The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (123 page)

69.
For the decision itself, see Willmott,
Empires in the Balance, ch
. 3; Hayashi and Coox,
Kogun
, pp. 19ff; Barnhart, “Japan’s Economic Security,” pp. 116ff; I. Nobutaka (ed.),
Japan’s Decision for War
(Stanford, Calif., 1967), passim; Spector,
Eagle Against the Sun, ch
. 4; R. J. Butow,
Tojo and the Coming of War
(Princeton, N.J., 1961).

70.
For general surveys, see Craig,
Germany 1866–1945
, pp. 396ff; A. J. Nicholls,
Weimar and the Rise of Hitler
(London, 1979 edn.), passim. For summaries of the massive historiography, and hotly contested debates upon Germany in the Nazi era, see I. Kershaw,
The Nazi Dictatorship
(London, 1985); and K. Hildebrand,
The Third Reich
(London/Boston, 1984).

71.
Taylor,
Origins of the Second World War
, passim; J. Hiden,
Germany and Europe 1919–1939
(London, 1977), espec. ch. 7; F. Fischer,
Bündnis der Eliten
(Düsseldorf, 1979). For details of the “continuity” among the armed forces, see G. Schreiber,
Revisionismus und Weltmachtstreben
(Stuttgart, 1978), passim; J. Dülffer,
Weimar, Hitler und die Marine: Reichspolitik und Flottenbau 1920–1939
(Düsseldorf, 1973); M. Geyer,
Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit
(Wiesbaden, 1980). Also important for what follows is
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite
Weltkrieg
, vol. 1,
Ursachen und Voraussetzungen der deutschen Kriegspolitik
, eds. W. Deist et al. (Stuttgart, 1979).

72.
A. Bullock,
Hitler: A Study in Tyranny
(London, 1962 edn.); A. Hillgruber,
Germany and the Two World Wars
(Cambridge, Mass., 1981), espec. chs. 5 and 8; N. Rich,
Hitler’s War Aims, 2
vols. (London, 1973–74); G. Weinberg,
The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany, 2
vols. (Chicago, 1970 and 1980); and the literature in M. Hauner, “A Racial Revolution?”
Journal of Contemporary History
, vol. 19 (1984), pp. 669–87; Calleo,
The German Problem Reconsidered
, pp. 85–95; Gruner,
Die deutsche Frage
, pp. 145ff; A. Kuhn,
Hitlers aussenpolitisches Programm
(Stuttgart, 1970); E. Jackel,
Hitler’s Weltanschauung
(Middletown, Conn., 1982).

73.
The term comes from E. N. Petersen,
The Limits of Hitler’s Power
(Princeton, N.J., 1969); but see also Craig,
Germany 1860–1945, ch
. 17; Kershaw,
Nazi Dictatorship
, chs. 4 and 7; Hildebrand,
Third Reich
, pp. 83ff, 152ff; also I. Kershaw,
Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich: Bavaria 1933–1945
(Oxford, 1983).

74.
Murray,
Change in the European Balance of Power
, pp. 20–21; Hillman, “Comparative Strength of the Great Powers,” p. 454.

75.
Quoted in A. Seaton,
The German Army 1933–45
(London, 1982), p. 55. See also Craig,
Politics of the Prussian Army
, pp. 397ff.

76.
Seaton,
German Army 1933–45
, chs. 3–4, covers this breakneck expansion, as does W. Deist,
The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament
(London, 1981), chs. 3 and 6, with references to the extensive further literature.

77.
For more details, see Deist,
Wehrmacht, ch
. 4; Overy,
Air War
, p. 21; W. Murray,
Luftwaffe
(Baltimore, Md., 1985), ch. 1; E. L. Homze,
Arming the Luftwaffe
(Lincoln, Neb., 1976); K.-H. Volker,
Die deutsche Luftwaffe 1933–1939
(Stuttgart, 1967).

78.
Deist,
Wehrmacht
, p. 81; with much more detail in Dülffer,
Weimar, Hitler und die Marine
, passim; and M. Salewski,
Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945
, 3 vols. (Frankfurt, 1970–75).

79.
R. J. Overy,
The Nazi Economic Recovery 1932–1938
(London, 1932), pp. 19ff.

80.
Ibid., pp. 28ff. Overy’s brief work contains full references to further studies on the German economy under the Nazis.

