The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (120 page)

166.
Dallek,
American Style of Foreign Policy
, p. 23

167.
Beale,
Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power
, passim; Dallek,
American Style of Foreign Policy, ch
. 2; Schulzinger,
American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century
, pp. 24–38.

168.
See especially the criticisms in G. F. Kennan,
American Diplomacy
(Chicago, 1984 edn.), chs. 1–3; and Dallek,
American Style of Foreign Policy
, passim.

169.
U.S. naval growth and naval policy in this period are now very well covered. Apart from Potter (ed.),
Sea Power
, chs. 15 and 17–18, see K. J. Hagan (ed.),
In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775–1978
(West-port, Conn., 1978), chs. 9–10; W. R. Braisted,
The United States Navy in the Pacific, 2
vols. (Austin, Texas, 1958 and 1971); and the older works H. and M. Sprout,
The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776–1918
(Princeton, N.J., 1946 edn.), and W. Mills,
Arms and Men
(New York, 1956), ch. 2.

170.
Apart from Braisted’s important works, see R. D. Challenor,
Admirals, Generals and American Foreign Policy 1898–1914
(Princeton, N.J., 1973); J.A.S. Grenville and G. B. Young,
Politics, Strategy and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873–1917
(New Haven, Conn., 1966).

171.
Challenor,
Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy
, passim; H. H. Herwig,
Politics of Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning, 1889–1941
(New York, 1976). For the improvement in Anglo-American relations, see C. S. Campbell,
From Revolution to Rapprochement: The United States and Great Britain, 1783–1900
(New York, 1974), chs. 13–14.

172.
Millet and Maslowski,
For the Common Defense
, chs. 9–10. For further details, see D. F. Trask,
The War with Spain in 1898
(New York, 1981); and G. A. Cosmas,
An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War
(Columbia, Missouri, 1971). Also useful on the change of attitudes is J. L. Abrahamson,
America Arms for a New Century
(New York, 1981); R. Weigley,
History of the United States Army
, chs. 13–14.

173.
See again Tables 14–20 above.

174.
F. Gilbert,
The End of the European Era, 1890 to the Present
(3rd edn., New York, 1984), p. 110. For detailed analyses of these decades, see Taylor,
Struggle for Mastery in Europe
, pp. 325ff; Bridge and Bullen,
Great Powers and the European States System
, chs. 6–8; Albrecht-Carrié,
Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna
, pp. 207ff; Bartlett,
Global Conflict
, chs. 2–3.

175.
B. Waller,
Bismarck at the Crossroads: The Reorientation of German Foreign Policy After the Congress of Berlin 1878–1880
(London, 1974), p. 195. See also Taylor,
Struggle for Mastery
, pp. 258ff; and Kennan,
Decline of Bismarck’s European Order
, pp. 73ff.

176.
Kennan,
Decline of Bismarck’s European Order
, passim; and idem,
The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia, and the Coming of the First World War
(New York, 1984), passim. The German side is well covered in N. Rich,
Friedrich von Holstein, 2
vols. (Cambridge, 1965), vol. 1, passim.

177.
The argument that the European scene was “stabilized” in the 1890s, permitting the turn toward colonial issues, is best covered in W. L. Langer,
The Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890–1902
(New York, 1951 edn.), passim.

178.
Langer’s phrase: see ibid., ch. 13; and, more generally, Padfield,
Battleship Era, ch
. 14.

179.
On this transformation, see again Perkins,
Great Rapprochement
, passim; Campbell,
From Revolution to Rapprochement, ch
. 14.

180.
The standard work here is I. H. Nish,
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance
(London, 1966); but see also C. J. Lowe,
The Reluctant Imperialists: British Foreign Policy 1878–1902, 2
vols. (London, 1967), vol. 1, ch. 10.

181.
Taylor,
Struggle for Mastery in Europe, ch
. 18; Andrew,
Delcassé and the Making
of the Entente Cordiale
, passim; Albrecht-Carrié,
Diplomatic History
, pp. 232ff. See also the comments in M. Behnen,
Rüstung-Bündnis-Sicherheit
(Tübingen, 1985).

182.
This is best covered in Andrew,
Delcassé
, passim; and G. L. Monger,
The End of Isolation; British Foreign Policy 1900–1907
(London, 1963).

183.
O. J. Hale,
Germany and the Diplomatic Revolution 1904–1906
(Philadelphia, Pa., 1931); Kennedy,
Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, ch
. 14.

184.
Kennedy,
Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism
, pp. 268ff; further details in B. Vogel,
Deutsche Russlandpolitik, 1900–1906
(Düsseldorf, 1973).

185.
The complicated events are covered in the works by Taylor, Monger, Andrew, Rich, and Kennedy, cited above. See also H. Raulff,
Zwischen Machtpolitik und Imperialismus: Die deutsche Frankreichpolitik 1904–5
(Düsseldorf, 1976); and Lambi’s excellent
Navy and German Power Politics 1862–1914, ch
. 13.

186.
Taylor,
Struggle for Mastery, ch
. 19; Z. Steiner,
Britain and the Origins of the First World War
(London, 1977), ch. 2 et seq. For the Russian response to the 1909 humiliation, see Lieven,
Russia and the Origin of the First World War
, pp. 36ff.

187.
Steiner,
Britain and the Origins of the First World War
, pp. 200ff; Williamson,
Politics of Grand Strategy
, passim, espec. ch. 7.

188.
The most detailed study of these events is L. Albertini,
The Origin of the War of 1914
, 3 vols. (London, 1952–57); but there are good succinct accounts in L.C.F. Turner,
Origins of the First World War
(London, 1970); J. Joll,
Origins of the First World War
, chs. 2–3; and Langhorne,
Collapse of the Concert of Europe
, chs. 6–7.

