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USSR and the attendant need to establish newly independent states. Many

authors wrote of a transition to democracy and transitologists were
in vogue
to identify the shopping list of attributes necessary to move towards Western style democratic governance (O’Donnell et al. 1986; Przeworski 1991;

Lijphart and Waisman 1996; Diamond et al 1997; Schmitter 1994; von

Beyme, 1996).2 It is clear now that rather than the early elections being

mere bumps on the road to democracy they were in fact the foundation

blocks of new authoritarian states that used pre-
Glasnost
Soviet methods to consolidate power and demand obedience.

Another popular myth propagated by the regimes attributes imperfections

to the failure of the common people to embrace democratic values. In this

version, enlightened (and benign) elites are doing their best to promote

democracy and implement reforms as quickly as possible but are held back

by a recalcitrant people attached to old Soviet practices, tradition and

“Asian values”. However, all evidence suggests that it is the elite and not

the electorate who fear democracy most. Indeed,
Glasnost
had been an

unwelcome interlude when the first signs of democratic politics took root,

——————

2 The “epitaph” of transitology was announced by Thomas Carothers (2002).

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and Central Asian presidents simply turned the clock back to centralized

authoritarian rule. A democratic façade belies an unreconstructed pre-
Glas-

nost
communist model of dictatorship.

This chapter focuses on the five former Soviet republics of Central

Asia and, given the 20th century time frame of the book, analyzes primarily,

but not exclusively, the practices of the 1990s. The reader is provided with

a brief overview of the origins of Central Asian states before being fur-

nished with an appreciation of how elections were conducted during the

Soviet era. The menu of manipulation at the disposal of the incumbent

presidents is discussed and the obstacles facing potential opposition move-

ments identified. Integral to the argument presented here is the assertion

that Central Asian political regimes are as much neo-Soviet as post-Soviet.

To illuminate this thesis, the chapter will examine election campaigns in all

five Central Asian states. As the manipulation generally takes place behind

closed doors and potential whistleblowers are rarely given a microphone in

the national media, it is difficult to quantify. However, after almost two

decades of systemic falsification, an attempt can be made to assess how

electoral politics has been conducted in post-Soviet Central Asia.

Central Asian States: Where did they Come from?

Central Asian states are relatively new creations and in their present form

they are entirely a product of Soviet imperial power, which, with the arro-

gance of the imperial pen, carved out new territories for those peoples on

whom Russian ethnographers bestowed the title “nation”. Soviet rule was a

mixed blessing for Central Asians. Millions died in the process of collec-

tivization and purges but the new political dispensation brought moder-

nization, industrialization and literacy. Though the state boundaries were

entirely arbitrary, Central Asian states were afforded, within the sometimes

suffocating limitation of Soviet democratic centralism, the emblems and

structures of statehood—anthems, flags, and parliamentary institutions.

The Brezhnev years in particular are popularly remembered as a golden age

of stability and relative prosperity. Brezhnev’s policies of cadre stability

meant Central Asian peoples enjoyed the fruits of relative autonomy under

the (often corrupt) patronage of leaders who shared the ethnicity of the

titular nation. Independence when it came was accepted reluctantly, more a

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burden than a gift. Communist cadres reinvented themselves as national

leaders who now changed their political lexicon from Marxism-Leninism to

national independence, democracy and market reforms.

Back to the Future: Soviet Elections in Central Asia

During the Soviet era, the law was considered subservient to the regime; its

role was to facilitate the leadership, never to restrain it. Marxist zealots and their apologists argued that socialism was superior to any law and that the

quest to achieve full communism was too important to be subjected to

legal straitjackets. In 1927, the USSR Supreme Court effectively defined

itself out of existence by declaring that “Communism means not the vic-

tory of socialist laws, but a victory of socialism over any law”.3 Policies

enunciated by the communist leadership and five year plans would do away

with the need for laws. This system, with modifications, remained intact

for decades. Writing in the early 1980s, T. H. Rigby (1980, 12) noted that

The Soviet constitution, even in its latest variant, is a notoriously misleading and incomplete guide to the distribution of power in the system […] [The] core aspect of the Soviet system, the party-state relationship, is regulated, as it always has been, by discretion and not by law […] The Soviet regime […] has never been prepared

to limit itself within the rules it itself prescribes.

