Sex, Marriage and Family in World Religions (27 page)

3.1.
Concerning the consent which makes marriage.
Moreover, the efficient cause of marriage is consent, not any kind but that expressed by words, not in the future tense but in the present tense. For if they consent in the future tense, saying I will take you as my husband, and I will take you as my wife, this consent does not make marriage. Likewise, if they consent in their minds and do not express it by words or by other sure signs, neither does such consent make marriage. Moreover, if consent were expressed in words, even though they did not will it in their heart, then that bond of the words with which they consented, saying I take you as my husband and I take you as my wife, makes marriage, provided that there was no coercion or deceit there. . . .

4.1.
When marriage begins to exist.
But, in fact, they are spouses from that promise in which the marital agreement is expressed. . . .

5.1.
According to some there is no marriage before sexual intercourse, but rather
they are betrothed persons.
Some, nevertheless, assert that true marriage is not contracted before the bride is handed over and sexual intercourse occurs, nor are they truly spouses before sexual union occurs, but rather that from the first promise of betrothal the man is a bridegroom and the woman a bride, not a spouse. Moreover, they say that betrothed men and women are frequently called “spouses” not because they are but because they will be, since they have made a solemn promise between them concerning this matter. And on this account they claim that the words of the previous authorities must be understood in this way.

5.2
On what reason they depend.
But they argue further that there is a great difference between a bride and a wife from this, that although a bride is allowed to choose to enter a convent before consummation, without consulting her bridegroom or even when he is unwilling, this done, the bridegroom is also allowed to marry another. But a married man or a married woman cannot preserve continence, except by mutual consent, nor enter monastic life, unless both of them equally profess continence. . . .

b o o k 4 . d i s t i n c t i o n 2 8

2.1.
Those things which pertain to the necessity and those to the propriety of the
sacrament.
For in celebration of this sacrament, just as in others, there are 112

l u k e t i m o t h y j o h n s o n a n d m a r k d . j o r d a n certain things pertinent to the substance of the sacrament, such as present consent, which alone is sufficient to contract marriage. But there are certain things that are pertinent to the propriety and solemnity of the sacrament, such as the handing over of the bride by her parents, the blessing of the priest, and such like, without which the marriage occurs lawfully as to its power but not as to the propriety of the sacrament.

2.2. Therefore, without these things, they do not come together as lawful spouses but as adulterers and fornicators. So, too, those who marry in secret, they especially are fornicators, unless consent expressed in words of the present tense should support them, which consent makes a lawful marriage. For secret consent, expressed in words of the present tense, also makes marriage, although there it is not an honest contract. But consent does not ratify a marriage which was made in secret. For if one should dismiss the other, he or she is not forced to return and remain with his or her spouse by the judgment of the church, because a contract which was made in secret cannot be proved by witnesses.

But if they, themselves, who consented to each other in secret, should voluntarily declare that same consent in public, then the proper consent supports them and lawful vows help them to ratify the marriage which previously had been contracted secretly. Therefore, consent expressed secretly by words supports them that a marriage occurred, but expressed publicly supports them to sanction and strengthen the marriage, and makes
it
possible for the church to judge concerning this, if need be.

3.1.
Concerning the very nature of that consent, whether it is to sexual intercourse, to cohabitation, or to something else.
This is asked since present consent makes marriage, of what nature that consent is
,
whether it is to sexual intercourse or to cohabitation or to both. If consent to cohabitation makes marriage, then a brother is able to contract marriage with his sister, a father with his daughter. If it is to sexual intercourse, then there was no marriage between Mary and Joseph. For Mary proposed to remain a virgin unless God ordered her to do otherwise, according to that which she is seen to have said to the angel: “How can this be since I do not know a man?” (Luke 1.34). That is, I have decided that I will not know a man. For it was not necessary for her to ask how she could have a son because she did not then know a man but because she had decided she would never do so. Bede, in his Commentary on Luke, said that she intended to remain a virgin. Therefore, if she afterwards consented to sexual intercourse, contrary to her intention, it would seem that she would have been guilty concerning the vow, even if it was not violated in deed.

