A History of China (85 page)

Economic growth has satisfied most of the population and has quelled potential disturbances. The country’s east coast has benefited from foreign and private entrepreneurs’ investment. Cheap labor has enticed many companies from highly developed countries to move their plants to China, leading to the world’s greatest rate of economic growth. Less efficient, less productive, and occasionally corrupt state-owned enterprises remain a problem, as is theft of intellectual property and technology, which has enraged many in Japan and the West. With the rise of a private economy, income inequality has increased at a rapid pace, leading some urban dwellers to have a more comfortable life while others in the city and countryside barely eke out a living. Rationing, which has even included cotton, has ended, as stores, which had few consumer goods in the 1960s and 1970s, now have sufficient quantities of necessities and luxuries for those who can afford them. The public transportation system, including buses and roads, and sanitation facilities have improved in many areas, and the more prosperous families have televisions, washing machines, and the other appurtenances of modern life that were barely available earlier. Nonetheless, the government has focused on an export-driven policy, not on consumption by Chinese. Other than the very comfortable, most Chinese have saved their money. Moreover, foreign imports are expensive because of the high value of Chinese currency. However, as foreign demand shrinks, Chinese consumption needs to increase, especially if workers in manufacturing enterprises are to retain their jobs.

To be sure, economic development has not been uniform. Rural areas have not always had access to the machinery and the conveniences of modern ­technology. China’s western regions have lagged behind, as investment and prosperity have grown disproportionately along the east coast and neighboring regions. In the late 1990s, however, the government, apprehensive about ­possible turbulence in these relatively remote areas, initiated efforts to foster the economy in the poorer regions of the west. The authorities have committed themselves to greater support and investment in the west, especially in the minority areas. It remains to be seen whether this policy will translate into ­significant economic gains and to reducing the tensions between Han, or ethnic Chinese, and the various minorities in the northwest and southwest.

After sixty years of communist rule, albeit with a measure of private entrepreneurship or capitalism over the past three decades, where does China stand as of the second decade of the twenty-first century? The Chinese government’s lack of transparency makes it difficult to assess China’s status and condition. The reports of fervent anticommunists about developments in China offer extraordinarily negative views. Evaluations of China’s present, not to mention its future, are perilous. The assessment here is not designed to be a catalog of potential difficulties or disasters. Nor is it meant to be a list of the consequences of instability. The present system could survive, particularly if the government is adept at adapting to its problems. Here the goal is merely to describe the problems and opportunities.

The Communist Party still dominates the government and is the only legal political party. The government itself has turned out to be more pragmatic than in the days of Mao’s leadership. Practical results rather than ideology crop up in policies and pronouncements. Transitions in leadership have been peaceful (a change from Mao’s era). Mao ultimately turned against his chosen successors (Liu Shaoqi, who was arrested and died during the Cultural Revolution, and Lin Biao, whose plane crashed as he tried to flee after a reputedly abortive attempt to assassinate Mao). All these events contributed to instability in China. Since Mao’s death, changes in leadership have not been as fraught, and transitions have not resembled the purges that earlier afflicted the party and government. Nonetheless, this authoritarian system scarcely makes any bows to democracy, and the political power of the military is another impediment to democracy. Dissent is limited, and, if construed as counterrevolutionary, is not tolerated. Democracy activists have emerged but have thus far had scant success. A few observers have asserted that China has never had a democratic government and yet has flourished. They argue that the lack of a democratic heritage may preclude such a development in China but that this will not necessarily harm its people. However, although traditional China had not been exposed to democracy, in the modern world, involvement with democratic countries cannot be avoided. Unlike the Chinese of the past, today its citizens are familiar with democratic principles.

A substantial movement that demands greater transparency in the government and the Communist Party and more citizen participation in decision making has not developed. Groups advocating human rights and more attention to civil liberties have sprung up both inside and outside China (among Chinese living abroad and among foreigners), but thus far they have had little resonance among the general population within the country. Officials have paid lip service to the rule of law and human rights, but sensitive trials are often secretly convened; accused citizens are, on occasion, detained but not charged with a crime and are not allowed visits from family and friends; and prisoners are frequently treated harshly or, in some cases, tortured. Political participation is limited, as voting is merely an endorsement of candidates already vetted and supported by the Communist Party. The lack of a multiparty political system limits choice and any potential for reducing the power of an authoritarian state.

There are also plentiful opportunities for abuses in local government. China’s large population and territory allow great flexibility for local officials. The central government’s control is hampered by distance and complexity, giving leverage to unscrupulous local officials. Some have collaborated with entrepreneurs, landlords, and factory owners to expropriate land, to evade environmental regulations and thus contribute to land and water pollution, and in general to exploit the local population. A few have concealed any problems that might reflect badly on them. For example, in the early to mid 1990s in Henan province, the poor sold their blood to unscrupulous companies that did not abide by proper precautions, and were infected with HIV/AIDS by contaminated needles. Yet officials tried to hide this public-health disaster. Similarly, officials in Yunnan and Xinjiang have, on occasion, sought to prevent public knowledge of drug addiction and the ensuing HIV/AIDS epidemic, which was spread by unclean needles. Authorities merely detained addicts and compelled them to follow a regimen of immediate withdrawal from their drugs.

