from English and even, perhaps, from

German intelligence.29

Golikov’s March 20 doklad was probably the worst intelligence docu-

ment he produced during his service as chief of the RU. It bore no relation-

ship to reality. It was intended to appease Stalin, to reassure him that his

view of Hitler’s intentions was correct and that Germany would not go

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159

to war until after the defeat of England. This is why Golikov labeled all

reporting to the contrary as British or German deception. He cited only a

very few of the agent reports or union republic NKGB summaries that

specifically predicted a German invasion, instead carefully assembling

those reports that confirmed the Stalinist view. Were these among the ones

that Stalin pointed to when he told Timoshenko and Zhukov that he had

his own documents?

Golikov’s reports continued up to the day of the invasion. An April 4,

1941, special report documented the steady movement of German troops

to the East during March; it was distributed to the military, including

Timoshenko, Zhukov, Meretskov, and Nikolai F. Vatutin.30 An April 16 spe-

cial report documenting movement between April 1 and April 15 was the

first one to note the arrival of river-crossing equipment in the area south-

east of Brest-Litovsk, but the implications were not discussed.31

Golikov’s May 5, 1941, special report conceded an increase in the num-

ber of German divisions in the Soviet border zone (from 70 to 107) and

predicted a further increase as troops were brought back from operations

in Greece and Yugoslavia. The report still insisted that the Germans had

sufficient troops to develop operations against England in the Near East,

Spain, and North Africa.32

A May 15 special report continued in the same vein: ‘‘The regrouping

of German troops in the first half of May was characterized by continuing

strengthening of those against the USSR along the entire western and

southwestern borders, including Romania. It was also characterized by a

further strengthening of forces for action against England in the Near

East, Africa, and Norway.’’ The report noted that ‘‘according to recent in-

formation, four to five divisions are preparing for movement through

Spain to carry out operations against Gibraltar.’’ It appears that neither

Golikov nor his head of the Information Department, Dronov, heard of the

meeting between Hitler and Franco on the Franco-Spanish border on Oc-

tober 23, 1940, in which Franco turned down all of Hitler’s suggestions for

military cooperation.33

This special report claimed eight to ten German parachute divisions,

with one division or two in Greece, five to six divisions on the coast of

France and Belgium, and two divisions within Germany. This was totally

inaccurate information. As of May 15, the Luftwaffe’s only parachute divi-

sion, the Seventh, was preparing its three parachute regiments and one air

landing (glider) regiment for an attack on Crete. (The assault was orig-

inally planned for May 17, but it was postponed to May 19 and finally took

160

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place on May 20.) The British, with their access to ULTRA, were fore-

warned of the attack plans. As a result, even though the Germans even-

tually succeeded in capturing Crete, the Seventh Division suffered heavily,

causing Hitler to abandon this approach to land warfare. Why did the RU

persist in listing eight to ten airborne divisions (including five to six on the

coast of France and Belgium) in its German order of battle? The only

logical answer lies in Stalin’s conviction that Hitler still intended to invade

England. Airborne divisions would be essential for such an operation, the

reasoning went. Golikov, therefore, obligingly made five to six divisions

available.34

The allocation of German divisions in the May 15 RU special report

formed the basis for the section on enemy forces contained in the famous

mid-May plan entitled ‘‘Considerations of a Plan for the Strategic Deploy-

ment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a War with

Germany and Its Allies.’’ The first paragraph of this document read: ‘‘At

present, Germany (according to information from the Intelligence Direc-

torate of the Red Army) has deployed around 230 infantry, 22 tank, 20

motorized, 8 airborne, and 4 cavalry divisions—about 284 divisions. Of

these, as of May 15, there were up to 86 infantry divisions, 13 tank, 12

motorized, and 1 cavalry—a total of 112 divisions—concentrated on the

borders of the Soviet Union. It is assumed that under certain political

conditions, Germany could, in the event of an attack on the USSR, array

against us up to 137 infantry, 19 tank, 15 motorized, and 5 airborne divi-

sions, for a total of 180 [
sic
] divisions.’’ The remaining 104 German divi-

sions were allocated as in the May 15 special report, including 40 infantry,

2 cavalry, 1 tank and 2 airborne divisions in Denmark, Belgium, Holland,

and France.