3.2.
Behold what that consent was to.
Therefore, let us say that consent to cohabitation or to sexual intercourse does not make marriage, but rather consent to conjugal partnership, expressed according to words
in
the present tense, as when a man says, “I take you as my wife,” not mistress, not servant, but spouse.

Christianity
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b o o k 4 . d i s t i n c t i o n 2 9

1.3. From this it appears that marriage is to be made between persons consenting voluntarily, not between those resisting and unwilling. Nevertheless, those who are unwilling and forced to marry, if afterwards they cohabited for some length of time, without objection and complaint, with the ability to separate and the disposition to protest, they would seem to consent and that consequent consent supplies that which the preceding coercion took away. . . .

b o o k 4 . d i s t i n c t i o n 3 0

3.2. Therefore, the final cause [goal, purpose] for contracting marriage is prin-cipally the procreation of children. For, on account of this, God instituted marriage between the first parents, to whom He said: “Go forth and multiply.”

The second reason, after the sin of Adam, is to avoid fornication. Whence the Apostle Paul said: “On account of fornication let each man have his own wife and each woman her own husband” (1 Cor. 7.2). And there are other honest reasons such as the reconciliation of enemies and the reestablishment of peace.

There are also other less honest reasons, on account of which it is sometimes contracted, such as the beauty of a man or woman which frequently impels souls inflamed by love to enter into marriage, so that they are able to satisfy their desire. Also, profit and the possession of riches is frequently a reason for marriage; and there are many others which it is easy for the diligent reader to discern. . . .

b o o k 4 . d i s t i n c t i o n 3 1

5.1.
Concerning the excusing of intercourse which happens for the sake of these
goods.
Therefore, when these three goods [faithfulness, sacrament, children]

occur together in any marriage they can excuse sexual intercourse. For when

spouses join for the sake of conceiving children, preserving the faithfulness of the marriage bed, intercourse is thus excused so that it has no blame. But when they come together because of incontinence, with the good of offspring lacking, even though marital faithfulness is preserved, the intercourse is not thus excused so that it bears no blame, but the fault is venial. Whence Augustine wrote in his book,
On the Good of Marriage:
“Marital intercourse for the sake of procreation has no guilt, however, marital intercourse for the sake of satisfying concupiscence, even though with one’s spouse, on account of the faithfulness of the marriage bed, has venial guilt.” Likewise: “The fact that married people, conquered by lust, use each other beyond what is necessary for procreating children, I count among those things for which we say each day: ‘forgive us our trespasses.’”

[Translated in Love, Marriage, and Family in the Middle Ages: A Reader, ed. and trans. Jacqueline Murray (Peterborough: Broadview, 2001), pp. 171–176]

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l u k e t i m o t h y j o h n s o n a n d m a r k d . j o r d a n THE FOURTH LATERAN COUNCIL

The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) is counted by Roman Catholics an ecu-menical or churchwide council (and the fourth held at the Lateran Palace in Rome). Unlike some of its predecessors, it did indeed bring together hundreds of bishops and heads of religious houses, not to say representatives of sovereign rulers. The Council was convened by Pope Innocent III with the twin purposes of reconquering the Holy Land and reforming the western churches, especially in matters of pastoral practice. The two canons or individual pieces of legislation given here are only a small sample of the council’s decisions.

Document 2–14

f o u r t h l a t e r a n c o u n c i l , c a n o n s 5 0 – 5 1

Summary.
The prohibitions against marriage in the second and third degrees of affinity and against the union of the offspring from second marriages to a relative of the first husband, are removed. This prohibition does not apply beyond the fourth degree of consanguinity and affinity.

