When China Rules the World (81 page)
Read When China Rules the World Online
Authors: Jacques Martin
Tags: #History, #Asia, #China, #Political Science, #International Relations, #General
13
. G. John Ikenberry,
Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition: Essays on American Power and World Politics
(Cambridge: Polity, 2006), p. 12.
. G. John Ikenberry,
Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition: Essays on American Power and World Politics
(Cambridge: Polity, 2006), p. 12.
14
. Joseph S. Nye Jr,
Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics
(New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. x.
. Joseph S. Nye Jr,
Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics
(New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. x.
15
. Joshua Kurlantzick,
Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007), Chapter 9.
. Joshua Kurlantzick,
Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007), Chapter 9.
16
. Paul Kennedy,
The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000
(London: Fontana Press, 1988), for example pp. 472-80, 665-92.
. Paul Kennedy,
The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000
(London: Fontana Press, 1988), for example pp. 472-80, 665-92.
18
. Ibid., p. 258.
. Ibid., p. 258.
19
. See Christopher Chase-Dunn, Rebecca Giem, Andrew Jorgenson, Thomas Reifer, John Rogers and Shoon Lio, ‘The Trajectory of the United States in the World System: A Quantitative Reflection’, IROWS Working Paper No. 8, University of California. A dramatic and early illustration of the effects of the UK’s imperial decline was the rapid loss of British Asia between 1941 and 1945; Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper,
Forgotten Armies: The Fall of British Asia, 1941
-
1945
(London: Allen Lane, 2004).
. See Christopher Chase-Dunn, Rebecca Giem, Andrew Jorgenson, Thomas Reifer, John Rogers and Shoon Lio, ‘The Trajectory of the United States in the World System: A Quantitative Reflection’, IROWS Working Paper No. 8, University of California. A dramatic and early illustration of the effects of the UK’s imperial decline was the rapid loss of British Asia between 1941 and 1945; Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper,
Forgotten Armies: The Fall of British Asia, 1941
-
1945
(London: Allen Lane, 2004).
20
. Joseph E. Stiglitz and Linda J. Bilmes,
The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict
(London: Allen Lane, 2008), Chapter 1.
. Joseph E. Stiglitz and Linda J. Bilmes,
The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict
(London: Allen Lane, 2008), Chapter 1.
21
. Adrian Wooldridge, ‘After Bush: A Special Report on America and the World’,
The Economist
, 29 March 2008, p. 10.
. Adrian Wooldridge, ‘After Bush: A Special Report on America and the World’,
The Economist
, 29 March 2008, p. 10.
22
. George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 29 January 2002.
. George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 29 January 2002.
23
. For a discussion of the US’s current account deficit, see Niall Ferguson,
Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire
(London and New York: Allen Lane, 2004), Chapter 8.
. For a discussion of the US’s current account deficit, see Niall Ferguson,
Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire
(London and New York: Allen Lane, 2004), Chapter 8.
24
. Speech by Henry Hyde, chairman of the House International Relations Committee, 26 January, reprinted as ‘The Perils of the “Golden Theory”’,
Strait Times
, 21 February 2006. Paul Kennedy, ‘Who’s Hiding Under Our Umbrella? ’,
International Herald Tribune
, 31 January 2008.
. Speech by Henry Hyde, chairman of the House International Relations Committee, 26 January, reprinted as ‘The Perils of the “Golden Theory”’,
Strait Times
, 21 February 2006. Paul Kennedy, ‘Who’s Hiding Under Our Umbrella? ’,
International Herald Tribune
, 31 January 2008.
25
. The US has even become a net importer of investment: the difference between the overseas assets owned by Americans and the American assets owned by foreigners fell from 8 per cent of GDP in the mid 1980s to a net liability of minus 22 per cent in 2006; Niall Ferguson, ‘Empire Falls’, October 2006, posted on
www.vanityfair.com
.
. The US has even become a net importer of investment: the difference between the overseas assets owned by Americans and the American assets owned by foreigners fell from 8 per cent of GDP in the mid 1980s to a net liability of minus 22 per cent in 2006; Niall Ferguson, ‘Empire Falls’, October 2006, posted on
www.vanityfair.com
.
26
. Steven C. Johnson, ‘Dollar’s Decline Presents a Challenge to US Power’,
International Herald Tribune
, 28-9 April, 2007.
. Steven C. Johnson, ‘Dollar’s Decline Presents a Challenge to US Power’,
International Herald Tribune
, 28-9 April, 2007.
