A History of China (47 page)

Numerous explanations have been offered for the Mongols’ eruption from Mongolia to create the largest contiguous empire in world history. One is simply the attraction of spoils. Once Chinggis had developed a sizable army, there was an almost inexorable drive to secure booty through additional conquests. China’s possible denial of trade may also have prompted Mongol raids. A series of bad winters in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries doubtless compelled movement out of Mongolia and attacks on the dynasties in China. A reputed injunction by Tenggeri, the Mongols’ Sky God, to Chinggis to conquer the world does not jibe with Chinggis’ actions. Other than his campaign in central Asia, Chinggis did not seek to occupy the states he had defeated, which challenges the view that he attempted to fulfill a divine mandate to ­conquer the world.

Chinggis’ initial campaigns led to the eventual destruction of the two ­non-Chinese dynasties in China and then the first Mongol occupation of a different land. In 1209, after an indecisive campaign, the Tangut Xia dynasty of northwest China sued for peace, and in 1227, a few months after Chinggis’ death, his commanders demolished the Xia. In 1215, Chinggis’ troops entered and sacked Zhongdu, near the modern city of Beijing, compelling the Jurchen Jin emperor to flee to the south, and in 1234 Chinggis’ son overwhelmed the Jin and occupied all of north China. In a campaign that lasted from 1219 to 1225, Chinggis swept through central Asia and occupied Samarkand, Bukhara, Herat, and other major commercial emporia. The Mongol conqueror died in 1227, probably of natural causes, although some sources attribute his death to injuries sustained in a hunt or to an unspecified illness.

Chinggis bequeathed a considerable legacy, both positive and negative, to his descendants. A positive contribution was his unification of the Mongols. On the other hand, he established a large army and introduced a level of violence that the world had never seen. Yet, once the destruction and massacres had been accomplished, his other policies paved the way for his descendants. He devised and articulated rules collected in a set of instructions known as the
Jasagh
, which provided a semilegal precedent for his successors. His recruitment of foreign advisers and administrators influenced his sons and grandsons to trust and employ foreigners whose states they had subjugated. His support for commerce prompted his descendants to impose a
Pax Mongolica
in the ­territories they conquered, a peace that facilitated a spectacular growth in international trade in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. His toleration of foreign religions as a means of ingratiating himself with foreign clerics also became a standard policy for his successors, although, on occasion, they ­initiated campaigns against Daoism, Islam, or other religions.

Chinggis chose one of his sons as his successor but did not mandate a system of succession, a disastrous flaw that would weaken the Mongols. Once they had become unified, the Mongol leaders abandoned two traditional means of selecting leaders. Older brother to younger brother and ­ultimogeniture, or the youngest son as successor, were discarded. Instead, the Mongol nobility would meet in a so-called
khuriltai
(assembly) to choose the khaghan, or khan of khans, from among Chinggis’ descendants. Naturally, different noblemen would support different Chinggisids, leading to disputes and often to civil wars. The first transfer of power worked out well, as Chinggis’ wishes were respected. His son Ögödei became the khaghan while Ögödei’s three brothers received territories in central Asia, Mongolia, and the Western Regions (which eventually encompassed Russia) respectively and were granted the title of “khan.”

Ögödei (r. 1229–1241) expanded the empire and was the first khan to conceive of actually ruling the vast domains that the Mongols had conquered. His troops added Korea, north China, and lands up to the Iranian border, and, most dramatically, conquered much of Russia and initiated successful forays into Hungary and Poland. Perhaps as important, he began to set up an administrative structure to govern the lands under his control. His first step was to build a capital city in Khara Khorum, a site in the Mongol steppes. Khara Khorum became a magnet for an international coterie of clerics, ­merchants, and artisans. Recent excavations at the site have attested to the existence of a mosque and a Buddhist temple, as well as numerous Buddhist artifacts. Stalls for craft shops have been found, and Chinese ceramics, gold objects, and other luxury products indicate the development of a sophisticated society. A pathway or road leading to the city served as a link both to China and to the Silk Roads. Although the Franciscan friar William of Rubruck ­compared Khara Khorum unfavorably to the Parisian “suburb” of St. Denis, it was still remarkable for a city with a multiethnic population in the steppes. However, its location was so remote that it could not readily maintain the large number of people needed in what was a world capital. William of Rubruck mentioned that four hundred wagons reached the town daily to supply its inhabitants. Such a logistical effort could not be sustained. Within three decades, the Mongols had moved their capital to a more central location in China.

