A History of China (86 page)

Many of these changes have particularly affected women. The elderly, for whom women generally have greater responsibility, have fewer state guarantees and benefits than in the early days of communist rule, which imposes financial burdens on their families. At workplaces, employers often violate the equal-pay-for-equal-work principle, offering lower wages and salaries to women. Many firms have been reluctant to hire young women because female employees might become pregnant and would have to be granted maternity leave. Women are also poorly represented in the higher administrative positions in government, education, and the economy. No important government official is currently a woman. The one-child-per-family policy, which translates into numerous abortions of female fetuses, has resulted in an extraordinary shortage of women as marital partners, and this paucity gives women a major advantage. The fervent desire for continuance of the family line means that young and unattached women have some leverage because fewer women are available for the men who want to produce a son to continue the family line. As of 2013, however, the government faces greater demands to modify the one-child-per-family policy because the aging population creates more pressure on the working young to support the elderly.

Spectacular economic growth has had its impact on the environment. In the early 1980s, regulations about air, ground, and water pollution were limited and generally unenforced. Factories discharged chemicals into the land and water. North China, which has often been plagued by droughts, currently ­suffers from a shortage of water, and pollution of lakes and rivers compounds the region’s difficulties in securing sufficient potable water for its inhabitants. The substantial dependence on coal for heating and other purposes has ­contributed to air pollution, especially in the big cities. Automobile emissions and traffic tie-ups have resulted in other environmental difficulties.

The environment for humans has also been criticized. Safety conditions at many factories and mines have been appalling. Scandals have repeatedly erupted over exploitation of factory workers, making conditions in the mills appear comparable to those in the early stages of the Industrial Revolution in the West. Workers have been compelled to work long hours, sometimes with dangerous materials, at low wages and in poorly lit buildings that lack proper ventilation. Protests about these conditions have increased, and suicides of workers have aroused concern both in China and abroad. Child labor in construction projects and mines, child trafficking, and prostitution persist. Human-rights activists have also condemned China for its liberal use of capital punishment. China continues to execute far more people than any other country. During so-called “Strike Hard” campaigns, sentences of capital punishment have often been excessive and capricious. More and more organizations have begun to lobby for prison sentences rather than execution for nonviolent crimes, and the government, perhaps in response, has reduced the number of people executed. Human-rights organizations have also objected to the harsh conditions faced by prisoners assigned to forced-labor camps. The Internet, despite considerable government censorship, has proven to be an effective ­galvanizing force in protests against abuses of the human environment. The government has been unable to totally control or close down this means of communication.

Concerning human rights in other areas, although China has plenty of coal and rare earth minerals (in fact, over 90 percent of the world’s supply of such minerals as of 2013), it has had to import many other natural resources for its economic growth, leading to relations with oppressive dictatorial regimes. Much of its oil comes from Kazakhstan, Iran, and Africa. Its copper, gold, and other resources derive from all corners of the world, including its neighbors in East Asia but also Latin America and Africa. The government and private entrepreneurs have invested in numerous Third World countries (including recently concluded agreements to obtain oil and copper from Afghanistan) to ensure steady supplies of raw materials for its growing industries. By supplying finished consumer goods and by purchasing raw materials from many countries, it has generated considerable leverage for itself in a variety of states. However, it has dealt with what many in the outside world consider to be rogue regimes. The USA and its allies have frequently criticized China for its willingness to collaborate with these governments, but they are not as dependent as China is on such ostracized lands as Iran for supplies that would fuel economic growth.