Even when the Cold War was at its peak, Soviet elections attracted re-

markably little attention from academics. It was assumed that, considering

the outcome was predetermined, the process was unworthy of scrutiny.

But despite—or because of—their irrelevancy in terms of political decision

making, elections were elaborate affairs, requiring immense organizational

effort. Over 50,000 Soviets at republican, regional and local levels were

regularly elected and subordinated to the Supreme Soviet, the Soviet of

Nationalities and, of course, the politburo. In 1984, the last pre-Gorbachev

elections, a staggering and almost identical number of citizens were

deemed to have cast their vote in elections to the Soviet of the Union

(99.95 per cent) and Soviet of Nationalities (99.94 per cent). In none of the

15 republics did turnout dip below 99.9 per cent (Russia was the lowest

with 99.91 per cent). In Central Asia, the results for the Soviet of the Un-

——————

3 Quoted in Linz and Stepan (1996, 248).

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ion were 99.93 per cent (Kyrgyzstan), 99.96 per cent (Kazakhstan), 99.98

per cent (Uzbekistan) and 99.99 per cent (Turkmenistan and Tajikistan)

with almost identical turnout for the Soviet of Nationalities.4 In Uzbeki-

stan, of almost eight and half a million voters only thirty failed to vote,

according to official sources, while in the whole of Turkmenistan there was

only one non-voter.

Such spectacular turnouts could only be achieved through a combina-

tion of great organizational effort and bending the rules. The manner of

casting a ballot spoke volumes. Voters were usually presented with a single

candidate and could either leave the ballot unmarked, thus signaling ap-

proval, or put a line through the name of the candidate indicating that he

or she rejected the candidate. Thus, a “good citizen”, who readily endorsed

the party nominee, would simply register at the table, collect their ballot

and walk to the ballot box and cast their vote without making a mark or

entering the booth. To enter the booth could only indicate an intention to

cross out a candidate’s name, spoil ones vote or write comments on the

paper. It was thus a subtle yet effective deterrent against dissident behav-

ior, a powerful tool to promote conformity and acquiescence. Mobile bal-

lot boxes brought to those unable to make it to the polling station also

boosted turnout and limited the options for making a protest.5 In the 1984

elections, votes against candidates were extremely rare. Only one in every

1,686 votes cast to the Soviet of the Union and every 1,897 Soviet of Na-

tionalities were against candidates.6

There was very little one could do with their vote beyond fulfilling

one’s duty and demonstrating loyalty to the regime. According to official

figures, invalid votes were very small in number. Of 183,897,278 votes cast

in the 1984 elections to the Soviet of the Union only 17 were deemed in-

valid. At the level of small villages, where only a few votes were cast, it was

sometimes possible to reject a candidate. It was still a very rare occurrence;

in 1975, one in every 30,000 electoral contests ended with a candidate

failing to secure 50 per cent of the vote (Smith 1988, 102). The majority

who went to the polling booth (estimated to be between two and five per

cent) (Smith 1988, 103) most likely did so to write something on the ballot

——————

4 Statistics for elections to Supreme Soviet (Soviet of the Union and Soviet of Nationalities) from Izvestia, March 7, 1984, 1.

5 Based on author’s interview with Dr. Vladimir Kibenko of Kharkiv State University and KGB Colonel (retired) Vladimir Bezruchenko in Yalta, July 10–11, 2009.

6 Izvestia, March 7, 1984, 1.

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paper knowing that the vigilant bureaucracy would take note of any

marked ballots and that through this form of petitioning something might

be done to solve their pet grievance. Since voting was anonymous and