What Stalin Knew (36 page)

commanders and their chiefs of air forces should take special care not to

permit their aviation to be destroyed at their airfields. The best means of

doing this is a surprise attack by our aviation on the airfields of the enemy

and the dispersed disposition of our aviation on airfields with camouflaged

equipment and antiaircraft defenses.’’2

The role of aviation was further amplified by Pavel V. Rychagov, chief

of Red Army air forces, who outlined these tasks for air units in a war: gain

air superiority, cooperate with the troops on the battlefield, protect the

troops, act against the operational/strategic reserves and rear services of

the enemy, provide intelligence based on aerial reconnaissance, and en-

sure the success of parachute drops and airborne landings if they are

employed. Rychagov cautioned that ‘‘basing of the large numbers of air-

craft required to accomplish these tasks demands a well-developed net-

work of airfields, and at each airfield on average there should be no more

than twenty-five aircraft.’’3 While a consensus certainly existed on these

issues within the Red Army leadership, actions to support that consensus

were almost totally lacking. It would not be until June 19, 1941, for exam-

ple, that a decree of the Council of People’s Commissars and the Central

Committee VKP(b), would call for ‘‘camouflage of aircraft, runways, tents,

and airfield equipment.’’4

Basing was especially problematic in the western border districts,

where forty-eight of the Red Army’s seventy air divisions were located in

1941. These units were expected to bear the brunt of the Luftwaffe’s antici-

pated effort to achieve air superiority. The poor condition and unsuitable

locations of the air units in the border districts made it much easier for the

Germans to succeed. Many Soviet airfields were only ten to thirty kilome-

ters from the frontier. Fighter aircraft and bombers were often based at the

same airfield. Takeoff while under attack was made difficult by the large

number of aircraft jammed together. Many air regiments had just received

new aircraft, but this meant that both new and old planes were crowded

onto the same fields; moreover, there were not enough pilots to man all

these aircraft. In the Baltic Military District, 118 aircraft were without

aircrews; in the Western Special Military Districts, the number was 430,

and in Kiev 342. Antiaircraft systems were weak, and camouflage mea-

sures had not yet been carried out. In the Baltic Military District, air

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units received orders to conduct training flights over the night of June 21–

22; as a result, the majority of bomber regiments were in the midst of

postflight inspection and refueling—their pilots having been released to

sleep—when the Luftwaffe attacked them. In the Western Special Military

District, fighter planes were dispersed along the entire length of the border.

The Ninth Mixed Aviation Division, which had just received 262 MIG 1s

and MIG 3s, was particularly close to the border; 420 new PE-2 bombers

were assigned to the bomber regiments of the Ninth and Eleventh Mixed

Aviation Divisions. The aircrews were just beginning to master these new

aircraft.

At 11:00 p.m. on June 21, enemy saboteurs cut the telephone wires

between the Western Special Military District’s air force headquarters and

its air divisions and their regiments. The situation was made worse by the

lack of contact with the service of air observation, warning, and communi-

cations (VNOS), which had yet to begin to function effectively. The air

forces of the Kiev Special Military District were also unprepared. Because

VNOS was not working properly, aviation units based on fields close to the

border did not receive warnings in time.5 At the December 1940 confer-

ence, the problems of VNOS had briefly been addressed by Filipp I. Goli-

kov, chief of military intelligence, who pointed out its importance, noting

that an advancing mechanized corps, for example, could be wiped out by

enemy dive bombers unless it received warning of their approach. There

were not enough VNOS posts to guarantee early warning, and those that

existed were badly trained and equipped. Their sole means of communica-

tions was telephone lines; they did not possess radios. German early warn-

ing systems, Golikov observed, were far superior to those of the Red Army.6

Despite general agreement at the December 1940 conference on what

was needed to upgrade the aviation components of the border military

districts, little was done, and what was done was done badly. In fact, it was

the Germans who appear to have implemented on their side of the border

the very programs the conference speakers prescribed. For example, they

repaired and modernized existing Polish airfields and constructed new

fields and landing strips, many with underground facilities for fuel and

munitions storage. To compound the problem, aerial photoreconnais-

sance, conducted over many months, enabled the Germans to observe

Soviet efforts to improve their frontal aviation posture. The Luftwaffe’s

surprise attack delivered massive blows to Soviet forward airfields with

great precision, depriving Soviet ground forces of air support when they

needed it most.

‘‘WE DO NOT FIRE ON GERMAN AIRCRAFT’’