Text.
It must not be deemed reprehensible if human statutes change sometimes with the change of time, especially when urgent necessity or common interest demands it, since God himself has changed in the New Testament some things that He had decreed in the Old. Since, therefore, the prohibition against the contracting of marriage in the second and third kind of affinity [or degree of familial relation] and that against the union of the offspring from second marriages to a relative of the first husband, frequently constitute a source of difficulty and sometimes are a cause of danger to souls, that by a cessation of the prohibition the effect may cease also, we, with the approval of the holy council, revoking previous enactments in this matter, decree in the present statute that such persons may in the future contract marriage without hin-drance. The prohibition also is not in the future to affect marriages beyond the fourth degree of consanguinity and affinity; since in degrees beyond the fourth a prohibition of this kind cannot be generally observed without grave incon-venience. This quaternary number agrees well with the prohibition of corporal wedlock of which the Apostle says that “the wife hath not power of her own body, but the husband; and in like manner the husband also hath not power of his own body, but the wife” (1 Cor. 7:4); because there are four humors in the body, which consists of four elements. Since therefore the prohibition of conjugal union is restricted to the fourth degree, we wish that it remain so in perpetuity, notwithstanding the decrees already issued relative to this matter either by others or by ourselves, and should anyone presume to contract mar-Christianity 115

riage contrary to this prohibition, no number of years shall excuse him, since duration of time does not palliate the gravity of sin but rather aggravates it, and his crimes are the graver the longer he holds his unhappy soul in bondage.

Summary.
Clandestine marriages and witness to them by a priest are forbidden.

Marriages to be contracted must be published in the churches by the priests so that, if legitimate impediments exist, they may be made known. If doubt exists, let the contemplated marriage be forbidden till the matter is cleared up.

Text.
Since the prohibition of the conjugal union in the three last degrees has been revoked, we wish that it be strictly observed in the other degrees.

Whence, following in the footsteps of our predecessors, we absolutely forbid clandestine marriages; and we forbid also that a priest presume to witness such.

Wherefore, extending to other localities generally the particular custom that prevails in some, we decree that when marriages are to be contracted they must be announced publicly in the churches by the priests during a suitable and fixed time, so that if legitimate impediments exist, they may be made known.

Let the priests nevertheless investigate whether any impediments exist. But when there is ground for doubt concerning the contemplated union, let the marriage be expressly forbidden until it is evident from reliable sources what ought to be done in regard to it. But if anyone should presume to contract a clandestine or forbidden marriage of this kind within a prohibited degree, even through ignorance, the children from such a union shall be considered illegitimate, nor shall the ignorance of the parents be pleaded as an extenuating circumstance in their behalf, since they by contracting such marriages appear not as wanting in knowledge but rather as affecting ignorance. In like manner the children shall be considered illegitimate if both parents, knowing that a legitimate impediment exists, presume to contract such a marriage before the church in disregard of every prohibition. The parochial priest who deliberately neglects to forbid such unions, or any regular priest who presumes to witness them, let them be suspended from office for a period of three years and, if the nature of their offense demands it, let them be punished more severely. On those also who presume to contract such marriages in a lawful degree, a condign punishment is to be imposed. If anyone maliciously presents an impediment for the purpose of frustrating a legitimate marriage, let him not escape ecclesiastical punishment.

[
Disciplinary Decrees of the General Councils: Text, Translation, and Commentary,
trans. and ed. H. J. Schroeder (St. Louis: Herder, 1937), pp. 279–281]

THOMAS AQUINAS

During the last four or five centuries Thomas Aquinas (1224/25–1274) has been firmly established as a leading authority for Roman Catholic theology. In his 116

l u k e t i m o t h y j o h n s o n a n d m a r k d . j o r d a n own lifetime he was regarded as brilliant and controversial, especially in his appropriation of non-Christian philosophy and natural science. The selection here is drawn from his
Summa “Against the Gentiles”
(1261–1265) in which Thomas explores how far philosophic argument can reach in understanding God, the world, and human beings. In it he reasons from human nature to secure basic moral principles for marriage.