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Elections in Central Asia, thus, are managed, rather than won or lost. It

is not enough that power is monopolized but competition for power is also

controlled by the ruling regime. Central Asian regimes do not resort to

limiting the franchise. This would give the game away and deny much-

sought legitimacy. Instead, they have fallen back on the Soviet trick of

endowing everyone with a meaningless vote with which they can do any-

thing but change the regime. Even if they decided not to go to the polling

booths, turnout figures will be boosted to deny them even this token act of

defiance. In this sense, there is much less competition in, say, contempo-

rary Uzbekistan, than there was in competitive oligarchies like 19th century

Britain or South Africa under apartheid. Elections, therefore, are not de-

terminative; there is only one possible outcome and the only question—

rarely posed—is how the result will be received domestically by the oppo-

sition (if one exists) and international opinion (if it can influence the re-

gime).

Central Asian elections, like their Soviet predecessors are noteworthy

for the extraordinary turnout, probably the highest among states whose

electoral legislation does not prescribe compulsory voting. Drained of any

life, however, political parties do not have the means nor the ability to

inspire turnout. Moreover, since parties merely support power rather than

exercise it, voters have no sense that by casting a ballot they are making the

slightest difference to their lives or the composition and character of the

political system. Thus,
it is the state and not the parties that bring the vote
out and even, as is most often the case, the state fails to arouse the electorate from

its political slumber, official figures will invariably record an astonishingly

high turnout. Campaigns in such environments are also “issue free”, for to

raise issues is to discuss issues and to discuss issues is to start talking about pros and cons, and before you know it someone has started questioning

government policy. Thus candidates are reduced to talking in terms of

vague aspirations without conceding that anything is actually wrong with

the status quo.

——————

per cent going to communists. Tajikistan’s communist party got 96 per cent of seats and was the only registered party. Though only state organizations nominated candidates (like large collectives) the number of candidates (878 for 350 seats) suggests unprecedented competition. **Figures refer only to first round voting for elections to the lower house of parliament. In 1995 and 2000, there were elections to a bi-cameral legislature, which included an upper house called the People’s Representative Assembly. Second round turnout for the lower house was 65.6 per cent in 1995 and 61.9 per cent in 2000.

In 2005, Kyrgyzstan reverted to a unicameral legislature.

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D O N N A C H A Ó B E A C H Á I N

Two potential obstacles to election manipulation are a vigilant media

and international election observers. The media were central to undermin-

ing authority in Ukraine (Kanal 5) and Georgia (Rustavi 2), facilitating

“color revolutions” following rigged elections in both countries (See Ó

Beacháin 2009a, 2009b; Polese 2009; Ó Beacháin and Polese 2009a,

2009b). The media environment in Central Asia, however, is not one that

lends itself to lively election campaigns.11 The local media is tightly con-

trolled and it is virtually impossible to conduct independent surveys. The

Internet is the only means through which alternative views can be ob-

tained. Internet penetration is very small in the countryside (where most of

the population live) and very expensive in urban centers.12 Opposition

websites are periodically blocked. Government pressure has meant media

self-censorship is deeply ingrained; newspapers no longer have to receive

formal instructions and are rarely admonished. Moreover, opposition

forces have found it impossible to establish alternative media sources.13

Though woefully partisan, Kazakhstan’s 2005 election coverage was per-

haps the best in terms of allowing opposition access to the airwaves and

even permitting a presidential debate. However, the president himself used

the opportunity to make an official visit to Ukraine and allowed the other

four candidates to debate among themselves at a time few television view-

ers with a job were likely to be at home.14

Election observers also provide a potential break on authoritarian ex-

cesses during national votes. For many Central Asian elections the OSCE

has provided the only detailed assessment but these missions have been

scaled down in recent years and challenged by more favorable assessments

from the (Russian-dominated) Commonwealth of Independent States

(CIS) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).15 Kazakhstan’s 2010

——————

11 Radio Free Europe//Radio Liberty, “Covering An Election In A Closed Country”, December 13, 2008, http://www.rferl.org/content/Turkmenistan_Covering_An_-Election_In_A_Closed_Country/1359433.html

12 Author’s observations in Central Asia from 2002–2008.

13 Azezkhan Kazhegeldin’s challenge against Nazarbayev in the late 1990s was doomed partially because he failed to establish a rival media empire as he had hoped (KTK—

“Commercial TV Channel”)

14 Based on observations of the author who was living in Kazakhstan during the 2004

parliamentary and 2005 presidential elections (See Kennedy 2006; Dave 2005; Ó

Beacháin 2005).