The author of these ‘‘considerations’’ gives these reasons for proposing

a new strategic deployment: ‘‘Inasmuch as Germany at the present time

holds its army mobilized, with rear services deployed, it has the capacity to

precede us in deployment and to deliver a surprise attack. In order to

prevent that (and destroy the German army), I consider it necessary that in

no case should we give the initiative for action to the German command.

We should preempt the enemy in deployment and attack the German army

at that moment when it will be in a stage of deployment and will not yet

have succeeded in organizing the front and the coordination of arms and

services.’’ This plan, although prepared for the signatures of Timoshenko

and Zhukov, was apparently never signed and was rejected by Stalin. In

any case, it was totally unrealistic. The three German army groups were

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161

moving into position, and communications plans within these formations

were well advanced. Those troops designated to form the lead elements

would begin their movement to their jump-off areas on June 10.35

A May 31, 1941, special report continued to emphasize German opera-

tions against England. Among actions undertaken by the German com-

mand in the second half of May with forces released from the Balkans, the

first cited was ‘‘renewal of the western groupings for the struggle against

England.’’ An ‘‘increase in the strength of the forces against the USSR’’

came second. The number of divisions earmarked for action on all fronts

against England totaled 122 to 126, while those against the USSR totaled

120 to 122. The penultimate paragraph reported: ‘‘As far as the front

against England is concerned, the German command . . . [is] continuing

concurrently its movement of troops to Norway, . . . having in view the

execution of the main operation against the British Isles.’’ This assertion

was pure poppycock. By May 31 evidence existed that the increase in

German forces in Norway was most likely related to German-Finnish co-

operation in planning for war against the USSR. This Golikov report, with

its deliberate distortions concerning England, was also disseminated by

name to Timoshenko and Zhukov, plus others on the normal dissemina-

tion list.36

On June 5, 1941, Golikov issued a special report on Romanian prepa-

rations for war, ending with this sentence: ‘‘Officers of the Romanian gen-

eral staff are insistent in declaring that, in accordance with an unofficial

declaration of Antonescu, war between Romania and the USSR should

begin soon.’’ A June 7 special report on the same subject stated that new

mobilization measures could bring the Romanian army to a strength of

one million men and thirty divisions. Both reports went to Timoshenko

and Zhukov.37

The latter report covered increases in Poland on the Soviet border and

concluded: ‘‘Considering Romanian mobilization as a means of strength-

ening Germany’s right flank in Europe, SPECIAL ATTENTION must be

paid to the continued strengthening of German troops on Polish territory.’’

Do these capital letters signify growing concern within the RU?

∞∏

C H A P T E R

‘‘We Do Not Fire on German

Aircraft in Peacetime’’

Notwithstanding intelligence reports describing

the buildup of German troops along the Soviet borders, there was an even

more serious threat. That one, too, affected the border areas but now it was

in the skies above them. Very probably the single greatest error committed

by Stalin between the summer of 1940 and June 22, 1941, was his deci-

sion to allow the Luftwaffe freedom to conduct unlimited reconnaissance

flights over the Soviet Union. Fearing that preventive action by Soviet air

defenses would ‘‘provoke’’ Hitler, he issued strict orders against it. He

would not change his views even after Soviet intelligence provided him

with precise evidence that the flights were part of a German program to

procure aerial photographs of Soviet fortifications, troop installations, air-

fields, and communications and supply facilities throughout the entire

theater of impending operations. Because of Stalin’s misjudgment, Soviet

losses in the early hours of the war were magnified as German bombers

systematically destroyed each of the targets reconnaissance had identified,

including the aircraft of the border military districts.

The leadership of the Red Army understood the importance of defend-

ing Soviet airspace against hostile reconnaissance. It understood, too, the

need to protect its aircraft from destruction so as to provide its ground

forces the support they would require in the event of war. At a conference

of senior Red Army commanders held in Moscow on December 23–31,

1940, Defense Commissar Timoshenko declared that the ‘‘decisive effect of

‘‘WE DO NOT FIRE ON GERMAN AIRCRAFT’’

163

aviation [in offensive operations] lies not in raids on the enemy’s rear but

in coordinated action with troops on the field of battle.’’1 The commander

of the Kiev Special Military District and future chief of the general staff,

General Georgy K. Zhukov, also emphasized the role of aviation: ‘‘Army