Stationed in Khara Khorum, Ögödei was determined to rule the northern Chinese territories he had subjugated in 1234. Lacking expertise in governance among his own people, Ögödei recruited Chinese and central Asians to assist in developing the proper institutions to rule the venerable civilization of China. He employed a sinicized Khitanese named Yelü Chucai, whom his father had also consulted. Yelü, whose ancestry stretched back to the Liao dynasty, sought to restore the traditional order in north China and advised Ögödei to reestablish institutions and practices resembling those of the previous Chinese governments. The sources credit him with preventing the Mongols from converting the agricultural land into grasslands and turning north China into a herder economy, although Chinese accounts also mention others, Chinese and Mongols alike, persuading the Mongol leadership to avoid such a radical step. Yelü also proposed the reintroduction of the civil-service examination as the main means of selecting officials. His efforts were frustrated, as Ögödei did not wish to be limited simply to Chinese officials and sought a multiethnic group of administrators. Yelü’s other principal suggestion was the development of a regular tax structure rather than the capricious system the Mongols employed. The Mongol leaders traditionally levied taxes when a need, such as a military campaign, arose, but the Chinese were accustomed to a specific annual tax burden. Yelü persuaded Ögödei to accept a yearly tax levy, but central Asian Muslims interceded and undermined his policy. They ­proposed a tax-farming system in order to reduce state expenditures. Muslim agents, rather than paid officials, would collect taxes, saving on the expense of paying state tax collectors. The state would assign quotas to the Muslim ­merchants who acted as tax farmers, and the merchants would retain any funds above the quotas, a policy that led to serious abuses. The tax collectors benefited from squeezing as much revenue as possible from the Chinese, who responded by developing a negative image of both the Muslims and the Mongols. Yelü had tried to avert such exploitation of the Chinese, but Ögödei had not followed his advice.

Ögödei’s death in 1241 ended the Mongols’ campaigns but also witnessed the onset of a decade’s long struggle for power among Chinggis’ descendants. Ögödei’s family became embroiled in a conflict with his brother Tolui’s sons. Partly due to this struggle, more than five years elapsed before Ögödei’s son Güyüg ascended the throne as the khan of khans. His death two years later precipitated still another conflict that was, on this occasion, bloody.

Sorghaghtani Beki, Tolui’s widow and Khubilai Khan’s mother, was the principal protagonist during this struggle. Portrayed as one of the most remarkable ­figures of her age by contemporaries in both East and West, she played a vital role in her sons’ accession to power. Chinggis Khan had defeated her people in his drive toward unification of the Mongols and had given her in marriage to his son Tolui. Extraordinarily intelligent, she was ambitious for her sons and prepared them to be the rulers of the entire empire. As a Nestorian Christian, she recognized that toleration of a variety of religions would facilitate rule over a multiethnic and multireligious populace. Granted her own lands in north China after her husband’s early death, she provided funds for Islamic, Buddhist, and Nestorian religious institutions. Instead of exploiting the Chinese ­peasants in her domain or compelling them to convert their property to Mongol-style grasslands, she encouraged them, through advice from agricultural specialists and through fewer corvée burdens, to grow more grain. She reasoned that the greater the increase in production, the greater the tax revenues that would accrue to the Mongols. Although she was illiterate, she ensured that her sons became literate, and her son Khubilai, who would have considerable influence on China, even learned spoken Chinese. Sorghaghtani Beki’s political skills were unmatched. She had ingratiated herself with influential Mongol leaders by offering gifts and valuable intelligence information to them. Strong support from the nobility thus enabled her to overcome the opposition of Ögödei’s descendants. Her son Möngke became the khan of khans in 1251, but she did not live long enough to enjoy the fruits of her labor. She died within a year.

