Unthinkable (69 page)

9.
 For a concurring Israeli assessment, see Amos Yadlin and Avner Golov, “A Nuclear Iran: The Spur to a Regional Arms Race?”
Strategic Assessment
15, No. 3 (October 2012): 7–12.

10.
 Former White House and State Department official Dennis Ross has publicly confirmed that King Abdallah told him this bluntly in private. See Chemi Shalev, “Dennis Ross: Saudi King Vowed to Obtain Nuclear Bomb After Iran,”
Haaretz
, May 30, 2012.

11.
 “Prince Hints Saudi Arabia May Join Nuclear Arms Race,”
New York Times
, December 6, 2011.

12.
 Jay Solomon, “Saudi Suggests ‘Squeezing' Iran over Nuclear Ambitions,”
Wall Street Journal
, June 22, 2011.

13.
 Guzansky, “Saudi Arabia's Nuclear Options,” pp. 77–79, 83–85.

14.
 On the UAE nuclear program, see Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr, “The United Arab Emirates' Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation,” Congressional Research Service, R40344, December 20, 2010, available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R40344.pdf
.

15.
 For instance, see Blanchard and Kerr, “The United Arab Emirates' Nuclear Program,” pp. 13–15.

16.
 For a concurring Israeli assessment, see Yadlin and Golov, “A Nuclear Iran: The Spur to a Regional Arms Race?,” esp. p. 21.

17.
 Jim Walsh, “In the Shadow of Dimona: Egypt's Nuclear Choices, 1954–1981,” Draft Manuscript, November 1996, p. 2.

18.
 Ibid., p. 1.

19.
 Ibid., p. 2.

20.
 “Egypt Unveils Nasser's Secret Nuclear Weapons Programme,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, July 24, 1995; Jim Walsh, “A History of Egyptian Nuclear Efforts, 1954–1992,” Draft Manuscript, November 1996, pp. 5–9.

21.
 Walsh, “In the Shadow of Dimona,” p. 4; Walsh, “A History of Egyptian Nuclear Efforts,” pp. 18–20; Jim Walsh, “The Riddle of the Sphinx: Egypt's Failure to Balance the Israeli Nuclear Threat,”
Breakthroughs
(Journal of the Defense and Arms Control Studies Program, MIT), Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 1994), p. 13.

22.
 The Israel Project, “Fact Sheet: Arab Leaders Voice Concerns About Iran and Its Nuclear Program,” 2009, available at
http://www.theisraelproject.org/site/pp.aspx?c=hsJPK0PIJpH&b=2070505&printmode=1
.

23.
 Keinan Ben-Ezra, “The Iranian Nuclear Program: An Egyptian Perspective,” in Landau and Kurz, eds.,
Arms Control Dilemmas,
pp. 61–69.

24.
 On Turkey and nuclear weapons, see Sinan Ulgen, ed.,
The Turkish Model for Transition to Nuclear Power
(Istanbul: Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies [EDAM], 2011), esp. pp. 138–77.

25.
 For a good summary, see Gallia Lindenstrauss, “Towards Turkey's Own Bomb? Not Yet,” in Landau and Kurz, eds.,
Arms Control Dilemmas,
pp. 91–99.

26.
 Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller,
Turkey's Kurdish Question
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), p. xii.

27.
 Aaron Stein, “Understanding Turkey's Position on the Iranian Nuclear Program,” WMD Junction, January 12, 2012, available at
http://wmdjunction.com/120112_turkey_iran_nuclear.htm
.

28.
 “Turkey—Trade Statistics,” European Council, March 2012, available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113456.pdf
.

29.
 For a concurring Israeli assessment, see Lindenstrauss, “Towards Turkey's Own Bomb? Not Yet,” p. 99.

30.
 Sinan Ulgen, “The Security Dimension of Turkey's Nuclear Program: Nuclear Diplomacy and Non Proliferation Policies,” in Ulgen, ed.,
The Turkish Model for Transition to Nuclear Power
, p. 140.