15 At time of writing (September 2009), the CIS is composed of all post-Soviet countries except the three Baltic States and Georgia. The SCO is composed of Russia, China and all Central Asian states except Turkmenistan.

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chairmanship of the OSCE damaged the credibility of that organization in

conducting its election-monitoring duties. Turkmenistan’s 2004 parliamen-

tary elections provide an example of how little scrutiny election fraud has

attracted. Foreign observers were not invited to observe the election.16

Instead, 200 members of the state-run Turkmen Institute for Democracy

and Human Rights under the President of Turkmenistan (TIDHR) were

entrusted with the task and they predictably gave the elections a clean bill

of health. This was an improvement on the 1999 elections when only ten

members of the TIDHR were entrusted with monitoring the national elec-

tions (which meant that there was one monitor for every 156 polling sta-

tions). The head of the Institute, Shemshat Atajanova, also served as vice-

chair of the 16 member Central Election Committee and obviously be-

lieved that there was no conflict of interest. As only one party was allowed

to contest the election, only one party filled the 50 seat legislature. A repeat performance in 2008 for an expanded 125-seat parliament was enthusiasti-cally endorsed by the CIS election monitoring mission. Despite the usual

array of fraud and irregularities, the organization’s Executive Secretary,

Sergey Lebedev, concluded that

The parliamentary elections were well-organized, competitive and free. They were held in compliance with election legislation in effect in the country and generally recognized norms of democratic elections, and were marked by high voter turnout

[…] The parliamentary elections in Turkmenistan have become an important fac-

tor in the further democratization of the Turkmen state and society.17

Not surprisingly, Central Asian dictators have increasingly sought the ser-

vices of CIS and SCO monitors to provide a counterbalance to western

critiques. In this way, something of a mutual support group has been es-

tablished among autocracies as monitors from non-democracies like Bela-

rus, Azerbaijan and China descend on Central Asia to approve the electoral

process and results, a favor happily reciprocated.

——————

16 In most former Soviet countries, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) plays a key role in monitoring elections. In 2004, however, the head of the OSCE in Turkmenistan was expelled from the country, having being accused of

“only looking for negative material”.

17 Turkmenistan.ru, December 15, 2008, “CIS observer mission highly rates parliamentary elections in Turkmenistan” http://www.turkmenistan.ru/?page_id=3&lang_id=en&-

elem_id=14158&type=event&sort=date_desc

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D O N N A C H A Ó B E A C H Á I N

Presidential Elections: Meet Mr. Ninety Per Cent

A two-round majority system for presidential elections is thought to have a

“decisive effect” on opposition attempts to forge successful coalitions (van

de Walle 2006). However, while all Central Asian states employ this elec-

toral system, there has never been a second ballot in any presidential elec-

tion; instead the incumbent wins the first round by an overwhelming ma-

jority. Rather than suffering from voter fatigue as the same face presents

himself for endorsement, election votes have often become more emphatic

over time. Official statistics tell a story of an indefatigable electorate who

turn out in implausibly high numbers to tell the leader that they want ab-

solutely no change at the top or indeed of any part of the political regime.

No. of

Incumbent vote

Opposition vote*

candidates

Uzbekistan 2 87.1 12.4

Turkmenistan

1

98.3

0.0

Kazakhstan

1

98.8

0.0

Kyrgyzstan

1

95.4

4.6

Tajikistan 6 56.9 33.1

Table 2: Founding Presidential Election in per cent (1990–1)18

With the exception of war-torn Tajikistan, which saw an effective
coup d’état
in 1994, and Kyrgyzstan, whose then liberal-leaning president depended

heavily on Western good-will, Central Asian presidents spent much of the

1990s avoiding elections by extending their terms of office. Turkmenistan’s

President Niyazov proved most effective in this regard when, after one

term extension, he dutifully accepted in 1999 the recommendation of the

people’s assembly he had personally appointed that he be relieved of elec-

toral burdens and made President for Life. Nazarbayev’s position in Ka-

zakhstan was not as all-powerful and he tried to pre-empt rising opposition

by first calling early elections in 1999 (all the more bewildering considering