81.
Deist,
Wehrmacht
, pp. 89–91 and passim; A. S. Milward,
The German Economy at War
(London, 1965), pp. 17–24.

82.
Murray,
Change in the European Balance of Power
, pp. 4ff, is the best summary here; but see also Hillmann, “Comparative Strength of the Powers,” pp. 368ff.

83.
Murray,
Balance of Power
, p. 15*.

84.
Ibid., pp. 15–16. See also the important chapter by H.-E. Volkmann, “Die NS-Wirtschaft in Vorbereitung des Krieges,” in Deist, et al.,
Ursachen und Voraussetzungen der deutschen Kriegspolitik
, espec. pp. 349ff.

85.
Deist,
Wehrmacht
, p. 90; Seaton,
German Army
, pp. 93–96.

86.
Quoted in Murray,
Luftwaffe
, p. 20; idem., “German Air Power and the Munich Crisis,” in Bond and Roy (eds.),
War and Society
, vol. 1, passim; Deist,
Wehrmacht
, pp. 66–69.

87.
B. R. Posen,
The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1984), passim; W. Murray, “German Army Doctrine, 1918–1939, and the Post-1945 Theory of Blitzkrieg Strategy,” in C. Fink et al. (eds.),
German Nationalism and the European Response 1890–1945
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1985), pp. 71–94; Dupuy,
Genius for War, ch
. 15.

88.
Murray,
Balance of Power
, pp. 150–51; and Volkmann, “Die NS-Wirtschaft in Vorbereitung des Krieges,” pp. 323ff. Details of the relationship between Germany’s economic difficulties and Hitler’s “forward” policy are in B. A. Carroll,
Design for Total War: Arms and Economics in the Third Reich
(The Hague, 1968); T. W. Mason, “Innere Krise und Angriffskrieg 1938/39,” in Forstmeier and Volkmann (eds.),
Wirtschaft und Rüstung am Vorabend des zweiten Weltkrieges
, pp. 158–88; J. Dulffer, “Der Beginn des Krieges 1939,”
Geschichte und Gesellschaft
, vol. 2 (1976), pp. 443–70.

89.
T. W. Mason, “Some Origins of the Second World War,” p. 125, in E. M. Robertson (ed.),
The Origins of the Second World War
(London, 1971); idem, “Innere Krise und Angriffskrieg 1938/39,” passim. Murray,
Balance of Power
, pp. 290ff, details the 1938 and 1939 plunder.

90.
R. J. Overy, “Hitler’s War and the German Economy: A Reinterpretation,”
Economic History Review
, 2nd series, vol. 35 (1982), pp. 272–91, is important here.

91.
Hillgruber,
Germany and the Two World Wars
, passim; Deist,
Wehrmacht, ch
. 7; Murray,
Luftwaffe
, pp. 81ff; M. Hauner, “Did Hitler Want a World Dominion?”
Journal of Contemporary History
, vol. 13, pp. 15–32;
J. Thies, Architekt der Weltherrschaft: Die “Endziele” Hitlers
(Düsseldorf, 1976), passim; and see the historiographical discussion in Kershaw,
Nazi Dictatorship, ch
. 6.

92.
On which see the two older works A. Wolfers,
Britain and France Between the Wars
(New York, 1940); and W. M. Jordan,
Britain, France and the German Problem
(London, 1943); as well as the essays in N. Waites (ed.),
Troubled Neighbours: Franco-British Relations in the Twentieth Century
(London, 1971); and N. Rostow,
Anglo-French Relations 1934–1936
(London, 1984), passim.

93.
C. Fohlen, “France,” in Cipolla (ed.),
Fontana Economic History of Europe
, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 80–86; T. Kemp,
The French Economy 1913–39: The History of a Decline
(New York, 1972), chs. 5–7; G. Ziebura, “Determinanten der Aussenpolitik Frankreichs 1932–1939,” in K. Rohe (ed.),
Die Westmächte und das Dritte Reich 1933–1939
(Paderborn, 1982), pp. 136ff. There are lots of details (also prejudiced commentary) in A. Sauvy,
Histoire économique de la France entre les deux guerres, 2
vols. (Paris, 1965–67); and more balance in
Histoire économique et sociale de la France
, vol. 4, pt. 2,
1914–1950
, eds. F. Braudel and E. Labrousse (Paris, 1980).