28
. There is no precedent for the extent of the militarization of the US economy both during the Cold War and subsequently; Eric Hobsbawm,
Globalisation, Democracy, and Terrorism
(London: Little, Brown, 2007), p. 160.
. There is no precedent for the extent of the militarization of the US economy both during the Cold War and subsequently; Eric Hobsbawm,
Globalisation, Democracy, and Terrorism
(London: Little, Brown, 2007), p. 160.
29
. For an interesting discussion of the economic cost to the United States of its military expenditure, see Chalmers Johnson, ‘Why the US Has Really Gone Broke’,
Le Monde diplomatique
, February 2008.
. For an interesting discussion of the economic cost to the United States of its military expenditure, see Chalmers Johnson, ‘Why the US Has Really Gone Broke’,
Le Monde diplomatique
, February 2008.
30
. Thomas L. Friedman,
The Lexus and the Olive Tree
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999), pp. 309-22; Gerald Segal, ‘Globalisation Has Always Primarily Been a Process of Westernisation’,
South China Morning Post
, 17 November 1998.
. Thomas L. Friedman,
The Lexus and the Olive Tree
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999), pp. 309-22; Gerald Segal, ‘Globalisation Has Always Primarily Been a Process of Westernisation’,
South China Morning Post
, 17 November 1998.
31
. For a discussion on the fundamental importance of cultural difference in the era of globalization, see Stuart Hall, ‘A Different Light’, Lecture to Prince Claus Fund Conference, Rotterdam, 12 December 2001.
. For a discussion on the fundamental importance of cultural difference in the era of globalization, see Stuart Hall, ‘A Different Light’, Lecture to Prince Claus Fund Conference, Rotterdam, 12 December 2001.
32
. Samuel P. Huntington,
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), Chapters 4-5.
. Samuel P. Huntington,
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), Chapters 4-5.
33
. Chris Patten,
East and West: China, Power, and the Future of East Asia
(London: Times Books, 1998), p. 166.
. Chris Patten,
East and West: China, Power, and the Future of East Asia
(London: Times Books, 1998), p. 166.
34
. Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’,
National Interest
, summer 1989. See also for example, Edward Luttwak,
Turbo-Capitalism: Winners and Losers in the Global Economy
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998), p. 25.
. Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’,
National Interest
, summer 1989. See also for example, Edward Luttwak,
Turbo-Capitalism: Winners and Losers in the Global Economy
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998), p. 25.
35
. John W. Dower,
Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), for example Chapters 2, 6, 12, Epilogue.
. John W. Dower,
Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), for example Chapters 2, 6, 12, Epilogue.
36
. Ezra F. Vogel,
The Four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization in East Asia
(Cambridge, Mass.: and London: Harvard University Press, 1991); Jim Rohwer,
Asia Rising
(London: Nicholas Brealey, 1996), Chapters 1-3.
. Ezra F. Vogel,
The Four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization in East Asia
(Cambridge, Mass.: and London: Harvard University Press, 1991); Jim Rohwer,
Asia Rising
(London: Nicholas Brealey, 1996), Chapters 1-3.
39
. Manuel Castells,
The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture
, Vol. III ,
End of Millennium
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), p. 277.
. Manuel Castells,
The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture
, Vol. III ,
End of Millennium
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), p. 277.
40
. James Mann,
The China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain Away Chinese Repression
(New York: Viking, 2007), pp. 1-2, 11-12.
. James Mann,
The China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain Away Chinese Repression
(New York: Viking, 2007), pp. 1-2, 11-12.
41
. Wilson and Stupnytska, ‘The N-11’, p. 8.
. Wilson and Stupnytska, ‘The N-11’, p. 8.
42
. G. John Ikenberry, ‘The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?’
Foreign Affairs
, January/February 2008, p. 2. Also Ikenberry,
Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition
, pp. 7-8.
PART I. G. John Ikenberry, ‘The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?’
Foreign Affairs
, January/February 2008, p. 2. Also Ikenberry,
Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition
, pp. 7-8.
1
. Göran Therborn,
European Modernity and Beyond: The Trajectory of European Societies, 1945
-
2000
(London: Sage, 1995), pp. 4-5.
. Göran Therborn,
European Modernity and Beyond: The Trajectory of European Societies, 1945
-
2000
(London: Sage, 1995), pp. 4-5.
2
. C. A. Bayly,
The Birth of the Modern World 1780
-
1914: Global Connections and Comparisons
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), p. 11.
. C. A. Bayly,
The Birth of the Modern World 1780
-
1914: Global Connections and Comparisons
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), p. 11.
6
. Ibid., p. 10.