165

Incidents of German overflights of Soviet territory were detected as

early as September 1939 but were probably not considered a serious prob-

lem. The border between the USSR and German-occupied Poland was

initially a military demarcation line, and German pilots could easily justify

losing their way. By early 1940, however, Soviet border troops had settled

down along the new frontier and begun to act against these overflights,

which had taken on the character of organized aerial reconnaissance. On

February 10, 1940, a German aircraft entered Soviet airspace to a depth of

two kilometers. Border troops opened fire with machine guns and the

aircraft returned to German territory. On February 11 there were three

more incidents, the last one involving the return flight of one of the air-

craft. Here again the border troops opened fire and the aircraft disap-

peared into German airspace.7 The situation worsened on March 17, when

a flight of thirty-two German aircraft, both fighters and bombers, entered

Soviet airspace in the area of the Eighty-sixth Border Troop Detachment in

the Western Special Military District. A border guard unit opened fire on

the aircraft as they were returning. An aircraft was hit and came down fifty

meters from the border; one crewman was killed and a second fatally

wounded. In reporting the incident, the Belorussian border troop district

noted that there had already been twelve violations of Soviet airspace

in that region alone since December 1939. In one case, a Soviet fighter

crashed trying to force a German aircraft to land. The Soviet pilot was

killed. The report concluded with a request that instructions be given to

border troops in the event of continuing violations of Soviet airspace. The

NKVD USSR brought the matter to Stalin’s attention. As if to underline the

urgency of the problem, another incident occurred in the area of the Kiev

Special Military District on March 19. Five German aircraft described as

reconnaissance types crossed the border and headed east. Soviet fighters

scrambled but reported they could not find the Germans. The headquar-

ters of the Sixth Army reported the aircraft as having landed on Soviet

territory. It turned out that one aircraft had run out of fuel, tried to land,

and was damaged; the other four landed safely and their pilots explained

that they were on a training flight, had lost their bearings, and were low on

fuel. The incident was reported to Beria by the NKVD deputy responsible

for troops, Ivan I. Maslennikov.8

It did not take long for Stalin to react. On March 29, 1940, Beria is-

sued NKVD Directive No. 102 to all border troop districts on the western

frontier: ‘‘(1) In case of violations of the Soviet-German border by Ger-

man aircraft or balloons, do not open fire. Limit yourselves to preparing

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a report on the violation of the state frontier. (2) Immediately lodge an

oral and written protest on each border violation with the appropriate

representative of the German command concerned with border service.

(3) Chiefs of border troops must take measures to present to the Chief

Directorate of Border Troops not only urgent reports but also documents

and all correspondence relating to violations of the state frontier.’’9

Apparently unconvinced that the directive would stop the trigger-

happy border troops from provoking the Germans, Beria followed up on

April 5 with a new order regarding the use of firearms anywhere on the

Soviet-German frontier. This order annulled a 1938 order calling on bor-

der troops to fire on border violators without concern for whether their

bullets fell on ‘‘the territory of a neighboring nation.’’ Now border troops

would ‘‘strictly see to it that bullets do not fall on German territory.’’ In the

event, thousands of heavily armed saboteurs and diversionists entered the

western oblasts and republics in the period leading up to the invasion, and

numerous firefights erupted as border troops tried to intercept them.

Where the order was not ignored, many of the intruders succeeded. It is

clear, therefore, why, on the night of June 21–22, 1941, they managed to

cut hundreds of the telephone lines in the western military districts.10

Violations of Soviet airspace continued throughout 1940. On May 26

Vasily A. Khomenko, chief of the Border Troops Directorate of the NKVD

Ukrainian SSR, reported on Germans photographing Soviet border zones,

particularly their road nets.11 Border troop commanders complained that

‘‘the recent orders to the border troops and Red Army covering forces have

reduced their role to that of passive observers whose protests are ignored.

German representatives admit to the violations and promise to report

them but nothing happens. The overflights continue more persistently

than ever.’’12

Obsessed with the idea that if he did not provoke Hitler there would be

no war, Stalin disregarded these complaints. In fact, on June 10, 1940, a

Soviet-German convention was signed on ‘‘Procedures for Regulating Bor-

der Conflicts and Incidents’’ that virtually invited the Germans to continue

their aerial reconnaissance without fear of possible consequences. Accord-

ing to point 5, article 5, of the convention, ‘‘in the event of a border viola-

tion, officials of one side or the other will initiate an investigation. If it is

determined that the border crossing (overflight) was unintentional (loss of

orientation, malfunction of the aircraft, lack of fuel, etc.), the person cross-

ing or flying over the border is subject to immediate return.’’ For the next

year, these procedures imposed serious restraints on Soviet border troops,

‘‘WE DO NOT FIRE ON GERMAN AIRCRAFT’’

167

Red Army units, and interceptor aircraft. At the same time, they embold-

ened the Luftwaffe not only to increase the number of overflights but

actually to land at Soviet airdromes for a closer look at their facilities and

aircraft.13

NKVD deputy Ivan I. Maslennikov signed over fifteen reports on air-

space violations between March and December 19, 1940. These reports

were normally sent to Stalin, Molotov, and Timoshenko. On only one occa-

sion that we are aware of did a military district try to adhere to an order,

issued back in January 1940 and sanctioned by Aleksandr M. Vasilevsky of

the General Staff Operational Directorate, to open fire immediately on any

aircraft violating Soviet airspace. On April 20 a brigade commander on

Maslennikov’s staff telephoned the Belorussian Special Military District

(BOVO) to inquire whether the district had received the NKVD order of

March 29. He didn’t get an answer; instead, the BOVO colonel to whom he

was speaking announced that, after the NKVD order was issued, BOVO

had checked with the general staff to see if the January order was still in

force. A written confirmation was received, signed by Deputy Chief of the

General Staff I. V. Smorodinov. There is nothing further available on this

question, but it seems unlikely that resistance to the March 29, 1940, order

continued.14 It is known that, in his reports on German violations of Soviet

airspace, Maslennikov began inserting this ritual phrase: ‘‘The aircraft

were not fired on.’’ Diplomatic protest was unsuccessful. On October 26,

1940, for example, Andrei Vyshinsky, deputy commissar for foreign affairs,

presented an aide memoire to Ambassador von Schulenburg describing