Closing the Ring (82 page)

Eisenhower and Montgomery disagreed with one important feature of General Morgan’s proposals. They wanted an assault in greater strength and on a wider front, so as to gain quickly a good-sized bridgehead in which to build up their forces for the break-out. Also it was important to capture the docks at Cherbourg earlier than had been planned. They wanted a first assault by five divisions instead of three. Of course, this was perfectly right. But where were the extra landing-craft? Southeast Asia had already been stripped. There were sufficient in the Mediterranean to carry two divisions, but these were needed for “Anvil,” the seaborne assault on Southern France which was to take place at the same time as “Overlord” and draw German troops away from the North. If “Anvil” were to be reduced, it would be too weak to be helpful. It was not until March that General Eisenhower, in conference with the British Chiefs of Staff, made his final decision. The American Chiefs of Staff had agreed that he should speak for them. Having recently come from the Mediterranean, he knew all about “Anvil,” and now as Supreme Commander of “Overlord” he could best judge the needs of both. It was agreed to take the ships of one division from “Anvil” and to use them for “Overlord.” The ships for a second division could be found by postponing “Overlord” till the June moon period. The output of new landing-craft in that month would fill the gap. As for the additional troops and fighting ships required, Britain and the
United States would each contribute one division to bring the total up to five. The United States also agreed to provide naval support for their extra division. Thus the naval forces allocated to the operation were roughly eighty per cent British and twenty per cent American. Planning now went ahead on this revised and greatly improved foundation.

*  *  * *  *

As soon as I returned from Marrakesh, I busied myself with the many technical matters of the “Overlord” preparations. Across the Channel the whole front bristled with obstacles; defences had been built and manned. The enemy expected us, but did they know
where
or
when
or
how?
They had no flanks that could be turned, at any rate within the range of our fighter air-cover. Ships were more vulnerable than ever to shore batteries which could aim by radar. Once our troops were landed, they still had to be supplied and the enemy’s air and tank counter-attacks beaten off. I never ceased to search for means to overcome the perils which lay before us.

Prime Minister to General Ismay and Sir Edward Bridges
    23 Jan. 44

In view of the many repercussions which “Overlord” preparations will make on our life, and in order to keep the whole matter under constant survey, I propose to set up a weekly committee, over which I will preside myself. This committee will be a substitute for the Anti-U-boat Warfare Committee, which can now be put on a two-monthly basis.

Pray let me have your suggestions for the personnel of this new committee.

*  *  * *  *

The “Mulberry” harbours, I now heard, were meeting with difficulties. I therefore summoned a conference on January 24. It was intended to plant a breakwater (“Gooseberry”) in each divisional assault area. This now meant a total of five “Gooseberries,” two of which would in due course be absorbed into the “Mulberries.” On the suggestion of Admiral Tennant,
who was in charge of the operational side of the “Mulberry” plan, it was agreed that all the “Gooseberries” should be composed of blockships, although this meant using many more vessels. Moving under their own power, they could quickly reach the scene and be sunk in the right place, thus providing a certain amount of shelter almost at once. All could be laid in four or five days. The “Phoenix” concrete caissons to complete the “Mulberries” would be towed over by instalments, but this would take at least fourteen days. There was a shortage of tugs, and I gave instructions for a census. The Admiralty needed eight thousand yards of blockships. Nearly all were provided by using seventy old merchant ships and four obsolete warships. As the British were building most of the “Mulberries,” I thought we could reasonably expect the Americans to help with the blockships. At my suggestion they did so, contributing nearly half. For the rest, the twenty-three “Whale” floating pier units were progressing well, but the steel “Bombardons,” for the outer breakwaters, were meeting technical troubles which the Admiralty had to solve.

*  *  * *  *

The plans for airborne attack seemed to me to deserve special attention and support.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee
    28 Jan. 44

I am not at all satisfied with the provision that, on existing plans, is being made for the carriage of airborne troops for “Overlord.” There are four airborne divisions available, but I am told that there are only sufficient aircraft to lift one of these divisions. This is not on account of lack of production, but because the date by which everything must be ready has been set at March 15. The production of Stirlings and Albemarles between March 15 and May 15 will be a hundred and ten aircraft—seventy Stirlings and forty Albemarles. All these should be available for the battle. I have also asked you to examine how many aircraft can be made available from Coastal Command. It is clear to me that if strenuous effort is made much more ample resources could be secured for General Eisenhower.

