Jessen & Richter (Eds.) (51 page)

“poor vigilance”, and, in the end, the lack of interest in elaborating conclu-

sive election programs opened the way to “hostile” and “backward” ele-

ments penetrating the trade unions.41

Even though, in actual fact, Party organizations frequently did influence

elections,42 the Party leadership’s poor opinion of the cells’ ideological

vigor did not miss the mark. Demands of trade union officials to stop

“independent” actions of factory cells,43 protests reported from factories

that “comrades from the factory organizations [of the Party—P.H.] were

intervening in the works council elections in a totally inadequate man-

ner”,44 and charges of district trade union councils against the “wrong con-

cept that the Party should have a leading role in the factories vis-à-vis the

ROH factory groups”45—faced with all these objections, Party organiza-

tions in the factories apparently did not think it advisable to add more fuel

to the flames.46

——————

40 Minutes of the conference of the cadre and social political department [of the
United
Kladno Steelworks
], March 21, 1949. Státní oblastní archiv, Prague. Inventory SONP, no.

10, 1949–1960.

41 Report on works council elections [November 1951]. NA, inventory 014/12, volume 7, no. 9.—In March 1948, the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party was compelled to

merge with the KSČ.

42 Cf. for the Plzeň
Škoda Works
: Minutes of the meeting of the works council’s workteam

[of the
Škoda Works
] together with youth representatives [1950]. Škoda archives, ROH

13/669.

43 Report on the delegation to Příbram-Březové Hory, August 18, 1948. VOA, ÚVOS-

horníci, box 5, 1948.

44 Minutes of discussions held by the political secretariat of the Olomouc district trade union council, May 18, 1950. VOA, KOR, box 14, 1950, no. 59.

45 Letter of the ROH district secretary in Olomouc to the Central Council of trade unions, April 12, 1950. Ibid.

46 Report of trade union instructor Málek on his activities from October 29 to November 2, 1951. VOA, ÚRO-Org., box 105, no. 382.

W O R K S C O U N C I L E L E C T I O N S I N C Z E C H O S L O V A K I A 195

Works council officials, for their part, made it clear that they would not

care for any instructions “from above” concerning elections—whether

issued by the Party or the trade unions—and considered an election proce-

dure “suitable for the factory” to be the proper option. “Your guidelines

[for works council elections—P.H.] are of no use, we have to do it in our

factory in a way that is in line with the circumstances prevailing here”, the

chairman of a works council in Ružomberok told the instructor of the

Žilina district trade union council.47 Many officials of Communist factory

cells did not approve of the orders given by their political bosses either

complaining that the factory cells would have to “iron out” what was

“bungled by those above”.48

Only as late as 1953, however, did this kind of stubborn localism as-

sume wider dimensions. In May 1953, the trade union of the iron and steel

industry grumbled at members of works councils “very often” disregarding

electoral regulations and deciding on their own who was to be elected.49 In

the same year, the České Budějovice district trade union council came out

very critically against this kind of high-handedness. Where the election

campaign had not been controlled in a “responsible” manner and the plan

to have “able officials of the KSČ factory organization” elected had mis-

fired, the trade unions’ rank and file were playing first fiddle in the elec-

tions. While this was proof of the “democratic character of elections, it

certainly does not strengthen political maturity of trade union organiza-

tions in the factories”.50

Defensive Stabilization after 1953: ROH Works Committees

After works councils had been restricted in their activities by the All-

Trade-Union Congress in 1955, they were replaced by act of law in 1959 by

ROH works committees (Sbírka 1959, 107–112). Thus, the second half of

the 1950s can be seen as a period when the turbulent development of in-

——————

47 Report of trade union instructor Pistovčák on his activities from November 5 to 15, 1951. Ibid.

48 Report on introduction of the new wage system in the Czechoslovak State Railways (October 1954). NA, inventory 014/12, vol. 15, no. 377.

49 Report on presentation of annual reports and on elections of trade union factory groups in the iron and steel industry [May 1953]. VOA, ÚRO-Org., box 140, no. 478a.

50 Evaluation of works council elections in the České Budějovice district [May 1953]. Ibid.

196

P E T E R H E U M O S

dustrial workers during the first five-year plan fizzled out (Kalinová 2007,

113–217). In actual fact, elections in the factories ceased to end up in con-

flicts and “election campaigns” against the bossy attitude of Party officials

only took place in exceptional cases.51 From 1953 up to the mid-sixties,

workers had obviously come to terms with the prevailing circumstances.52

Conditions, however, for successfully preventing the central authorities

from shaping the shop floor according to their ideas did not change for the

worse as ROH works committees remained, in many respects, on the

works councils’track. The possibility of maintaining opposition and thereby

upholding the democratic potential of works council elections of the early

1950s depended very much on the informal balance of power within the

factories.