2 THE RISE OF THE WEST. Ibid., p. 10.
2
. For a pessimistic view of China, see ibid., Chapter 21; Eric L. Jones,
The European Miracle: Environments, Economics, and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
. For a pessimistic view of China, see ibid., Chapter 21; Eric L. Jones,
The European Miracle: Environments, Economics, and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
3
. Kaoru Sugihara, ‘Agriculture and Industrialization: The Japanese Experience’, in Peter Mathias and John Davis, eds,
Agriculture and Industrialization
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 148-52.
. Kaoru Sugihara, ‘Agriculture and Industrialization: The Japanese Experience’, in Peter Mathias and John Davis, eds,
Agriculture and Industrialization
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 148-52.
4
. Giovanni Arrighi,
Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century
(London: Verso, 2007), p. 69.
. Giovanni Arrighi,
Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century
(London: Verso, 2007), p. 69.
5
. John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman,
China: A New History
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 102.
. John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman,
China: A New History
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 102.
6
. Kenneth Pomeranz,
The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 34-5, 43-6, 61-2, 70, 168.
. Kenneth Pomeranz,
The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 34-5, 43-6, 61-2, 70, 168.
9
. R. Bin Wong,
China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 27-8.
. R. Bin Wong,
China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 27-8.
10
. Paul Bairoch, ‘The Main Trends in National Economic Disparities since the Industrial Revolution’, in Paul Bairoch and Maurice Levy-Leboyer, eds,
Disparities in Economic Development Since the Industrial Revolution
(New York: St Martin’s Press, 1975), pp. 7, 13-14.
. Paul Bairoch, ‘The Main Trends in National Economic Disparities since the Industrial Revolution’, in Paul Bairoch and Maurice Levy-Leboyer, eds,
Disparities in Economic Development Since the Industrial Revolution
(New York: St Martin’s Press, 1975), pp. 7, 13-14.
11
. Angus Maddison,
The World Economy: Historical Statistics
(Paris: OECD, 2003), pp. 249-51. In fact, the Yangzi Delta was one of Eurasia’s most developed regions over a very long historical period, from 1350 to at least 1750; Bin Wong,
China Transformed
, p. 29.
. Angus Maddison,
The World Economy: Historical Statistics
(Paris: OECD, 2003), pp. 249-51. In fact, the Yangzi Delta was one of Eurasia’s most developed regions over a very long historical period, from 1350 to at least 1750; Bin Wong,
China Transformed
, p. 29.
12
. Peter Perdue writes: ‘Recent research on late imperial China has demonstrated that in most measurable aspects of demographic structure, technology, economic productivity, commercial development, property rights, and ecological pressure, there were no substantial differences between China and western Europe up to around the year 1800.’ Peter C. Perdue,
China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 536-7. See Arrighi,
Adam Smith in Beijing
, pp. 24-39, for an interesting discussion of these issues.
. Peter Perdue writes: ‘Recent research on late imperial China has demonstrated that in most measurable aspects of demographic structure, technology, economic productivity, commercial development, property rights, and ecological pressure, there were no substantial differences between China and western Europe up to around the year 1800.’ Peter C. Perdue,
China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 536-7. See Arrighi,
Adam Smith in Beijing
, pp. 24-39, for an interesting discussion of these issues.
13
. ‘In the light of this recent research, the Industrial Revolution is not a deep, slow evolution out of centuries of particular conditions unique to early modern Europe. It is a late, rapid, unexpected outcome of a fortuitous combination of circumstances in the late eighteenth century. In view of what we now know about imperial China, Japan, and India, among other places, acceptable explanations must invoke a global perspective and allow for a great deal of short-term change.’ Perdue,
China Marches West
, p. 537.
. ‘In the light of this recent research, the Industrial Revolution is not a deep, slow evolution out of centuries of particular conditions unique to early modern Europe. It is a late, rapid, unexpected outcome of a fortuitous combination of circumstances in the late eighteenth century. In view of what we now know about imperial China, Japan, and India, among other places, acceptable explanations must invoke a global perspective and allow for a great deal of short-term change.’ Perdue,
China Marches West
, p. 537.
14
. Bin Wong,
China Transformed
, Chapter 5; Mark Elvin,
The Retreat of the Elephants: An Environmental History of China
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), Chapters 1-4; Elvin, ‘The Historian as Haruspex’, p. 87.
. Bin Wong,
China Transformed
, Chapter 5; Mark Elvin,
The Retreat of the Elephants: An Environmental History of China
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), Chapters 1-4; Elvin, ‘The Historian as Haruspex’, p. 87.
