Unthinkable (71 page)

86.
 Mark Perry, “False Flag,”
Foreign Policy
, January 13, 2012, available at
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/13/false_flag?page=0,0
.

87.
 Various Iranian cyberattacks on the United States have also been documented in the press. See, for instance, Lolita C. Baldor, “U.S. Blaming Iran for Persian Gulf Cyberattacks,” Associated Press, October 12, 2012; Dan De Luce, “Cyber War on Iran Has Only Just Begun,” Agence France-Presse, July 13, 2012; Siobhan Gorman and Julian Barnes, “Iran Blamed for Cyberattacks,”
Wall Street Journal
, October 13–14, 2012, p. A1; Nicole Perlroth, “In Cyberattack on Saudi Firm, U.S. Sees Iran Firing Back,”
New York Times
, October 27, 2012.

88.
 On the risks of escalation from the covert and cyber battles with Iran,
see David Ignatius, “Lessons from an Iranian War Game,”
Washington Post,
September 20, 2012; Kenneth M. Pollack, “A Series of Unfortunate Events: A Crisis Simulation of a U.S.-Iranian Confrontation,” Middle East Memo No. 26, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, October 2012, available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/11/us%20iran%20crisis%20simulation%20pollack/us%20iran%20crisis%20simulation%20pollack%20paper.pdf
; Kenneth M. Pollack, “Are We Sliding Toward War with Iran?”
New Republic
, January 18, 2012, available at
http://www.tnr.com/article/world/99741/war-iran-america#
.

89.
 Bradley Klapper, “Senators Mull Tougher Iran Sanctions,” Associated Press, November 9, 2012.

90.
 See the conclusions of the so-called Duelfer Report, the independent inquiry into Saddam's WMD programs after the fall of Baghdad,
Comprehensive Report of the Special Adviser to the DCI on Iraqi WMD
, December 20, 2004, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/Comp_Report_Key_Findings.pdf
.

91.
 Richard N. Haass,
Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), p. 197.

92.
 Stuart E. Eizenstat, “Do Economic Sanctions Work? Lessons from ILSA and Other U.S. Sanctions Regimes,” Atlantic Council, Occasional Paper, February 2004, p. vii.

93.
 The classic work on this topic remains David A. Baldwin,
Economic Statecraft
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), esp. the section on trade policy, pp. 206–289.

94.
 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott,
Economic Sanctions Reconsidered
, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990), p. 93.

95.
 Daniel W. Drezner,
The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1999), esp. p. 308.

96.
 Meghan L. O'Sullivan,
Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), p. 288.

97.
 Ibid.

98.
 Eizenstat, “Do Economic Sanctions Work?” pp. 9–12; Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O'Sullivan, eds.,
Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2000), pp. 189–91; O'Sullivan,
Shrewd Sanctions
, pp. 173–230.

99.
 For a concurring view from the man responsible for imposing sanctions during the 1990s, see Eizenstat, “Do Economic Sanctions Work?,” pp. 8–9.

100.
 “China Knocks US Sanctions on State-Run Firm over Iran,” Agence France-Presse, January 15, 2012.

101.
 See Helia Ighani, “Video: Analysts Say New Sanctions Bill Would Increase Gas Prices, Unlikely to Change Iran's Behavior,” October 13, 2011, available at
http://www.niacouncil.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=7648
; Robert McNally, “Energy Brief: Managing Oil Market Disruption in a Confrontation with Iran,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 2012, p. 1.

102.
 James Risen and Duraid Adnan, “U.S. Says Iraqis Are Helping Iran to Skirt Sanctions,”
New York Times
, April 18, 2012.

103.
 Rick Gladstone, “Iran Finding Some Ways to Evade Sanctions, Treasury Department Says,”
New York Times
, January 10, 2013.

