“We have been unfortunate, but not disgraced,” Porter wrote to the secretary of the navy. “The defense of the
Essex
has not been less honorable to her officers and crew, than the capture of an equal force; and I now consider my situation less unpleasant than that of Commodore Hillyar, who in violation of every principle of honor and generosity, and regardless of the rights of nations, attacked the
Essex
in her crippled state, within pistol shot of a neutral shore—when for six weeks I had daily offered him fair and honorable combat, on terms greatly to his advantage; the blood of the slain must be upon his head.” Porter added that “I must in justification of myself observe that with our six twelve-pounders only we fought this action, our carronades being almost useless.”
Looking back many years later, Midshipman David Farragut, who had fought alongside the captain, had these observations about Porter’s tactics: “In the first place, I consider that our original and greatest mistake was in attempting to regain the anchorage; as, being greatly superior to the enemy in sailing qualities, I think we should have borne up and run before the wind. If the
Phoebe
caught the
Essex
, then Porter could have taken her by boarding. If Hillyar outmaneuvered the
Essex
and avoided her grasp, the
Essex
could have taken her fire and passed on, replacing her topmast as she went and sailing beyond Hillyar’s reach.” The slow-sailing
Cherub
would not have entered into the action and would have been left far behind, according to Farragut.
“Secondly,” he wrote, “it was apparent to everyone that we had no chance of success, under the circumstances, the ship should have been run ashore, throwing her broadside to the beach, to prevent raking, [and] fought as long as was consistent with humanity, and then set fire to her.”
The
Cherub
had been engaged in the battle only briefly, while
Essex Junior
, with her light armament and tiny crew of sixty, kept out of the fight entirely. Hillyar treated the survivors with great care, allowing Porter and his crew to return home on parole in the undamaged
Essex Junior
. One hundred and thirty men, including Porter, left Valparaiso on April 27. Two of the wounded were left behind.
Good weather accompanied Porter the entire way home. They rounded Cape Horn under topgallant studding sails and were off New York on July 5. Before they reached Sandy Hook, however, the British razee
Saturn
, under Captain James Nash, stopped them and, despite Hillyar’s safe-conduct pass, detained them. Porter was furious. On the spur of the moment, he left Lieutenant Downes in charge and fled in a whaleboat with a few men, rowing sixty miles to Long Island. Nash later reconsidered and released
Essex Junior.
Downes, after some additional trouble, sailed her into New York, where he was reunited with Porter. The city gave them a stupendous reception.
Lieutenant Gamble, meanwhile, had as difficult a time on Nuku Hiva as Porter did in Valparaiso. In May, Gamble barely escaped from the island after some islanders—urged on by a man named Wilson, Porter’s English interpreter, whom he found living on the island when he arrived—killed Midshipman Feltus and were about to do the same to the rest of them. Miraculously, Gamble managed to get away and sail all the way to Hawaii in the
Sir Andrew Hammond
, one of the captured whale ships, only to be caught by the
Cherub
, fresh from her triumph at Valparaiso. Gamble was eventually paroled. He finally reached the United States on August 27, 1815, long after the war was over.
Like the rest of the country, President Madison, although regretting the loss of the
Essex
and so many of her brave men, celebrated the heroism of Porter and the other survivors. Madison blamed the disaster on Captain Hillyar for attacking the
Essex
in neutral waters. Hillyar claimed that Porter violated Valparaiso’s neutrality first, but the president was determined to make Porter a hero. On September 20, 1814, in his opening message to the third session of the 13th Congress, Madison acknowledged the capture of the
Essex
, but wrote that “the loss is hidden in the blaze of heroism with which she was defended . . . till humanity tore down the colors which valor had nailed to the mast.... [Captain Porter] and his brave comrades have added much to the rising glory of the American flag, and have merited all the effusions of gratitude which their country is ever ready to bestow on the champions of its rights and of its safety.”
CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR
Burning Washington
C
OMMODORES RODGERS AND Porter, as well as Oliver Hazard Perry, were available in the summer of 1814 to help defend against Vice Admiral Cochrane’s east coast raids. It had been obvious for some time that Cochrane would concentrate on the Chesapeake Bay area, since it contained both the capital and Baltimore, the city with the largest and most bothersome privateer fleet. New York and Philadelphia were much harder to get at, and the ports of Federalist New England seemed even less likely targets. Secretary Jones positioned Rodgers, Porter, and Perry so that they could help defend whatever city Cochrane struck.
On April 4, Rear Admiral Cockburn began operations in Chesapeake Bay by establishing a forward base on Tangier Island, where he could receive escaped slaves and spread the news to others that a secure retreat awaited them. Alerted by friends, runaways watched for British barges rowing up rivers and creeks at night. Lighted candles signaled that boats were ready to take men, women, and children to safety. They came by the dozens and then the hundreds to an uncertain future. Anything was better than the hell they were experiencing, however. Cockburn’s operation was so successful that as early as the middle of June he was employing former slaves as soldiers in the small-scale, hit-and-run raids he had resumed.
Situated ten miles southeast of the Potomac, Tangier Island was also an ideal base from which to attack Washington, Annapolis, and Baltimore. Cockburn could keep an eye on Joshua Barney’s flotilla from there as well. Before attacking any of the major cities, Cockburn first had to deal with Barney. Small though they were, Barney’s row galleys were the only naval force challenging the British in the bay.
On April 26 Barney was promoted to the rank of captain in the American Flotilla Service. He had been building his fleet in Baltimore all winter. It wasn’t easy. Money was tight, as were men and resources, but by the third week in May, Barney had thirteen specially constructed galleys ready with one twelve-pounder in their bows and a single powerful carronade mounted in the stern. Each was powered primarily with oars. He also had a gunboat, a smaller galley, another smaller boat for surveillance, and the 5-gun cutter
Scorpion
, commanded by William Barney, his eldest son. The
Scorpion
was Barney’s flagship. The schooner
Asp
joined him later.
On May 24, Barney set out with his fleet for a surprise attack on Tangier Island. A few courageous merchantmen, who wanted to get to the Atlantic, accompanied him. After leaving Baltimore, they stopped at the Patuxent River and then sailed south on June 1. At nine o’clock in the morning, they ran into a strong British squadron that included the 74-gun
Dragon
, under Captain Robert Barrie; the 13-gun armed schooner
St. Lawrence
, under Commander David Boyd; and a number of smaller boats. For a brief time the
Dragon
was separated from the others, which gave Barney an opportunity to attack the rest of the squadron, but he missed it, and when the
Dragon
reappeared he retreated in a big hurry to the Patuxent, twenty-five miles north of the Potomac and sixty miles south of Baltimore. Shots were exchanged at the mouth of the river near Cedar Point, but adverse weather and general fatigue made further fighting too difficult, and both sides pulled back. The Patuxent was a safe refuge for Barney’s flotilla. His shallow draft vessels could travel forty miles upriver beyond Pig Point, where low water levels protected them from all British warships. Smaller enemy barges could get at the flotilla, but Barney was confident he could deal with them.
After the fight at Cedar Point, Cockburn went after Barney in earnest. He reinforced Barrie’s
Dragon
and
St. Lawrence
with the 50-gun razee
Loire
, under Captain Thomas Brown; the 18-gun brig-sloop
Jaseur
, under Commander George E. Watts; and more barges. Barney responded by moving his flotilla farther up the Patuxent.
On June 8 and 9, all of Barrie’s larger ships, except the
Dragon
, sailed up the Patuxent with fifteen barges. Barney drew back into St. Leonard’s Creek for protection, where the barges attacked him. They began firing Congreve rockets at eight o’clock in the morning on June 9. The projectiles screeched as they flew at the Americans, but they all missed and did no damage. The small missiles were only good for frightening an opponent. Barney rowed his undamaged barges forward, firing twelve pounders, forcing the enemy barges to retreat back to the larger ships. When they did, he withdrew up the creek.