31.
 On these problems, and their relationship to political instability, revolution, civil war, insurgency, and terrorism, see Kenneth M. Pollack,
A Path Out of the Desert: A Grand Strategy for America in the Middle East
(New York: Random House, 2008), esp. pp. 67–120.

32.
 On the impact of the Arab Spring so far, see Kenneth M. Pollack and Daniel L. Byman et al.,
The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011).

33.
 Mitchell Reiss,
Bridled Ambitions: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995); T. V. Paul,
Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000); Ariel Levite, “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,”
International Security
2, No. 3 (Winter 2002–2003): 59–88; and Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds.,
The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004); James Walsh, “Bombs Unbuilt: Power, Ideas, and Institutions in International Politics” (Ph.D. diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 2001).

34.
 I have purposely excluded North Korea from this list. While the North Koreans did proliferate against the will of the international community, they paid an outrageous price for doing so. Three million North Koreans starved to death and many others live in abject poverty in part because Pyongyang refused to give up its nuclear program. No other nation on earth would be willing to make such a sacrifice, and so the North Korean case reinforces the disincentives for proliferation.

35.
 Michael Wines, “China Leader Warns Iran Not to Make Nuclear Arms,”
New York Times
, January 20, 2012.

36.
 Stepan Kravchenko, “Putin Says Iran Developing Nuclear Capability Would Risk Global Stability,” Bloomberg News, February 24, 2012.

1.
 Former senior Obama administration official Dennis Ross has outlined both the logic of this position and the deal he believes that the United States should offer Iran as just such an ultimatum. See Dennis Ross, “Calling Iran's Bluff: It's Time to Offer Tehran a Civilian Nuclear Program,”
New Republic
, June 15, 2012.

2.
 Paul Bracken has a fascinating and illuminating discussion of this issue
in his newest book. See Paul Bracken,
The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics
(New York: Times Books, 2012), pp. 127–61.

3.
 For a description of a pure engagement approach to Iran and how it would work, see Kenneth M. Pollack et al.,
Which Path to Persia? Options for a New American Strategy Toward Iran
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), pp. 57–81.

4.
 Ray Takeyh,
Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic
(New York: Times Books, 2006), p. 223.

5.
 For instance, see Nathan Gonzalez,
Engaging Iran: The Rise of a Middle East Powerhouse and America's Strategic Choice
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2007); Suzanne Maloney and Ray Takeyh, “Pathway to Coexistence: A New U.S. Policy Toward Iran,” in Richard N. Haass and Martin Indyk, eds.,
Restoring the Balance: A Middle East Strategy for the Next President
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), pp. 59–92; Vali Nasr and Ray Takeyh, “The Costs of Containing Iran: Washington's Misguided New Policy,”
Foreign Affairs
87, No. 1 (January/February 2008); Trita Parsi,
Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2007); Trita Parsi, “The Price of Not Talking to Iran,”
World Policy Journal
, Winter 2006; Barbara Slavin,
Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S., and the Twisted Path to Confrontation
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 2007); Barbara Slavin, “Engagement,” in Jon Alterman, ed., “Gulf Kaleidoscope: Reflections on the Iranian Challenge,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2012, pp. 11–21; Takeyh,
Hidden Iran
, pp. 217–26; Ray Takeyh, “Time for Détente with Iran,”
Foreign Affairs
86, No. 2 (March/April 2007).

6.
 Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O'Sullivan, eds.,
Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 167.

7.
 Ibid., p. 174. This quote is actually one of the subheadings of their concluding, summary chapter, representing one of their key findings.

8.
 Ibid., p. 175.

9.
 Johannes Reissner, “Europe and Iran: Critical Dialogue,” in Haass and O'Sullivan, eds.,
Honey and Vinegar
, p. 46.

10.
 James A. Bill,
The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 276–93.

11.
 Crist,
The Twilight War
, pp. 106–174; Pollack,
The Persian Puzzle
, pp. 198–205.

12.
 Senator Alfonse D'Amato introduced the initial sanctions legislation in January 1995. The Iranians announced that Conoco would be awarded
the contract for two offshore oilfields in March 1995. Pollack,
The Persian Puzzle
, pp. 271–72.

