Clinical Handbook of Mindfulness (22 page)

Dennett (1992)
termed it “the center of narrative gravity.” In contrast, the

“minimal self” is our basic, immediate experience of reality; it is that feature

of consciousness that constitutes our experience of “what it feels like” to see

our friend approaching, feel joy or sadness, receive a creative insight, and

otherwise be an active recipient of what conscious awareness brings to our

attention
(Legrand, 2007).

To speak of being an active recipient of experience is to suggest that

the phenomenological attitude has both active and passive aspects. Husserl

pointed out that consciousness is intentional, in that it aims toward or

intends something beyond itself; it is not self-enclosed
(Thompson & Zahavi,

2007).
This is not to be confused with the more familiar usage of the term that implies goal directedness. For Husserl, our most fundamental intentional

activity is to be actively receptive to reality, to take notice by giving attention

to that which affects us. By speaking of “that which affects us” is to recognize

that attention is subject to influence; it tends to turn toward what is salient at

a given time or, said differently, toward stimuli that are sufficiently strong to

64

Kirk Warren Brown and Shari Cordon

engage the conscious mind. Thus, in this mode we are actively receptive to

that which engages the mind, and this dynamic forms our fundamental way

of being open to reality
(Thompson & Zahavi, 2007).
2

A Basic Phenomenology of Mindfulness

Husserl’s detailed analysis of the natural attitude and the phenomenologi-

cal attitude offers considerable insight into how mindfulness can be under-

stood, particularly as it operates in a day-to-day life context. Indeed, the

study of the nature of mindfulness is inherently phenomenological, as it con-

cerns the subjective nature and uses of the conscious mind. Further, mindful-

ness bears several striking similarities to the phenomenological attitude that

Husserl described, as we hope to make clear in our effort to characterize

mindfulness.

Much historical and contemporary scholarship uses the term mindfulness

(
sati
in Pali) to refer to heightened attention and specifically the sustained

focusing of the mind upon an object or experience (e.g.,
Lutz et al., 2007;

Wallace, 1999).
As contemporary Theravadin scholars
Analayo (2003)
and

Bodhi (2000)
note, mindfulness, in its simplest form, is
bare attention
, or full attention to the present. As
Nyanaponika (1973)
first used that expression, attention is bare when undisturbed by, or captured by, the mind’s usual

discriminative thought and language – evaluations, conceptual elaborations,

and so on. In this way, mindfulness is intended to
lay bare
events and expe-

riences as clearly as possible
(Bodhi, 2000;
cf.
Dreyfus & Thompson, 2007).

Thus, for example, thoughts and emotions are experienced as psychological

and somatic events, not as episodes in a narrative or personal drama
(Bodhi,

2000).
Even though attention may shift from one event or experience to

another, mindful attention is given to each.

Focused attention is the traditional, core meaning given to mindfulness.

However, Theravadin thought, like contemporary cognitive science, recog-

nizes that attention and awareness are intertwined in daily life. That is, atten-

tion regularly pulls “figures” out of the “background” of sensory and internal

stimuli that come into awareness. In traditional mindfulness training, once a

student has a certain familiarity with focused attention, it is supplemented by

meta-awareness (Pali:
sampajanna
). This term has multiple meanings: The

simplest meaning is knowing the state of the mind at a given moment, includ-

ing the quality of one’s attention. A deeper meaning is insight or clear see-

ing into the nature of the phenomena that are given attention. Such insight

comes as refined attention brings the field of experience into ever finer focus,

allowing for a deepening discovery of the elements that constitute experi-

ence – for example, the fact that thoughts, emotions, and other mental events

are in constant flux
(Analayo, 2003;
Bodhi, 2000, 2006).

Sati
and
sampajanna
, though often discussed separately in scholarship,

can operate together in practice (Pali:
satisampajanna
;
Analayo
,
2003).

For example, in MBSR and other mindfulness-based treatment approaches,

2 It is important to note that an active–passive dynamic also occurs in object-oriented,

second-order processing, but in that case, the activity is not about opening to what

is, but rather concerns evaluation, discrimination, and other cognitive activities that

attention has been affectively turned to.

Chapter 4 Phenomenology and Emotional Correlates of Mindfulness

65

the student is encouraged to take a kinesthetic experience as an object of

focused attention – most commonly, the breath. When awareness arises that

the mind has strayed from this object, attention is gently brought back to its

focus. In this way, attention is refined while awareness is made more sensi-

tive to what is occurring at any given moment, both of which are key, inter-

related skills to be translated into day-to-day life. For example, one can be

aware of all that is currently salient and can use that meta-awareness to bring

a focus of attention toward some stimulus or phenomenon
(Kornfield, 1993).

In this way, mindfulness involves a voluntary, fluid regulation of attention.

This mindful mode of processing may have particular value for mental and

physical health maintenance and treatment, wherein a more sensitive aware-

ness can lead to the uncovering of (perhaps challenging) psychological or

somatic realities that can be given focused attention as a means to investi-

gate, more fully process, and thereby better regulate or transcend them.