On June 10 Barrie made a more determined attack, but Barney stood firm, and the British retreated again. This time Barney pursued them down the creek, attacking fiercely, driving them back. The ferocity of his attack took the
St. Lawrence
, which was at the mouth of the creek, off guard, and in the ensuing melee she ran aground. Barney continued his assault, cutting up the stranded schooner and nearly capturing her before the larger ships, which were also taken by surprise, came to the rescue and forced Barney to retire. The battle lasted six grueling hours.
On June 26, after careful preparation, Barney attacked the larger warships blockading him in St. Leonard’s Creek. He was supported this time by a battery firing from elevated ground at the mouth of the creek. His combined land and sea barrage forced Captain Brown to withdraw the
Loire
farther down the Patuxent. When he did, Barney escaped from the creek and rowed north up the Patuxent to safety above Pig Point.
BARNEY’S FLOTILLA WAS still secure in the Patuxent when, on July 24, forty-seven-year-old Major General Robert Ross arrived at Bermuda with 3,500 battletested veterans of Wellington’s army in France, men who thought they’d be going home after defeating Napoleon. Instead, they were confined in the bowels of troop transports for a long, uncomfortable voyage. They were supplemented by 1,000 marines, bringing Ross’s army to a total of 4,500 men.
Ross was expected to work closely with Admiral Cochrane to conduct large-scale raids along the American coast. Cochrane would decide where the raids were made, but Ross would command on the ground and have a veto if he disagreed about the places or timing of the raids. The Admiralty cautioned Cochrane not to advance his modest army “so far into the country as to risk its power of retreating to its embarkation.”
According to Lord Bathurst the overall purpose of the raids was to “effect a diversion on the coast of the United States . . . in favor of the army employed in the defense of Upper and Lower Canada,” but Cochrane intended to do more than simply create a diversion. He wanted to punish Americans for the atrocities they had committed along the Canadian frontier. Colonel Campbell’s depredations at Long Point in May had so infuriated Governor-General Prevost that on June 2 he had asked Cochrane to “assist in inflicting that measure of retaliation which shall deter the enemy from a repetition of similar outrages.” Cochrane was only too happy to comply. On July 18 he ordered his commanders “to destroy and lay waste such towns and districts upon the coast as you may find assailable. You will hold strictly in view the conduct of the American army towards His Majesty’s unoffending Canadian subjects, and you will spare the lives merely of the unarmed inhabitants of the United States.” Cochrane and Prevost ignored British massacres and depredations against American soldiers and civilians, acting as if only the United States savaged civilians.
Over a month later Cochrane sent a copy of his order to Secretary of State Monroe, who wrote back the first week of September, explaining that any acts of destruction or outrages committed by American troops were not sanctioned by the government, as Cochrane charged, and those responsible were disciplined. Cochrane was not interested in winning an argument, however; he intended to carry out a course of destruction no matter what, since it was what his government wanted and, indeed, what his countrymen wanted.
Although Cochrane told Prevost months before that he would be conducting raids in Chesapeake Bay, by August he had doubts about the timing. The heat, humidity, and generally unhealthy climate during the summer made it the worst time for an attack on Washington. Cochrane preferred October, when the weather was milder and the climate not so sickly. He also had to think about New Orleans. The battles in the Chesapeake, however important, were only diversions. New Orleans was a far more important objective, and it would take time to gather the forces for the invasion.
On the other hand, Cochrane yearned to hurl Mr. Madison “from his throne.” He was also impressed with the psychological importance of taking the capital and of how easy it would be right then. Rear Admiral Cockburn had been urging Cochrane to attack right away. “It is quite impossible for any country to be in a more unfit state for war than this now is,” he wrote to his chief, “and I much doubt if the American Government knew . . . every particular of the intended attack on them, whether it would be possible for them to . . . avert the blow.” In another letter, written the same day, Cockburn boasted, “within forty-eight hours after the arrival in the Patuxent of such a force as you expect, the city of Washington might be possessed without difficulty or opposition of any kind.”