13.
 Ibid.

14.
 Ibid., pp. 303–342.

15.
 See David Patrikarakos,
Nuclear Iran: The Birth of an Atomic State
(London: Tauris, 2012), pp. 181, 185–86, 188–91, 193–201.

16.
 For various perspectives on the May 2003 Iranian message and its import, see David Crist,
The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran
(New York: Penguin Press, 2012), pp. 476–81; Steven J. Rosen, “Did Iran Offer a ‘Grand Bargain' in 2003?”
American Thinker
, November 16, 2008, available at
http://www.americanthinker.com/2008/11/did_iran_offer_a_grand_bargain.html
; Michael J. Rubin, “The Guldimann Memorandum: The Iranian ‘Roadmap' Wasn't a Roadmap and Wasn't Iranian,”
Weekly Standard
, October 22, 2007; Slavin,
Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies
, pp. 200–205; Ray Takeyh,
Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 217–18.

17.
 Asr Iran and Raja News, February 20, 2007,
http://www.asriran.com/view.php?id=12170
, translated and cited in Hassan Daioleslam, “Iran's 2003 Grand Bargain Offer: Secrets, Lies, and Manipulation,” In Search of Truth website, June 25, 2008, available at
http://english.iranianlobby.com/page1.php?id=10&bakhsh=ARTICLES
.

18.
 Emrooz news website from the “Goftegoo” radio station, broadcast on January 31, 2007, translated and cited in Daioleslam, “Iran's 2003 Grand Bargain Offer.”

1.
 See for instance, Karim Sadjadpour, “The Nuclear Players,”
Journal of International Affairs
60, No. 2 (Spring/Summer 2007): 126.

2.
 Fredrik Dahl and Parisa Hafezi, “Iran Defiant as UN Nuclear Talks Fail,” Reuters, February 22, 2012.

3.
 For a thoughtful analysis both of the general difficulty of making “coercive diplomacy” work, and making it work with Iran in particular, see Robert Jervis, “Getting to Yes with Iran: The Challenges of Coercive Diplomacy,”
Foreign Affairs
92, No. 1 (January/February 2012): 105–115. Jervis is one of the wisest and most sensible scholars of political science writing today and his work on a range of topics relevant to our current problems with Iran is well worth reading.

4.
 With complete immodesty, but after a thorough review of the literature, I would direct the reader looking for a fuller exposition of the concept
of the Dual Track or carrot-and-stick approach for Iran to my own book
The Persian Puzzle
, which was one of the first to propose this strategy. See Kenneth M. Pollack,
The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America
(New York: Random House, 2004), pp. 400–424. For a more neutral presentation of the same basic points, see Kenneth M. Pollack et al.,
Which Path to Persia? Options for a New American Strategy Toward Iran
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), pp. 31–56.

5.
 Sadjadpour, “The Nuclear Players,” esp. pp. 126–27.

6.
 Michael R. Gordon and Jeff Zeleny, “Obama Envisions New Iran Approach,”
New York Times
, November 2, 2007.

7.
 Brian Knowlton, “In Interview, Obama Talks of ‘New Approach' to Iran,”
New York Times
, January 11, 2009.

8.
 Karim Sadjadpour, “Interview: Engagement with Iran: An Assessment of Options,”
Middle East Progress
, December 8, 2009.

9.
 Thomas Erdbrink and Glenn Kessler, “Obama Message to Iran,”
Washington Post
, March 21, 2009; Eli Bardenstein, “When Iran Said ‘No' to Obama,”
Maariv
, October 28, 2012, translated by Sandy Bloom, Al-Monitor, October 28, 2012.

10.
 Bardenstein, “When Iran Said ‘No' to Obama.”

11.
 David E. Sanger and James Risen, “Iran's Slowing of Enrichment Efforts May Show It Wants a Deal, Analysts Say,”
New York Times
, December 27, 2012.

12.
 See Trita Parsi,
A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama's Diplomacy with Iran
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2012).