Sino–American relations have had their vagaries. The USA, on occasion, has criticized China’s human-rights violations, while China has accused the USA of adventurist and bellicose policies in Eastern Europe, Iraq, and Iran. The Chinese authorities portray US involvement in human-rights issues as intrusions in China’s internal affairs. For example, they portray US calls for religious freedom for Buddhists, Christians, and Muslims as support for ­subversives, anti-Communist Party dissidents, and so-called capitalist roaders. These tensions continue but have not led to the kinds of confrontations that characterized the Korean War and the early stages of relations. Tensions have at times erupted into brief contretemps, such as when the USA probably inadvertently bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and when the Chinese brought down a US plane that violated China’s airspace. However, no real armed confrontation has evolved since the Korean War. Indeed, the USA has tried to elicit Chinese assistance in dealings with Iran and North Korea – countries with which the USA has no formal diplomatic relations. However, economic relations continue to plague the Sino–American relationship. Faced with a decidedly unfavorable balance of trade with China, the USA has repeatedly asserted that Chinese currency has been deliberately undervalued and has urged the communist authorities to revalue the yuan, the basic unit of Chinese currency. On the other hand, consumers in the USA have benefited from the relatively cheap prices of Chinese goods. Businesses in the USA have ­complained that the Chinese have imposed barriers on the sale of American products in China. Businesspeople in the USA want a cheaper dollar so as to compete with Chinese products in the USA and around the world.

Simultaneously, as the second-largest economy in the world, China has begun to flex its muscles in its foreign relations. It expects to be respected and treated as a great power. Over the past few years, it has become embroiled in disputes with Vietnam, Japan, and the Philippines concerning oil, fishing and shipping rights, and ownership of islands between China and these other lands. The USA has decided to play a more significant role in the Pacific and has stationed more vessels and forces in the region, alarming and alienating the Chinese. In this connection, US officials have asserted that China has increased the size of its armed forces. Although China has devoted a somewhat higher percentage of funds to its military than previously, its budgetary increase does not compare with the amounts allocated by the USA. Yet China has been using its economic leverage in trade and investment to influence the policies of countries with which it has economic relations. After all, the Marxism that China espouses emphasizes the economic underpinnings and indeed significance of politics.

Taiwan represents one of the most crucial issues in Chinese foreign ­relations. The Chinese government has persisted in its claim that Taiwan is a Chinese province. Ironically, the government in Taiwan concurs but believes that Taiwan itself is the legitimate republic of China. Taiwan turned to a more democratic system after the death of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975 and the succession of his son Chiang Ching-kuo (1910–1988), who permitted greater freedom for the population and recruited more native Taiwanese into government. Its economy boomed from the late 1960s, creating a modernized and high-tech country. Conflicts between China and Taiwan have flared up into small-scale battles or bombings over the past sixty years, but they appear to have subsided. On occasion, one or the other side rattles its saber by testing weapons. Yet entrepreneurs from Taiwan have invested in China, and, at the time of publication, no substantial conflicts have taken place. Some observers have suggested the Hong Kong model for Taiwan. In 1997, Hong Kong reverted to nominal Chinese control after a century of British rule but was not compelled to abandon its economic system in favor of the communist system. However, because the fate of Taiwan is a more viscerally charged issue, it may be more difficult for both the Chinese and the Taiwanese to accept the Hong Kong formulation.

The problem of the so-called national minorities is similarly fraught. As of 1950, the communists had regained the territories that the Qing dynasty had conquered by the 1750s and had incorporated, according to their own count, fifty-five minorities. Many have acquiesced, and some have prospered under Han, or ethnic Chinese, rule. Southwest China, which has numerous minorities, some of whom are related to the Tai peoples, has generally been relatively peaceful, although the identities of many of the locals have begun to erode. Inner Mongolia, which has undergone considerable turbulence (especially during the Cultural Revolution), appears to have achieved a peaceful equilibrium. There are still Mongol nationalists who seek greater autonomy, but the Chinese in the so-called Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region now vastly outnumber the Mongols. Chinese peasants have encroached on pastoral lands, generating considerable erosion and dust storms. Despite this setback, which has resulted in the loss of grazing land, many Mongols have found other employment in the burgeoning industrial economy. Because Inner Mongolia produces more coal than any other region in China, mining has provided many, albeit hazardous and polluting, jobs. Mongol identity survives, as does the Uyghur script associated with early Mongol history and created by order of Chinggis Khan. Occasional incidents have given rise to demonstrations but have not translated into significant disruptions. Yet the potential for violence persists.