Nyaniponika
(1973)
noted that when both attention and meta-awareness

work together in this way, mindfulness achieves its intended p
urpose.3
Bodhi

(2006)
has called this conjoining of attention and awareness “integrated wise attention.” The subjective experience of this refinement of the basic capacities of consciousness is
presence
(Bodhi, 2006;
Tsoknyi, 1998; Uchiyama,

2004)
– an immediacy of experience as it occurs. As we have noted else-

where (Brown et al., 2007), the mind is adept at “time-traveling” into mem-

ories of the past, fantasies about the future and, in general, away from the

realities of the present. This time travel can serve the important regulatory

purpose of protecting, maintaining, and enhancing the self in, for example,

the pursuit of goals
(Sheldon & Vansteenkiste, 2005),
but it is easily forgotten that we and our thoughts exist only in the present moment, with no

direct experience of either past or future. With consciousness dwelling in

current reality as it actually offers itself, rather than caught up in thought-

generated accounts about the past, present, and future, reality is more likely

to be seen objectively, as it is, rather than ignored or conceptually controlled,

and thereby only partially experienced. Indeed, in this experiential mode of

processing, thoughts of past, present, and future can be attentively engaged

in the same way that other phenomena are – that is, without the loss of psy-

chological autonomy that presence of mind confers.

This discussion suggests that the Buddhist concept of mindfulness has

several broad points of connection to Husserl’s phenomenological attitude:

First, in both traditions the experience of what is occurring in the present

becomes of paramount interest, whether that experience arises from within

the body-mind or through the senses. Second, both propose that this pres-

ence is entered through a suspension of the habitual or automatized way

of processing experience in favor of an open attentiveness that simply

processes what is occurring moment by moment. In both traditions, two

activities are involved in this – a suspension of inattentive immersion in

3 It is this integration of attention and meta-awareness that helps to distinguish mind-

fulness from concentration. As Georges Dreyfus (personal communication, October

17, 2007) notes, attention may become focused on an object but without sufficient

clarity or presence to retain that focus. That is, the mind may become concentrated,

but without meta-awareness to help preserve that focused attentiveness, it would be

lacking in mindfulness.

66

Kirk Warren Brown and Shari Cordon

experience that meta-awareness allows and a turning of attention to the

manner in which things appear. Both traditions claim that this flexibility

of attention helps to bring a freshness and clarity to subjective experience

(Thompson, 2007; Varela & Depraz, 2003).
Third and relatedly, as an experiential state, this attention is actively receptive to what enters the mind

rather than placed in the service of cognitive manipulation of that mental

content. Fourth, both systems of thought propose that presence can be cul-

tivated (lengthened, deepened, etc.) through practice, although historically,

these traditions have differed in their emphasis on the practical application

of attention to investigate first-person experience. Recently, phenomenolo-

gists have sought to more explicitly delineate pragmatic approaches to the

study of conscious experience from a first-person perspective
(Depraz, 1999;

Thompson & Zahavi, 2007),
but mindfulness and other attentional practices have been foundational to informing Buddhist philosophy and psychology

for centuries.

Historically, these traditions have also received different degrees of atten-

tion from scientists interested in the benefits of the experiential mode of

processing and the way of being in the world, perhaps in part due to the dif-

fering focus on practical application. Recently, phenomenologically informed

researchers have begun to examine the neural correlates and perceptual

effects of attentional stability and other features of the experiential stance

described here (see
Thompson, 2007,
for a review). In contrast, mindfulness researchers have, to date, emphasized the study of the purported mental and

physical health-relevant consequences of this state. The vast majority of this

research has been conducted using the mindfulness-based and mindfulness-

integrated interventions described in other chapters of this volume. But there

has been increasing interest in the study of the nature and effects of the phe-

nomenon itself. In the remainder of this chapter, we outline recent findings

from this recent research on the emotional correlates and consequences of

mindfulness, both as an induced state of mind, typically conducted in lab-

oratory settings (state mindfulness), and as a disposition toward day-to-day

experience (trait mindfulness). As we have suggested here, the two modes

of processing outlined herein have differing implications for emotional expe-

rience, and research on state and trait mindfulness has begun to offer support

for that claim. Before discussing that evidence, we first briefly outline devel-

opments in the operationalization of the mindfulness construct.

Operationalizations of Mindfulness

While the capacity for mindful presence is inherent to the human organ-

ism, this experience can vary considerably, from heightened states of clarity

and sensitivity to low levels, as in habitual, automatic, mindless, or blunted

thought or action
(Wallace, 1999).
This suggests both that individuals may differ in the frequency with which mindful capacities are deployed, due to

inherent capability, inclination, or discipline, and also that there are intra-

individual variations in mindfulness. This research thus investigates mind-

fulness as an attribute that varies both between and within persons, and

examines the significance of both kinds of variation for emotional and other

correlates and consequences.

Chapter 4 Phenomenology and Emotional Correlates of Mindfulness

67

Trait and State Mindfulness

The study of individual differences in mindfulness is based on a current sci-

entific consensus that “trait mindfulness” reflects a more frequent abiding

in the experiential state described earlier. Several self-report measures have

been recently published in attempts to assess dispositional mindfulness and

mindfulness practice skills, a number of which are reviewed by Baer in this

volume
.4
Self-report measures of momentary mindful states have also been

developed
(Brown & Ryan, 2003;
Lau et al., 2006),
though to date these have not been subjected to much study. Most study of the mindful state

has been conducted using brief, laboratory-based experimental inductions