104.
 The question of Iraqi deaths from casualties has been an issue of controversy for nearly twenty years. Unfortunately, the matter remains in dispute even long after the fall of Saddam. See, for instance, J. Blacker, M. Ali, and G. Jones, “A Response to Criticism of Our Estimates of Under-5 Mortality in Iraq, 1980–98,”
Population Studies
61 (2007): 7–13; Michael Spagat, “Truth and Death in Iraq Under Sanctions,”
Significance
7, No. 3 (September 2010): 116–20; Michael Spagat, “The Iraq Sanctions Myth,”
Pacific Standard
, April 26, 2013. In particular, Spagat cites several post-invasion surveys as strongly disputing the claim that 400,000–500,000 Iraqi children died as a result of the sanctions. His evidence, relying on three post-invasion surveys, suggests that only thousands or a few tens of thousands may have died from the sanctions.

105.
 On the humanitarian impact of the Iraq sanctions, see Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology and Kurdistan Regional Statistics Office,
Iraq Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2006
, Final Report (Baghdad: Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology, 2007); Richard Garfield,
Morbidity and Mortality Among Iraqi Children from 1990 to 1998: Assessing the Impact of Economic Sanctions
(Goshen, Ind.: Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, 1999); Sarah Graham-Brown, “War and Sanctions: Cost to Society and Toll on Development,” in John Calabrese, ed.,
The Future of Iraq
(Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1997), pp. 31–42; Sarah Graham-Brown,
Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention in Iraq
(London: Tauris, 1999); Youssef Ibrahim, “Iraq Is Near Economic Ruin,”
New York Times
, October 25, 1994; O'Sullivan,
Shrewd Sanctions
, pp. 105–167; Kenneth M. Pollack,
The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq
(New York: Random House, 2002), pp. 125–40; David Rieff, “Were Sanctions Right?”
New York Times Magazine
, July 27, 2003; Spagat, “Truth and Death in Iraq Under Sanctions,” pp. 116–20.

106.
 See O'Sullivan,
Shrewd Sanctions
, pp. 105–167, 310–11; Pollack,
The Threatening Storm
, pp. 71–108.

107.
 On the collapse of sanctions and containment, see in particular the report of the Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, “Manipulation of the Oil-for-Food Programme by the Iraqi Regime” (colloquially known as the “Volcker Committee Report”), United Nations, October 27, 2005, available at
http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/IIC%20Final%20Report%2027Oct2005.pdf
. Also see, O'Sullivan,
Shrewd Sanctions
, pp. 114–22, 130–36; and Pollack,
The Threatening Storm
, pp. 85–108.

108.
 O'Sullivan,
Shrewd Sanctions
, p. 311.

109.
 Nasser Karimi, “Iran's Medical Crisis Deepens as Economy Sputters,” Associated Press, January 8, 2013; “Spider Web,” International Crisis Group, pp. ii, 35–36.

110.
 “Spider Web,” International Crisis Group, p. 34.

111.
 “Iran: New EU Sanctions ‘Inhuman' but Won't Force Nuclear Concessions,” Associated Press, October 16, 2012.

1.
 On the abuses of the Iranian regime, see “Iran,”
World Report 2012
, Human Rights Watch, available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/iran_2012.pdf
. For more intimate accounts, see Maziar Bahari with Aimee Molloy,
Then They Came for Me: A Family's Story of Love, Captivity, and Survival
(New York: Random House, 2011); Haleh Esfandiari,
My Prison, My Home: One Woman's Story of Captivity in Iran
(New York: HarperCollins, 2009); Roxanna Saberi,
Between Two Worlds: My Life and Captivity in Iran
(New York: HarperCollins, 2010).

2.
 David Crist,
The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran
(New York: Penguin Press, 2012), pp. 490–91.

3.
 Sara Beth Elson and Alireza Nader, “What Do Iranians Think? A Survey of Attitudes on the United States, the Nuclear Program and the Economy,” RAND Corporation, 2011, pp. 11–13.

4.
 Ibid., p. 13.

5.
 Jay Loschky and Anita Pugliese, “Iranians Split, 40% to 35%, on Nuclear Military Power,” Gallup, February 15, 2012, available at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/152633/Iranians-Split-Nuclear-Military-Power.aspx
.