Xinjiang has been more problematic for the communist authorities. The continued migration of Chinese into the so-called Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region has alienated the mostly Turkic but also Iranian and Mongol peoples in the area. There has been little intermarriage between the Chinese and the traditional local inhabitants, and Xinjiang is now approximately evenly divided between Han and non-Han residents. Many non-Han accuse the Han and the government of seeking to undermine their culture in every area, from Uyghur poetry to the Uyghur language to Muslim religious observances. The government has responded with ever-changing policies. In moderate times, it has emphasized affirmative action for the non-Han in employment and education and toleration toward Islam and non-Han customs and language. In repressive times, it has cracked down on the expression of the indigenous Islamic and Turkic cultures and on evidence of ethnic sentiments. Another source of irritation has been the general paucity of non-Han in leadership positions in local government, education, and the economy. Moreover, the non-Han population earns less than the Han because they have less training and less capital to invest, and face greater discrimination.

Violence has punctuated Xinjiang in the twenty-first century. The authorities have cracked down on the non-Han population and have made even more strenuous efforts to dissuade the neighboring central Asian Muslim countries from providing sanctuary for Uyghur “splittists,” or nationalists who yearn for independence. The government has tried to portray these dissidents as Islamic fundamentalists in order to gain support against them. In short, six decades after the communists gained control over Xinjiang, animosity and turbulence between Han and non-Han persist.

Tibet has been similarly turbulent. After violence erupted in 1959, the Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhists, left his land and went into exile in Dharamsala, India. Despite occasional informal discussions between the government and the Dalai Lama’s representatives, no compromise has been reached. As in Xinjiang, a substantial number of Chinese have moved to the capital city, Lhasa, where they play an important economic role. Many Tibetans resent the Chinese presence, and, like the Turkic peoples of Xinjiang, fear erosion of their identity and culture. The Tibetan response has been a spiritual revival and a persistent attachment and devotion to the Dalai Lama. The Tibetan leader has been an attractive figure for many influential people in the world, placing the Chinese government, which mistrusts him, in a defensive position. The worldwide “Free Tibet” movement, which has the support of well-meaning celebrities, has actually aroused the government’s suspicions of the Dalai Lama’s intentions and has perhaps hardened its position. As in Xinjiang, the government has used economic incentives to ingratiate itself with the Tibetan population. The authorities have invested considerable resources in Tibet, including the construction of an extraordinary railway line (one of the world’s most expensive infrastructure projects) linking it to China. They have also provided funding for educational and medical facilities. However, many Tibetans fear that their culture will be overwhelmed. On the other hand, Tibetan music and arts are popular and have had an influence in China. To be sure, China would like to resolve the Tibetan problem, especially because of its resonance throughout the world and the ensuing negative image for the ­government. So far the parties have not been reconciled. Occasional violence, as well as suicides and self-immolations by Tibetans, have heightened tensions between China and, in particular, the community of Tibetan monks. However, the Chinese authorities can afford to wait for a settlement because the death of the current charismatic Dalai Lama may leave Tibet without a similarly popular and recognized leader.

It is appropriate to end this history with a reference to many Chinas. China and its history cannot truly be gauged without consideration of the non-­Chinese within the country and on its borders. The relations between the two have vastly influenced Confucian China. Moreover, society over the past two thousand years has consisted not only of the Confucian elite but also of peasants, merchants, artisans, monks, doctors, and a variety of others. Because most of the primary sources derive from the elite, the principal literate group, knowledge of other groups and thus of Chinese civilization is limited. Archeology, careful study of indirect references in written sources, and the reports of foreigners, among others, supplement the elite’s viewpoint, but the religions, lifestyles, and political and economic roles of the nonelite often lie beyond our grasp. The lives and contributions of women in traditional times have only come into partial view over the past few decades. In essence, a ­portrait of segments of the nonelite population who did not leave behind ­material remains can scarcely be recovered.