The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (126 page)

7.
Quoted in Ropp,
War in the Modern World
, p. 336.

8.
Ibid., p. 334. For much fuller details, see Erickson,
Road to Stalingrad
, passim; idem,
The Road to Berlin
(London, 1983), passim; E. F. Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East 1942–1945
(Washington, D.C., 1968); Clark,
Barbarossa
, passim; and Seaton,
Russo-German War 1941–45
, passim.

9.
Erickson,
Road to Stalingrad
, p. 272.

10.
Dupuy,
Genius for War
, p. 343.

11.
Clark,
Barbarossa
, chs. 17–18; Erickson,
Road to Berlin, ch
. 4.

12.
These rivalries come out clearly in Clark,
Barbarossa
, passim; and are covered in more detail in Milward,
German Economy at War
, espec. ch. 6; Speer’s own
Inside the Third Reich
(New York, 1982 edn.), pts. 2–3; Seaton,
German Army, 1933–45
, chs. 9–11; Hildebrand,
Third Reich
, pp. 49ff.

13.
Kennedy, “Japanese Strategic Decisions, 1939–45,” in
Strategy and Diplomacy
, pp. 181–95; C. G. Reynolds, “Imperial Japan’s Continental Strategy,”
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
, vol. 109 (August 1983), pp. 65–71; Spector,
Eagle Against the Sun
, passim; and the excellent survey by A. Coox, “The Effectiveness of the Japanese Military Establishment in World War II,” in Millett and Murray (eds.),
Military Effectiveness
, vol. 3.

14.
Willmott,
Empires in the Balance
, p. 89.

15.
R. Lewin,
The American Magic: Codes, Cyphers and the Defeat of Japan
(New York, 1982), is the best synthesis.

16.
Clark,
Barbarossa
, p. 228; Erickson,
Road to Stalingrad, ch
. 6. For Soviet war production, see Nove,
Economic History of the USSR., ch
. 10; Munting,
Economic Development of the USSR, ch
. 5; A. Milward,
War, Economy and Society 1939–1945
(Berkeley, Calif., 1979), pp. 94ff.

17.
see Table 34 below; and Overy,
Air War
, pp. 49ff.

18.
Erickson,
Road to Berlin
, p. 447. See also the figures in Liddell Hart (ed.),
Red Army, ch
. 13.

19.
Liddell Hart,
History of the Second World War
, p. 559.

20.
For this trend, see such works as Dupuy,
Genius for War
, passim; M. van Creveld,
Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939–1945
(Westport, Conn., 1982), passim; M. Hastings,
Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy
(London, 1984), pp. 14, 370, and passim.

21.
Ropp,
War in the Modern World
, p. 342. For details of the Japanese “overstretch,” see Hayashi and Coox,
Kogun
. More generally, see the similar argument in A. J. Levine, “Was World War II a Near-Run Thing?”
Journal of Strategic Studies
, vol. 8, no. 1 (March 1985), pp. 38–63.

22.
Figures from Willmott,
Empires in the Balance
, p. 98.

23.
Ropp,
War in the Modern World
, p. 328, quoting from S. E. Morison,
History of United States Naval Operations
, vol. 10,
The Atlantic Battle Won
(Boston, 1956), p. 64. For further details, see Roskill,
The War at Sea
, 3 vols., passim; Liddell Hart,
History of the Second World War, ch
. 24; Potter (ed.),
Sea Power, ch
. 24; Levine, “Was World War II a Near-Run Thing?” pp. 46ff.

24.
For comparisons, see Kennedy,
Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery
, pp. 309–10; Seaton,
German Army 1933–45
, p. 239 (Seaton includes self-propelled guns with these tank totals).

25.
Overy,
Air War
, p. 150. Overy’s figures for Italian production in the first half of the war are much less than those given in Table XVIII of James J. Sadkovich’s article “Minerals, Weapons and Warfare: Italy’s Failure in World War II,”
Storia contemporanea
(forthcoming).

26.
Overy,
Air War
, p. 150.

27.
Murray,
Luftwaffe
, chs. 6–7.

28.
See Tables 30 and 32 above.

29.
Hillman, “Comparative Strength of the Powers,” in Toynbee (ed.),
World in March 1939
, pp. 439, 446; Wright,
Study of War
, p. 672. See also R. W. Goldsmith, “The Power of Victory: Munitions Output in World War II,”
Military Affairs
, vol. 10 (Spring 1946), pp. 69–80.

30.
Figures from R. Wagenführ,
Die deutsche Industrie im Kriege 1939–1945
(Berlin, 1963), pp. 34, 87. The Italian figures are my own very rough “guestimates,” based upon the size of its economy relative to those of the other Powers. For further comparisons, see F. Forstmeier and H. E. Volkmann (eds.),
Kriegswirtschaft und Rüstung 1939–1945
(Düsseldorf, 1977).

31.
Milward,
German Economy at War
, pp. 72ff; Wagenführ,
Die deutsche Industrie in Kriege, ch
. 3; and for more general comparisons, Aldcroft,
European Economy 1914–1980
, pp. 124ff.

32.
Spector,
Eagle Against the Sun, ch
. 23; L. Giovannetti and F. Freed,
The Decision to Drop the Bomb
(London, 1967), passim; H. Feis,
The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II
(Princeton, N.J., 1966 edn.), passim; G. Alperowitz,
Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam
(London, 1966); M. J. Sherwin,
A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance
(New York, 1975).