Central- and local-government officials have frequently shown a flagrant disregard for ordinary citizens. Having decided upon a so-called Three Gorges Dam to generate hydroelectric power and to avert floods on the Yangzi River, the government simply moved more than a million people from their homes as they diverted the water onto their lands (in addition, the water has become infested with garbage and algae, and some experts have insisted that the dam has increased the possibility of landslides and earthquakes). Lack of official supervision has permitted contaminated food and liquor to be sold and to jeopardize the population’s health. Food safety is a serious public-health issue, yet there is scant government regulation of the food industries. In 2009, Chinese leaders razed traditional Muslim buildings in Kashgar, a predominantly Muslim city, and, without consulting the local population, moved the residents to newly constructed housing. In May of 2009, the government reacted belatedly to a devastating earthquake in the province of Sichuan. Revelations about local officials permitting shoddy construction of schools, which trapped and led to the deaths of many children, embarrassed the government. Other examples of official malfeasance and lack of concern for citizens have become commonplace and, somewhat unusually, have also become public in the twenty-first century. China has the largest number of coal-mining fatalities in the world, a striking indication of a lack of implementation of its safety regulations.

Nepotism and corruption have also undermined the government’s ­performance. As of 2012, China is 75th of 178 countries on Transparency Inter­national’s corruption index – a poor record for a country among the more developed states and currently the world’s second-largest economy. Partly due to the Confucian emphasis on devotion to family, nepotism has been characteristic throughout much of Chinese history. It is not surprising that connections and relationships (
guanxi
) persist as a means of educational, economic, and political advancement. The communist system has not subverted this tradition. Hopes that the corruption that plagued China’s traditional dynasties would be more controllable in modern times have not come to fruition. Cases of bribery and corruption regularly appear in the newspapers. In addition, the media, which are controlled or influenced by the government, do not report quite a few instances.

The media and Internet continue to be regulated. The government dominates newspapers, television, and other outlets and limits information that criticizes or embarrasses officialdom. Foreign television and radio broadcasts in China are monitored and censored, and untrustworthy Internet sites are blocked. The media almost never challenge the government or the status quo. In effect, the media do not represent the individual citizen and merely reflect the official view, which barely takes note of the growing economic inequality.

The government has also censored or criticized some of its leading writers and artists. Gao Xingjian (1940–), who received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 2000, has lived in France since the 1980s, partly because his critiques of the government led to censorship. He spent years on a farm performing manual labor during the Cultural Revolution, and, even after his return from the countryside, the government continued to harass him. Ai Weiwei (1957–), the artist son of poet Ai Qing (1910–1996), has used his sculptures and installations to criticize the government’s corruption and authoritarianism, especially in light of the shoddy construction of schools in Sichuan that led to increased fatalities in a 2009 earthquake (as mentioned above). His repeated criticism of the authorities may have prompted his arrest and imprisonment in 2011 on charges of tax evasion. Mo Yan (1955–), winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 2012, has not aroused the government’s hostility, although he has written about corruption. Because his work employs the techniques of magical realism, he has not been perceived as a threat to the state and the official ideology. His general lack of support for dissidents has also contributed to a positive image with the government.

On another note, although economic growth has been remarkable over the past thirty years, distribution of income has not conformed to the Marxist model. Income inequality has continued to accelerate since the early 1980s. A few entrepreneurs and relatives of prominent leaders have profited in these years, and many have prospered because of special benefits or relations with officials who offered lucrative advantages. For example, bank loans have often been obtained by favored customers who had a unique relationship with bank employees. The loans have created a housing bubble, and banks have experienced losses but have averted disaster because of the population’s high rate of savings. Having so many depositors, the banks have not needed to provide high rates of interest. However, the more prosperous and more sophisticated Chinese have begun to demand higher rates, placing greater pressure on the banks to make better and more productive loans. They could provide loans for additional low- and middle-income housing, which is desperately needed, but thus far an excess of luxurious and expensive housing has been built.

Until 2000, the newly rich had not flaunted their wealth, but in the early years of the twenty-first century they have begun to revel in pecuniary excesses, sending their children to expensive US universities, patronizing private clubs and entertainment centers, and purchasing helicopters and flying them without informing air controllers. The Gini coefficient, which measures levels of inequality, has continued to increase, signifying a considerable deviation from Communist Party professions of equality.

There are a substantial number of people living below the poverty line – the reverse of the nouveau riche. The government has done remarkably well in reducing the number, but even a conservative World Bank estimate has found more than 135 million counted as poor. The floating migrant population, consisting of tens of millions of people, has among the most precarious of existences. Members of this group – mostly peasants and those on the fringes of rural areas who cannot eke out a living in the countryside – travel to larger towns or cities to find employment. Most of the jobs they have secured have been seasonal, and they barely earn enough money to survive during slack times. Because they have not been registered as residents in their new workplaces, they have not been entitled to benefits, including housing, health care, pensions, and schools for their children. They have not, until recently, obtained the privileges available to ordinary citizens, which has set the stage for a descent into poverty. Over the past few years, the government has belatedly begun to provide them with a safety net. The lack of vibrant labor unions, most of which have been co-opted by the Communist Party and have little power, means that the poor have few advocates and scant leverage in an authoritarian state.

Access to state-provided health and educational facilities has declined, and the social safety net has been frayed. Rudimentary health care, which was available even for remote rural areas during the early years of communist rule, is not readily provided. There are fewer “barefoot doctors,” or lay people trained by the government who cater to basic medical needs. Patients have to pay for their own medical insurance, care by physicians, clinic or hospital stays, and medicine, while the government has abandoned free and very-low-cost medical care. An additional problem is that medical facilities in the big cities are superior to those in the countryside. Similarly, schools and universities in the urban areas are generally better than the ones in the rural areas, and indeed the rate of literacy is lower in the countryside. Even in the cities, students in so-called key schools have superior teachers and better facilities and a much better chance of gaining admission into universities. Parents, on occasion, pay or provide gifts to administrators or teachers to ensure admission to these key schools. Entrance into universities is based on examinations, generally offering an advantage to educated or middle-class families, which is antithetical to the communists’ professed egalitarianism. The social-welfare system, composed of pensions and child-care and housing allowances, among other benefits, has also been reduced. The government has begun to tackle these health and social-welfare problems, but much needs to be done.