The “plan fulfillment pact”, i.e. the informal agreement between man-

agement and workers to the effect that the mostly unlawful demands re-

sulting from daily work (extremely flexible working hours caused by abrupt

changes in the plans and stop-and-go material supply, uncomfortable

working conditions, etc.) had to be exchanged for social and material con-

cessions (Heumos 2008b), formed, without doubt, part of the protective

shield against central interference. Thus, for example, the extension of shift

work repeatedly required by the Party and the trade unions came to noth-

ing precisely because the industrial management put forward social argu-

ments against it.53 The “plan fulfillment pact” based on, among other

things, the fact that as early as 1950 one-third of factory directors were

former workers who had been promoted since 1948 (Kalinová 1993), re-

mained effective up to the 1960s. Due to this tacit agreement works coun-

cils and works committees maintained their strong informal position.54

——————

51 With regard to these exceptions see report of the Šimák delegation to Příbram, December 14, 1955. VOA, ÚVOS-horníci, box 33, 1955, fascicle 3, delegation reports.

52 Report on elections in factories of the Brno district, October 5, 1956. VOA, ÚRO-Org., box 157, no. 523/1.—Final report on elections [of the ROH works committees] and on annual general meetings and conferences. VOA, ÚVOS-horníci, 1959, box 89, fascicle

“Volby 1959–1960”.—Evaluation of annual general meetings of ROH works commit-

tees in 1965, July 8, 1965 (for the meeting of the presidency of the Central Council of trade unions on July 21, 1965). VOA, ÚRO-Před., box 75, no. 419 I/1.

53 Report of the trade union district committee for mechanical engineering of the South Moravian district on use of basic funds through shift work. VOA, strojírenství, box 55, 1962.

54 In accordance with the syndicalist aim of abolishing the traditional division of labor between white-collar and blue-collar workers (see minutes of the joint meeting of works council and ROH factory group, January 10, 1950. Škoda archives, ZVIL 1515/PV

W O R K S C O U N C I L E L E C T I O N S I N C Z E C H O S L O V A K I A 197

After 1953, there is every indication that ROH works committees and

Communist factory cells by way of informal interplay were trying to pro-

tect each other against influence “from outside”. Thus, in times of political

purges (1958), cadre appraisals were used for mutual confirmation of im-

peccable political behavior.55 A much more decisive factor with regard to

distribution of power on the shop floor was the “absorption” of KSČ

members by the social environment of works council members, as, for

instance, in a Prague-based aircraft factory. To be sure, the works council

in that plant had “many Communist” members, but would not hear any-

thing of the “leading role of the Party in the factory”.56 In the
Škoda Works
, too, the factory cells only just managed to mobilize their comrades in the

trade union organizations to keep to the Party line,57and, in the end, even

lost any control of ROH works committee.58 This case easily serves to

demonstrate to which extent KSČ members were “assimilated” by trade

unions. Out of 155 members of ten ROH works committees in the Plzeň

Škoda Works
in 1957, 119 were KSČ members.59 During the elections in

1958, however, the very same works committees prevented any Commu-

——————

1287), in the early fifties works councils assumed tasks of managers; in the area of the Prague district trade union council this was a “general phenomenon” as early as 1951.

Even in big factories works councils used the politically weak position of foremen to secure control over the organization of work (i.e. control over distribution of
hard
or
soft
work standards, over the fixing of premiums and bonuses, waiting and down-times, etc.) and thus gained quite considerable influence on the process of determining wages. The fact that the ROH works committees, too, were effectively controlling organization of work, can be seen from: Documents for the programmatic statement of the
Škoda Works
management referring to the period 1960–1968 [July 1969]. Škoda archives, RP, box 10, no. 180.

55 In April 1958, a leading member of an ROH works committee wrote (in a letter checked by security services): “… I have four perfect appraisals. The works committee gave me the appraisal ‘very good’, my boss appraised me ‘excellent’, the KSČ also ‘good’, and so did the cadre department. I myself, in turn, appraised them, so we cannot reproach each other with anything: It is tit for tat…” Quoted from: Overview of the insights gained from checks of correspondence on the reorganization of economy for April 1958. NA, inventory AN.

56 Report on the factory
Rudý Letov
in Prague-Letňany. VOA, strojírenství, box 10, 1954, fascicle 5.

57 Report on the party’s political situation in the
Škoda Works
[1958]. Škoda archives, PV

KSČ 1/430.

58 Report on the situation in the electric railway engine works, April 13, 1964. Škoda archives, PV KSČ 45, PŘ 560.