Like his immediate predecessors, Möngke was determined to annex ­additional territories for the growing Mongol Empire. Because he needed ­revenue and troops to pursue such campaigns, he quickly proclaimed that only the court could levy taxes, impose corvée labor, and raise military forces for attacks and invasions. Once he had enforced these regulations, he turned to his plans for expansion. He directed his younger brother Hülegü to head toward west Asia to encroach upon the Islamic lands. After meticulous preparations, Hülegü led his forces, in 1256, in an attack on the Ismaili mountain stronghold of Alamut. The Ismailis, a small order within Islam, used suicide missions to assassinate their enemies, the Muslim leaders of the Baghdad-based
ʿ
Abbasid Caliphate (750–1258), which governed the Sunni or majority order of Islam. They assumed that such violence would create instability and would lead to the downfall of the caliphate, which was the most important contemporary Islamic state. Hülegü’s troops scaled the mountain and crushed the defenders. Shortly thereafter, in February of 1258, Hülegü overwhelmed the
ʿ
Abbasid Caliphate and initiated a bloody massacre at its capital in Baghdad. Within a few years, Hülegü founded the so-called Il-Khanate, an indication that he planned to remain in west Asia. However, the Mongol rulers in Russia, who eventually became known as the Golden Horde, believed that Chinggis Khan had granted the Western Regions, which included west Asia, to his alleged son and their ancestor, Jochi. Their resentment against Hülegü and the Il-Khanate resulted in tensions and then in actual battles. These internal disputes and wars would harm the Mongol Empire and would eventually contribute to its collapse.

Möngke also set his sights on the Southern Song dynasty, which still ruled the Chinese territories south of the Yangzi River. Concerned that the Song rulers would lead a revanchist effort to oust the Mongols from north China, he wanted to destroy this opposition force. In 1259, he and his commanders devised a plan for a three-pronged assault on the Song. His own troops would embark from northwest China to the southwest and then march eastward to attack from the west. His younger brother Khubilai would meet the Song forces head on by crossing the Yangzi River and moving toward the Song’s eastern lands. A naval force would then raid and seek to occupy the flourishing ports along the east coast. The campaign was successful until Möngke’s death in August of 1259. The succession struggles that had plagued the Mongols for several generations now led to a cessation of the planned ­conquest of the Song. Khubilai and his brother Arigh Böke, each advocating ­different philosophies of governance, fought for the throne. Khubilai suggested that the Mongols needed to adopt some Chinese institutions and practices to rule China. Fearful that the Mongols would become increasingly sinicized, Arigh Böke objected to policies that might detract from the Mongol way of life and would erode Mongol values. Naturally, a drive for power also contributed to this civil war. China’s abundant resources coupled with the traditionally ­powerful Mongol military, especially its cavalry, enabled Khubilai to overcome Arigh Böke. By 1264, the conflict had ended, permitting Khubilai to focus on ruling China.

However, the Mongols needed to overwhelm the Southern Song dynasty and unify China to gain credibility and legitimacy with the Chinese population, which was eager for a restoration of a China ruled by one dynasty. The Song, through increases in agricultural productivity, infant industries, and trade, had built a flourishing economy and a resplendent social and cultural life. But its government was chaotic and corrupt, with weak emperors often influenced by empress dowagers. As soon as Khubilai gained power, he ordered an attack on the Song. Toward the end of a five-year siege of the important town of Xiangyang, two Islamic engineers brought and employed powerful catapults and mangonels that led to victory. Success in overcoming this resistance meant that the Mongols could cross the Yangzi River. They gradually moved toward the Song capital at Hangzhou. Their reputation had reached the Song court, prompting the empress dowager to submit. Patriotic ministers swept up the child emperor and fled south. The sickly child died during the constant moves needed to keep one step ahead of the pursuing Mongol forces. The ministers who accompanied the court officials simply enthroned another child emperor. In 1279, the Mongols caught up with the Chinese, and the chief minister, with the young emperor in tow, dove into the sea and drowned. The Song dynasty had come to an end, and the Mongols had reunified China, a goal the Chinese had sought for four centuries and had been unable to accomplish.