What Stalin Knew (9 page)

1939 Stalin could not foresee how quickly Hitler would overrun Western

Europe, but he clung to his view that Germany would not attack the USSR

in 1941 and never abandoned his hope that Hitler would deal with En-

gland first before launching such an attack.10

As late as May 5, 1941, there were still echoes, in a speech Stalin gave

to the graduates of military academies, of his fascination with Lenin’s view

of war as the midwife to revolution. In the wake of the speech, the Red

28

PROSKUROV SETS STALIN STRAIGHT

Army’s Chief Directorate for Political Propaganda began work on a new

Red Army Political Handbook (
Krasnoarmeiski Polituchebnik
). This hand-

book contained the following statements:

If, as a result of war, a situation arises in some countries whereby

a revolutionary crisis ripens and the power of the bourgeoisie is

weakened, the USSR will go to war against capitalism, to the aid of

proletarian revolution. Lenin said, ‘‘As soon as we are strong enough

to crush capitalism, we will immediately grab it by the scruff of

the neck.’’

If the USSR had gone along with England and France, there is

no doubt that the German military machine would have been turned

against the Soviet Union.

The possibility is not excluded that the USSR, in situations

that might develop, will take the initiative of offensive military

operations.

The new handbook was reviewed by members of the Main Military

Council on June 10, 1941, and these paragraphs (from pages 149, 152, and

155) were excised.11

On September 17, 1939, the Red Army began the occupation of the

western regions of Belorussia and Ukraine. The impact of these and other

territorial acquisitions will be examined in the next chapter.

∂

C H A P T E R

Soviet Borders Move

Westward

Historians have largely subscribed to the theory

that by recovering the borderlands lost to Russia after World War I and

moving Soviet frontiers westward, the USSR improved its defensive pos-

ture. This was not entirely true. By incorporating parts of Romania and

Poland into the Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Moldavian union republics

and absorbing the Baltic States, Soviet security and military forces had to

contend with intensely hostile populations. Ukrainian and Belorussian

nationalists aided German intelligence in espionage operations before

June 1941 and served as saboteurs in the early hours and days of the

war, destroying Red Army communications and other facilities. So did the

Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians (most of the military units of those

states integrated into the Red Army were found to be quite unreliable). On

the purely military side, the Red Army did not have time to complete new

defensive positions in the new territories before June 22, and suggestions

to Stalin that the defensive structures along the old border be manned

were rejected. The restoration of areas that had been traditionally Russian

was seen by Stalin as enhancing Soviet prestige and expanding the fron-

tiers of socialism. He had little patience with professional Red Army of-

ficers such as Boris M. Shaposhnikov, chief of the general staff, who fore-

saw problems in defending these newly acquired areas. He was content to

let Beria and his minions deal harshly with their anti-Soviet populations.

The speed of the German advance into Poland allegedly took Stalin

30

SOVIET BORDERS MOVE WESTWARD

by surprise and it was not until September 17, 1939, that he released a

statement blaming the Poles for leaving defenseless ‘‘its kindred Ukrainian

and Belorussian people’’ and announcing the Red Army’s entry into Po-

land. Actually, extensive preparations had been made earlier. Therefore

Soviet forces, together with special NKVD units, had begun advancing at

5:40 a.m. that day on two fronts formed from the Belorussian and Kiev

Special Military Districts. The Belorussian Front under General Mikhail P.

Kovalev, composed of four armies, moved rapidly against little resistance.

By September 28 it was able to organize elections to a People’s Assembly

that on November 2 voted to become part of the Belorussian SSR.1

Ukrainian areas were occupied by the Ukrainian Front under Semen K.

Timoshenko. The Front had a force of the Fifth, Sixth, and Twelfth armies,

containing a total of eight infantry corps, three cavalry corps, plus a tank

corps and five tank brigades. Each army created a special mobile force

from tank and cavalry units in order to reach the demarcation line in the

shortest possible time.2 Stalin was taking no chances: even though he had

Hitler’s agreement on the territory to be occupied, the Soviet assistant

military attaché in Berlin had earlier reported a different plan. This at-

taché had been shown a Wehrmacht map placing the line east of Lvov

and Drogobych, an oil-producing area much coveted by the Germans.3 It

should have been expected, therefore, that when forward elements of the

Sixth Army arrived in the Lvov area on September 19, the Germans were

already approaching the city from the west. A firefight had ensued, result-

ing in casualties on both sides and the loss of equipment.4 Incidentally, the

Sixth Army was commanded by Filipp I. Golikov, the ‘‘politically correct’’

corps commander who in 1938 had been the political member of the Mili-

tary Council of the Belorussian Military District and in 1940 would be-

come the head of Soviet military intelligence.5 By mid-October, elections

to a People’s Assembly were held, paralleling the procedure in Belorussia.

By October 27 the assembly, sitting in Lvov, voted to become part of the

Ukrainian SSR and the union was accepted on November 15, 1939. Glow-

ing reports were received in Moscow describing the happiness of the west-

ern Ukrainians at joining the Soviet family. This one from Lev Z. Mekhlis,

chief of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, was typical: ‘‘The Ukrai-

nian population is meeting our army as true liberators. . . . As a rule, even

advance units are being met by entire populations coming out onto the

streets. Many weep with joy.’’ The youth of Drogobych said ‘‘their hearts

were filled with deep love for the great Soviet people, the Red Army, and

the Ukrainian Communist Party.’’6 These first reactions on the part of west-

SOVIET BORDERS MOVE WESTWARD

31

ern Ukrainians reflected their dislike of the Poles, who had governed them

since 1919, and their lack of experience with either the tsarist or the Soviet

government. They had, after all, been part of the Austro-Hungarian Em-

pire from the first partition of Poland in 1772 to the end of World War I.

