allow a sex worker to see the variety within feminism, so that she need not think that feminists are unilaterally against sex work or against one form of sex work. Furthermore, taking responsibility for her sexuality will allow her to see the diversity among sex workers, especially those whose work may be much less lucrative or satisfying than her own. In this way her considered judgments about her own work and sex work generally will be better informed and more sensitive to feminist politics than before.
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From this perspective, the relevant question for both sex workers and feminists is not "What kind of sex do women like?" but "What kind of sex (if any) does this woman like?" If both women's and men's contemporary sexuality is a complex social construction under conditions in which patriarchal institutions define the norms of the sexual, then it makes no sense to ask, paraphrasing Freud, ''What do women really want?" Enmeshed as we are within the social framework that circumscribes our sexuality, we cannot know which aspects of our sexual lives are defined by conditions of women's sexual subordination by men and which are the "natural" conditions of women. Alan Soble critiques a Reichian sexual philosophy on the basis that we cannot know what kind of sexuality will emerge from repressive capitalist conditions, when all we know about that sexuality is circumscribed by those conditions. On this basis, however, I do not think that Soble can argue for his thesis that there will be pornography under communism with any more epistemological certainty than Reich has at his disposal. 138 The question of whether or not there will be sex work in the ideal society assumes that there is one ideal to which individual women and men universally subscribe and to which we all have the same epistemological access, a perspective firmly ensconced in the "view from nowhere," which I have argued greatly misrepresents the variety and complexity of women's sexuality. What we can say is that our individual attitudes toward our own and others' sexualities is quixotic and complex enough to warrant skepticism about making generalizations concerning what women (and men) may derive politically or personally from sex work. As with Andrea Dworkins's Mercy , the subject/object dialectic in sex work makes distinctions between pornography, erotica, and feminist moral realism tenuous even when their contexts are carefully noted. Robert Stoller has pointed out, "In both art and erotics, each episode feels different and is done differently from every other episode , even in the same person" (Stoller's italics). 139 Feelings of power and powerlessness, fear and rage, tenderness and intimacy often paradoxically combine to form a single human sexual relationship. Sex work, like sex, is simply too complexly motivated to lend itself to easy analysis or simple categories.
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To affirm this ambiguous, contradictory, and uncertain space is typically unpopular with philosophers and feminists who require analytically and morally determinable foundations from which to argue their positions. My thesis throughout this book has been that while both feminism and philosophy are essential to clarify the issues that divide people over sex, it is a mistake to treat sex itself as capable of conceptual and moral clarity. What we do need is more women talking and listening to each other, so that we will feel united, not divided, by our diversity; and we need more women talking to men who perform sex work, more women listening to men who are embarrassed, confused, or themselves enraged by sex work, and more women willing to "world"-travel to the social location of men who simply cannot get
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