6.
 Pollack,
The Persian Puzzle
, p. 318. See also, Ray Takeyh,
Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic
(New York: Times Books, 2006), pp. 152–53.

7.
 “Interview with Muhammad Reza Khatami,”
La Repubblica
, March 4, 2006.

8.
 Takeyh,
Hidden Iran
, pp. 208–211.

9.
 Quoted in ibid., p. 211.

10.
 “Israeli Paper Publishes Interview with Vice President Ebtekar,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 3, 1998.

11.
 Ervand Abrahamian,
Iran: Between Two Revolutions
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 269; Fakhreddin Azimi, “Unseating Mosaddeq: The Configuration and Role of Domestic Forces,” in Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, eds.,
Mohammad Mosaddeq and the Coup of 1953 in Iran
(Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2004), pp. 51–52; Elton L. Daniel,
The History of Iran
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2001), p. 151; Stephen Kinzer,
All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror
(Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, 2003), pp. 136–37.

12.
 Azimi, “Unseating Mosaddeq,” pp. 30–31, 78–82; James A. Bill,
The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 90–91; Daniel,
The History of Iran,
pp. 153–154; Mark J. Gasiorowski, “The 1953 Coup d'Etat in Iran,” in Gasiorowski and Byrne, eds.,
Mohammad Mosaddeq and the Coup of 1953 in Iran
, pp. 248–66; Mark J. Gasiorowski,
U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 72–73; Richard Helms,
A Look over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency
(New York: Random House, 2003), pp. 182–87; Kinzer,
All the Shah's Men,
pp. 162–63.

13.
 Said Arjomand,
The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 131–32; Bill,
The Eagle and the Lion,
pp. 253–56; Zbigniew Brzezinski,
Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977
–1
981,
rev. ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1985), pp. 382–93; General Robert E. Huyser,
Mission to Tehran
(New York: Harper & Row, 1986), esp. pp. 18, 275–90; Charles Kurzman,
The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 160–61; Barry Rubin,
Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran
(New York: Penguin, 1981), pp. 226–27; Gary Sick,
All Fall Down: America's Fateful Encounter with Iran
(London: Tauris, 1985), pp. 138–87; Sepehr Zabih, “Iran's Policy Toward the Persian Gulf,”
International Journal of Middle East Studies
7, No. 3 (July 1976): 43–54, 93–111.

14.
 Crist,
The Twilight War
, pp. 69–71.

15.
 Ibid., p. 71.

16.
 As quoted in Tom Barry, “Iran Freedom and Regime Change Politics,”
New York Times,
May 19, 2006, available at
http://rightweb.irc-online.org/rw/3277.html
.

17.
 Negar Azimi, “Hard Realities of Soft Power,”
New York Times
, June 24, 2007.

18.
 Suzanne Maloney, “Fear and Loathing in Tehran,”
National Interest,
No. 91 (September/October 2007).

19.
 Robin Wright, “On Guard over U.S. Funds, Pro-Democracy Program Leads Tehran to Scrutinize Activists,”
Washington Post,
April 28, 2007.

20.
 Azimi, “Hard Realities.”

21.
 Wright, “On Guard over U.S. Funds.”

22.
 The best unclassified sources at present are Daniel Byman,
Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 79–110, esp. p. 85; Richard Clarke,
Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror
(New York: Free Press, 2004), pp. 112–31; Timothy Naftali,
Blindspot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism
(New York: Basic Books, 2005), pp. 248–51, 260–61; and the grand jury indictment against thirteen members of Saudi Hizballah filed by the U.S. government in Alexandria, Virginia. The indictment in particular provides an excellent overview of the operational elements of the attack, and is available at
http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/khobar/khobarindict61901.pdf
, accessed July 26, 2004. The 9/11 Commission also found that the evidence of Iran behind the Khobar Towers bombing was “strong.” See
Report of the 9/11 Commission: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), p. 60. Also see Pollack,
The Persian Puzzle
, pp. 282–84.