The Soviet security forces had a more realistic view of the difficulties

they would encounter when the Belorussian and Ukrainian populations of

Poland were brought under Soviet control. On September 1, 1939, soon

after the Germans launched their attack on Poland, they began to plan for

a massive NKVD presence in the new territories. A week later, NKVD chief

Beria issued orders to Ivan S. Serov and Lavrenti F. Tsanava, the heads of

the NKVD in the Ukrainian and Belorussian SSRs, to create special Chek-

ist groups composed of operational and political workers from their own

staffs and from the border troop districts in their republics. Personnel

for these groups, approximately 500 officers, were also to be taken from

temporary assignments in the Leningrad NKVD Directorate and from the

central NKVD staff. Arrangements were made for assigning these groups

to army units in accordance with plans of the defense commissar. Serov

was directed to coordinate his activities with Ukrainian Communist Party

Secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev and with Ukrainian Front Commander

Semen K. Timoshenko. In Belorussia the same pattern was to have been

followed. Every day at 6:00 p.m. Serov and Tsanava were to report by tele-

graph on their progress. The deputy chief of the USSR NKVD for troops,

Ivan I. Maslennikov, was to place personnel of the Ukrainian and Belorus-

sian border troop districts at the disposal of the chiefs of the operational

Chekist groups; these troops were to be formed into battalions, one per

group, to carry out special tasks. Sergei N. Kruglov, NKVD deputy com-

missar, was directed to form a reserve group of 300 taken from the local

organs of the NKVD and to compile a list of the selected persons by Sep-

tember 10. Beria concluded by ordering Vsevolod N. Merkulov, his first

deputy, to the Ukrainian SSR to supervise operations there, and Viktor M.

Bochkov, chief of NKVD Special Departments, to Belorussia. By the next

day, Serov responded, noting that the required personnel were either on

hand or en route; the First and Second operational groups were already

being provided by agreement with the Kiev Special Military District. Serov

added that he was in regular contact with Khrushchev and Timoshenko.

From these communications one can see how quickly and efficiently the

NKVD functioned to create the administrative structure to support mili-

tary operations in the new territories.7

On September 15, two days before the Red Army made its move, Beria

32

SOVIET BORDERS MOVE WESTWARD

sent a directive to Serov and Tsanava explaining how and what was to be

done as Soviet forces entered former Polish territory. When Soviet troops

occupied a town, a temporary civil administration including leaders of the

NKVD operational groups was to be created. Working in close contact with

the military and under the leadership of the temporary civil administra-

tions, NKVD operatives would maintain public order, eliminate sabotage,

suppress counterrevolution, and form the nucleus of future NKVD offices

for the area. Here are some of their specific tasks:

Immediately seize all communications facilities—that is, telephone,

telegraph, radio stations, post offices—and place trusted persons

in charge. Seize all private and government banks and treasury

branches, impound all funds, and arrange for their safekeeping.

Extend all possible cooperation to political departments of the

Red Army in seizing printing presses, newspaper editorial offices,

and newsprint warehouses and start up new newspapers. Also seize

all government archives, particularly those of the intelligence and

counterintelligence services of the former Polish government.

Arrest the more reactionary representatives of the former gov-

ernment, such as local police officers, members of the gendarmerie,

border police, military intelligence officers, etc. Also arrest leaders

and active members of counterrevolutionary political parties and

organizations. Also occupy the jails, check the backgrounds of pris-

oners. Release those with records of resistance to the Polish govern-

ment, establish a new prison system staffed by reliable people and

headed by an NKVD operative.

In addition to the above measures, the NKVD component of the ad-

ministration was to deal with criminal matters and establish a reliable fire

department. Its main concern, however, was the detection and elimination

of espionage and terror, as well as sabotage, in industry and transport.

In organizing this replica of NKVD operations within the existing Soviet

Union, Stalin and Beria did not for a moment consider any other model or

allow for a period of transition. The inhabitants of the new areas were to be

transformed overnight into obedient Soviet citizens. The term
reliable peo-

ple
referred to those individuals who were already known to be anti-Polish

and pro-Soviet, some of whom had served as agents of Soviet intelligence.8

Problems in Western Ukraine

On September 19, 1939, Merkulov and Serov got their first taste of the

operational problems they would encounter in implementing Beria’s or-

SOVIET BORDERS MOVE WESTWARD

33

ders. They complained that they would need even more operational Chek-

ist groups than they had planned to create. On September 28, in an interim

report on NKVD operations, Merkulov noted that Ukrainian nationalists

such as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) exceeded all

other persons arrested in accordance with the criteria established by the

Beria order. To illustrate, Merkulov reported that of the 1,923 arrests made

by operational group 1, over 1,000 were members or activists of nationalist

organizations. He also commented on the ‘‘enormous quantity of weap-

ons’’ uncovered.9

Merkulov’s mention of the OUN should not have surprised Serov or

Khrushchev. This group had been in existence in various forms since the

collapse of the short-lived Ukrainian National Republic. Proclaimed in

January 1919 and incorporating all Ukrainian lands, including western

Ukraine, or Galicia, and those in the Carpathian Mountain area and in