189.
The literature upon pre-1914 war plans is immense; for surveys, see P.M. Kennedy (ed.),
The War Plans of the Great Powers 1880–1914
(London/Boston, 1979); S. E. Miller (ed.),
Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War
(Princeton, N.J., 1985); J. Snyder,
The Ideology of the Offensive
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1984).

190.
Strachan,
European Armies and the Conduct of War, ch
. 9; B. E. Schmitt and H. C. Vedeler,
The World in the Crucible 1914–1919
(New York, 1984), pp. 62ff.

191.
Kennedy,
Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, ch
. 9.

192.
For this argument, see L. L. Farrar,
The Short-War Illusion
(Santa Barbara, Calif., 1973), passim.

193.
On which see, briefly, Schulzinger,
American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century
, pp. 62ff; and, in more detail, D. M. Smith,
The Great Departure: The United States and World War I, 1914–1920
(New York, 1965); P. Devlin,
Too Proud to Fight: Woodrow Wilsons Neutrality
(New York, 1975); E. R. May,
The World War and American Isolation
(Chicago, 1966 edn.); A. S. Link,
Wilson
, 5 vols. to date (Princeton, N.J., 1947–65), vols. 3–5.

194.
Bosworth,
Italy, the Least of the Great Powers
, is best here.

195.
On which distractions, see P. Guinn,
British Strategy and Politics, 1914–1918
(Oxford, 1965); Beloff,
Imperial Sunset
, vol. 1, ch. 5; and D. French,
British Strategy and War Aims 1914–1916
(London/Boston, 1986), passim.

196.
Rothenberg,
Army of Francis Joseph
, chs. 12–14, is an excellent analysis of Austro-Hungarian military policy—including both strengths and weaknesses—during the war.

197.
For this argument, see Steiner,
Britain and the Origins of the First World War, ch
. 9; Kennedy,
Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism
, pp. 458ff.

198.
For a more extended argument on these lines, see Kennedy,
British Naval Mastery, ch
. 9.

199.
Ibid.

200.
Strachen,
European Armies and the Conduct of War, ch
. 9; and see also the
excellent analysis of the problem in S. Bidwell and D. Graham,
Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904–1945
(London, 1982), chs. 4–8. For a succinct survey, see B. Bond, “The First World War,” in
NCMH.
, vol. 12, ch. 7.

201.
For excellent examples, see Stone,
Eastern Front
, p. 265 and passim.

202.
Van Creveld,
Supplying War, ch
. 4, is convincing here. See also the critique in G. Ritter,
The Schlieffen Plan
(New York, 1958), and in L.C.F. Turner, “The Significance of the Schlieffen Plan,” in Kennedy (ed.),
War Plans of the Great Powers
, pp. 199–221.

203.
For further details, see Stone,
Eastern Front
, chs. 3–8; Schmitt and Vedeler,
World in the Crucible
, chs. 4–5; B. H. Liddell Hart,
History of the First World War
(London, 1970 edn.), chs. 4–5; Lincoln,
Passage Through Armageddon
, chs. 2–4.

204.
Schmitt and Vedeler,
World in the Crucible, ch
. 6; J. L. Stokesbury,
A Short History of World War I
(New York, 1981), chs. 11–12.

205.
See, for example, Stone on Russia, in
Eastern Front, ch
. 9; Barnett on Britain, in
Collapse of British Power
, pp. 113ff; McNeill on France, in
Pursuit of Power
, pp. 318ff.

206.
Apart from McNeill’s excellent general survey, see also G. Hardach,
The First World War 1914–1918
(London, 1977), espec. chs. 4 and 6; and A. Marwick,
War and Social Change in the Twentieth Century
(London, 1974), chs. 2–3.

207.
See again Rothenberg,
Army of Francis Joseph
, chs. 12–14; for the internal problems, Kann,
History of the Habsburg Empire, ch
. 9; A. J. May,
The Passing of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914–1918
, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, Pa., 1966), passim.

208.
See especially the paper by J. Gooch, “Italy During the First World War,” in the forthcoming collection A. Millett and W. Murray (eds.),
Military Effectiveness
.

209.
J.A.S. Grenville,
A World History of the Twentieth Century 1900–1945
(London, 1980), vol. 1, pp. 218–19.

210.
Stone,
Eastern Front
, passim, has excellent details (even if his case for Russia’s industrial successes begs certain questions). See also Seton-Watson,
Russian Empire
, pp. 698ff; and D. R. Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Armed Forces at War, 1914–1918: An Analysis of Combat Effectiveness,” in Millett and Murray (eds.),
Military Effectiveness
. The role of the Moscow industrialists and their quarrels with the ministries is detailed in L. H. Siegelbaum,
The Politics of Industrial Mobilization in Russia, 1914–1917
(New York, 1984); and there is further massive detail in A. L. Sidorov,
The Economic Position of Russia During the First World War
(Moscow, 1973 trans.). The czar’s own efforts are examined in D. R. Jones, “Nicholas II and the Supreme Command,”
Sbornik
, vol. 11 (1985), pp. 47–83.

211.
Schmitt and Vedeler,
World in the Crucible
, pp. 188–99. This quotation is from N. Golovine,
Russian Army in the World War
(New Haven, 1932), p. 281. For the casualty numbers, and the discontents at the “second-category” call-up, see Wildman,
End of the Russian Imperial Army, ch
. 3; and the nice survey in Lincoln,
Passage Through Armageddon
, passim.