16
. Robin Blackburn, ‘Enslavement and Industrialisation’, on
www.bbc.co.uk/history
; Pomeranz,
The Great Divergence
, Chapter 6, especially pp. 274-6.
. Robin Blackburn, ‘Enslavement and Industrialisation’, on
www.bbc.co.uk/history
; Pomeranz,
The Great Divergence
, Chapter 6, especially pp. 274-6.
18
. Ibid., p. 283; also pp. 206-7, 215, 264-5, 277, 285.
. Ibid., p. 283; also pp. 206-7, 215, 264-5, 277, 285.
19
. C. A. Bayly,
The Birth of the Modern World 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 62-71, 92.
. C. A. Bayly,
The Birth of the Modern World 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 62-71, 92.
21
. ‘The capabilities of the Qing to manage the economy were powerful enough that we might even call it a “developmental agrarian state”’: ibid., p. 541.
. ‘The capabilities of the Qing to manage the economy were powerful enough that we might even call it a “developmental agrarian state”’: ibid., p. 541.
22
. Ibid., p. 540.
. Ibid., p. 540.
24
. Ibid., p. 149.
. Ibid., p. 149.
25
. Ibid., pp. 147-9.
. Ibid., pp. 147-9.
26
. Elvin, ‘The Historian as Haruspex’, pp. 98-9; Fairbank and Goldman,
China
, pp. 180-81; William H. McNeill,
The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 525-9.
. Elvin, ‘The Historian as Haruspex’, pp. 98-9; Fairbank and Goldman,
China
, pp. 180-81; William H. McNeill,
The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 525-9.
28
. ‘The source of Chinese weakness, complacency, and rigidity, like the Industrial Revolution itself, was late and recent, not deeply rooted in China’s traditional culture.’ Perdue,
China Marches West
, p. 551; also p. 541.
. ‘The source of Chinese weakness, complacency, and rigidity, like the Industrial Revolution itself, was late and recent, not deeply rooted in China’s traditional culture.’ Perdue,
China Marches West
, p. 551; also p. 541.
30
. Paul A. Cohen,
Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 79.
. Paul A. Cohen,
Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 79.
34
. Ibid., p. 21. Also Deepak Lal,
Unintended Consequences
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), p. 73.
. Ibid., p. 21. Also Deepak Lal,
Unintended Consequences
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), p. 73.
36
. Landes,
The Wealth and Poverty of Nations
, p. 201; Elvin, ‘The Historian as Haruspex’, pp. 85, 97, 102.
. Landes,
The Wealth and Poverty of Nations
, p. 201; Elvin, ‘The Historian as Haruspex’, pp. 85, 97, 102.
38
. Andre Gunder Frank,
ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), p. 343.
. Andre Gunder Frank,
ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), p. 343.
41
. Norman Davies,
Europe: A History
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 1259, 1266-7, 1282-4.
. Norman Davies,
Europe: A History
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 1259, 1266-7, 1282-4.
42
. Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper,
Forgotten Armies: The Fall of British Asia, 1941
-
1945
(London: Allen Lane, 2004), p. 33.
. Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper,
Forgotten Armies: The Fall of British Asia, 1941
-
1945
(London: Allen Lane, 2004), p. 33.
43
. Göran Therborn,
European Modernity and Beyond: The Trajectory of European Societe: 1945-2000
(London: Sage, 1995), pp. 24, 68-70.
. Göran Therborn,
European Modernity and Beyond: The Trajectory of European Societe: 1945-2000
(London: Sage, 1995), pp. 24, 68-70.
44
. Ibid., p. 68.
. Ibid., p. 68.
47
. Not fundamentalism, however, which unusually originated in the United States.
. Not fundamentalism, however, which unusually originated in the United States.
48
. Ibid., pp. 21-4, 68, 356.
. Ibid., pp. 21-4, 68, 356.
49
. Alan Macfarlane,
The Origins of English Individualism
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), p. 196, quoted by Lal,
Unintended Consequences
, p. 75.
. Alan Macfarlane,
The Origins of English Individualism
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), p. 196, quoted by Lal,
Unintended Consequences
, p. 75.
Other books
Lights Out Liverpool by Maureen Lee
Fighting For Their Mate by Vella Day
French Twist by Catherine Crawford
Mutineer by Sutherland, J.A.
Noctuary by Thomas Ligotti
Scorned! (Interracial Erotica) by Lexy Harper
Engines of the Broken World by Vanhee, Jason
The Dumbest Generation by Bauerlein, Mark
Just That Easy by Moore, Elizabeth
The Maggot People by Henning Koch