94.
Fohlen, “France,” p. 88.

95.
Ibid., pp. 86–91; Landes,
Unbound Prometheus
, pp. 388ff; Kemp,
French Economy 1913–39
, chs. 8–12 (with very good details); Caron,
Economic History of Modern France
, pp. 258ff.

96.
The best source here is R. Frankenstein,
Le Prix du réarmement français 193–1939
(Paris, 1939), passim, but p. 303 for the spending totals. The national-income figure is taken from A. Adamthwaite,
France and the Coming of the Second World War
(London, 1977), p. 164. See also B. A. Lee, “Strategy, Arms and the Collapse of France 1939–1940,” in R.T.B. Langhorne (ed.),
Diplomacy and Intelligence During the Second World War
(Cambridge, 1985), pp. 63ff.

97.
R. J. Young,
In Command of France: French Foreign Policy and Military Planning 1933–1940
(Cambridge, Mass., 1978), ch. 1; see also the essays in
Les Relations franco-allemandes 1933–1939
(Paris, 1976).

98.
Frankenstein,
Le Prix du réarmement français
, p. 317; idem, “The Decline of France, and French Appeasement Policies 1936–9,” in Mommsen and Kettenacker (eds.)
Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement
, p. 238; Overy,
Air War
, p. 21. The relatively generous treatment of the navy—and that service’s ingratitude—is detailed in R. Chalmers Hood,
Royal Republicans: The French Naval Dynasties Between the World Wars
(Baton Rouge, La., 1985).

99.
Frankenstein,
Le Prix des réarmement français
, p. 319; Murray,
Change in the European Balance of Power
, pp. 107–8. The navy’s strength by then is assessed
in P. Masson, “La Marine française en 1939–40,”
Revue historique des armées
, No. 4 (1979), pp. 57–77.

100.
No attempt will be made here to cover all the literature upon French politics and society in the 1930s and its relationship to the 1940 “strange defeat.” There are important surveys in J. B. Duroselle,
La Décadence 1932–1939
(Paris, 1979); R. Hohne, “Innere Desintegration und äusserer Machtzerfall: Die französische Politik in den Jahren 1933–36,” in Rohe (ed.),
Die Westmächte und das Dritte Reich
, pp. 157fï; H. Dubief,
Le Déclin de la III
^e
République 1929–1938
(Paris, 1976); J. Joll (ed.),
The Decline of the Third Republic
(New York, 1959). There is also a useful summary in J. C. Cairns, “Some Recent Historians and the ‘Strange Defeat’ of 1940,”
Journal of Modern History
, vol. 46 (1974), pp. 60–85.

101.
For details, see A. Home,
The French Army and Politics 1870–1970
(London, 1984), ch. 3; P.C.F. Bankwitz,
Maxime Weygand and Civil-Military Relations in Modern France
(Cambridge, Mass., 1967); the more technical details in Frankenstein,
Le Prix du réarmement français
, and H. Dutailly,
Les Problèmes de l’Armée de terre française 1933–1939
(Paris, 1980); and the more cautionary comments in R. A. Doughty, “The French Armed Forces, 1918–1940,” in Millett and Murray (eds.),
Military Effectiveness
, vol. 2.

102.
Adamthwaite,
France and the Coming of the Second World War
, p. 166; Gorce,
French Army: A Military-Political History
, pp. 270ff; Young, “French Military Intelligence and Nazi Germany,” in May (ed.),
Knowing One’s Enemies
, pp. 271–309.

103.
Posen,
Sources of Military Doctrine, ch
. 4; Doughty, “French Armed Forces, 1918–1940,” passim; Murray,
Change in the European Balance of Power
, pp. 97ff; L. Mysyrowicz,
Autopsie d’une Défaite; Origines de l’effondrement militaire français de 1940
(Lausanne, 1973). But the most thorough analysis is now R. A. Doughty,
The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine 1919–1939
(Hamden, Conn., 1985).

104.
French diplomacy in these critical years is best covered in Adamthwaite,
France and the Coming of the Second World War
, passim; Duroselle,
La Décadence
, passim; and P. Wandycz,
The Twilight of the French Eastern Alliances, 1926–1936
(forthcoming).

105.
See R. Girault, “The Impact of the Economic Situation on the Foreign Policy of France, 1936–9,” in Mommsen and Kettenacker (eds.),
Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement
, pp. 209–26.