33.
Cited in M. Matloff,
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944
(Washington, D.C., 1959), pp. 523–24.

34.
DePorte,
Europe Between the Superpowers, ch
. 4.

35.
W. Ashworth,
A Short History of the International Economy Since 1850
(London, 1975), p. 268. See also the figures in Milward,
War, Economy and Society 1939–1945
, p. 63.

36.
Rowland (ed.),
Balance of Power or Hegemony
, p. 220.

37.
Ashworth,
Short History of the International Economy Since 1850
, p. 268.

38.
Apart from the early chapters of L. Freedman,
The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy
(London, 1981), see also D. A. Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960,”
International Security
, vol. 7,
no. 4 (Spring 1983); M. Mandelbaum,
The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons 1946–1976
(New York, 1979).

39.
Figures from W. P. Mako,
U.S. Ground Forces and the Defense of Central Europe
(Washington, D.C., 1983), p. 8.

40.
R. Steel,
Pax Americana
(New York, 1977), ch. 2. For the parallels with Britain after 1815, see above, pp. 151–58; and T. Smith,
The Pattern of Imperialism: The United States, Great Britain and the Late-Industrializing World Since 1815
(Cambridge, 1981), pp. 182ff.

41.
M. Balfour,
The Adversaries: America, Russia, and the Open World, 1941–62
(London, 1981), p. 14.

42.
G. Kolko,
The Politics of War 1943–1945
(New York, 1968), passim; Becker and Wells (eds.),
Economics and World Power
, chs. 6–7; R. Keohane, “State Power and Industry Influence: American Foreign Oil Policy in the 1940s,”
International Organization
, vol. 36 (Winter 1982), pp. 165–83; A. E. Eckes,
The United States and the Global Struggle for Minerals
(Austin, Texas, 1979).

43.
Balfour,
Adversaries
, p. 15.

44.
On which see R. N. Gardner,
Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy
(New York, 1969), passim.

45.
The phrase used in Steel,
Pax Americana
, p. 10.

46.
Quoted by R. Dallek, “The Postwar World: Made in the USA,” in S. J. Ungar (ed.),
Estrangement: America and the World
(New York, 1985), p. 32.

47.
Cited in J. W. Spanier,
American Foreign Policy Since World War II
(London, 1972 edn.), p. 26. See also R. A. Divine,
Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II
(New York, 1971), passim.

48.
Thorne,
Issue of War
, p. 206. See also M. P. Leffler’s recent writings: “The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945–48,”
American Historical Review
, vol. 89 (1984), pp. 349–81; and his Lehrman Institute paper “Security and Containment Before Kennan: The Identification of American Interests at the End of World War II,” passim.

49.
Erickson,
Road to Berlin
, p. ix.

50.
G. Hosking,
A History of the Soviet Union
(London, 1985), p. 296.

51.
Nove,
Economic History of the USSR
, p. 285.

52.
See the figures in Munting,
Economic Development of the USSR
, p. 118.

53.
McCauley,
Soviet Union Since 1917
, p. 138. For further details, see Nove,
Economic History of the USSR
, pp. 140–42.

54.
McCauley,
Soviet Union Since 1917
, pp. 140–42.

55.
For details, see M. A. Evangelista, “Stalin’s Postwar Army Reappraised,”
International Security
, vol. 7, no. 3 (1982–83), pp. 110–38.

56.
Mackintosh,
Juggernaut: A History of the Soviet Armed Forces
, pp. 272–73.

57.
Ibid. See also the relevant chapters in Liddell Hart (ed.),
The Red Army
, pt. 2; D. Holloway,
The Soviet Union and the Arms Race
(New Haven, Conn., 1983), pp. 15ff; Mitchell,
History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power
, pp. 469ff.

58.
Hosking,
History of the Soviet Union, ch
. 11, is best here. See also McCauley,
Soviet Union Since 1917, ch
. 5; Nove,
Economic History
, pp. 266ff; Ulam,
Expansion and Coexistence
, pp. 467ff.

59.
Spanier,
American Foreign Policy Since World War II
, p. 3; G. Challiand and J.-P. Rageau,
Strategic Atlas: A Comparative Geopolitics of the Worlds Powers
(New York, 1985), pp. 18ff; J. L. Gaddis,
Strategies of Containment
(New York, 1982), pp. 57ff; and the comments in A. K. Henrikson, “America’s Changing Place in the World: From ‘Periphery’ to ‘Center’?” in J. Gottman (ed.),
Center and Periphery
(Beverly Hills, Calif., 1980), pp. 73–100.

60.
Ulam,
Expansion and Coexistence
, p. 405.

61.
Cited in H. Feis,
Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin
(Princeton, N.J., 1967), p. 462.

62.
Landes,
Unbound Prometheus
, p. 488, fn. 1.

63.
Allen,
Short Economic History of Modern Japan
, pp. 187ff, and the relevant tables in appendix B.

64.
Ricossa, “Italy 1920–1970,” in Cipolla (ed.),
Fontana Economic History of Europe
, vol. 6, pt. 1, p. 240.

65.
Ibid., p. 316.

66.
Wright,
Ordeal of Total War
, p. 264.

67.
Fohlen, “France 1920–1970,” in Cipolla (ed.),
Fontana Economic History of Europe
, vol. 6, pt. 1, pp. 92, 109.

68.
Ibid., p. 100.