2. General Eisenhower should be asked to state the maximum
airborne forces he desires to launch simultaneously at the opening of “Overlord.” At the same time I should be glad to receive a statement of what we are giving him under present plans. I will preside at a meeting next week to review the position and see how we can meet General Eisenhower’s requirements.

*  *  * *  *

The appointment of the commanders gave a fresh impetus. “D.D.” tanks which could swim ashore had already been successfully used in the Mediterranean, and would certainly be wanted again. There was also a process of “waterproofing” ordinary tracked and wheeled vehicles to enable them to drive ashore under their own power through several feet of water. But, as usual, the Army’s demands for vehicles of all kinds seemed wildly extravagant.

Prime Minister to Minister of Production and Minister of Supply
    25 Jan. 44

Pray let me have the report upon the possibilities of producing three hundred D.D. tanks by the end of April.

2. What is the position of waterproofing material?

3. I understand that General Montgomery has given a list of some of his priorities to the Ministry of Supply. Let me see this list, with comments upon the possibility of meeting his wishes.

Prime Minister to General Montgomery
    31 Jan. 44

You spoke to me about waterproofing materials, and every effort is being made to produce what is necessary. Surely however the whole two hundred thousand vehicles with their one hundred varieties, each of which is a separate proposition, do not require to be waterproofed. Many of these vehicles will not come in till three or four months after the landing has begun, and we hope that by that time the troops will not have to wade ashore. It is very necessary that selective processes and refinements should play their part in the preparations for “Overlord” at this stage in the war, when one need can usually be met only at the expense of another. I know you will bear this in mind.

2. I am most anxious that you should have, if possible, a two-division lift for your airborne force. This would be helped if a firm date could be fixed. The Air Ministry and Ministry of Aircraft
Production have been given target dates—for instance, March 15 as the date for providing certain aircraft, such as Albemarles, etc., of which one hundred and eighty are to be available. If however without prejudice to the above a two-months later date were acceptable, then in this batch alone, instead of one hundred and eighty there would be two hundred and seventy by May 15. I cannot doubt that similar expansions could be obtained in the case of many other requisites. I am well aware of the arguments about training, but it is the crews and not the machines which need training. If highly skilled crews can be obtained (from, say, the Fleet Air Arm), they can practise on the existing stock of machines so as to have a redundancy of troops to be taken, up till zero hour, over the outflow of machines. Talk to me about this when we meet.

  I was most interested in the fire plan of the opening bombardment, particularly its naval aspect.

Prime Minister to First Sea Lord
    20 Feb. 44

As you will remember, I have several times stressed in my minutes to the Chiefs of Staff the great importance of a bombarding squadron or fleet in Operation “Overlord.” Once the air shield has been established, the power of the warships is liberated. High-velocity guns are particularly suited for the smashing of concrete pillboxes. You have told me of the arrangements that you are making, and I consider they should be pressed to the fullest possible extreme.

2. I had a talk yesterday with Admiral Cooke [U.S.N.], who showed me photographs of the Kwajalein attack in the Marshalls. He also stressed the great value of short-range bombardment, at, say, two thousand yards. The beaches in our case will not be convenient for that, I presume. Nevertheless, the greater the power that can be brought to bear the better. Here is the time to use the
Ramillies
class; and, as I have said, men can be taken off other ships in order to work up a bombardment for the actual event of the landing, after which they can return to their duties.

3. I propose to have a Defence Committee meeting on Monday week, February 28, to discuss this aspect of “Overlord.” Meanwhile, I shall be glad to have a paper from you.

  In the event naval bombarding forces included six battleships,
two large monitors, and twenty-two cruisers, besides large numbers of destroyers and smaller vessels. Two-thirds of these were British.

*  *  * *  *

I was anxious that General Marshall should realise the efforts I was making to sustain the plan he had so long desired. I accordingly telegraphed:

Prime Minister to General Marshall (Washington)
    11 Mar. 44

Since I got home from Marrakesh I have looked carefully into the following aspects of “Overlord,” namely: (i) “Mulberry” and all connected with it; (ii) airborne assault lift, including method of glider attack; (iii) inshore bombarding squadrons; and (iv) Air Command arrangements.

I have presided at a series of meetings at which either Ike or Bedell has been present, and I am satisfied that everything is going on well. Ike and Bedell will probably tell you they are well pleased. I am hardening very much on this operation as the time approaches,
in the sense of wishing to strike if humanly possible, even if the limiting conditions we laid down at Moscow are not exactly fulfilled.
¹
I hope a chance may come for us to have a talk before long. Every good wish.

*  *  * *  *

Once the size of the expedition had been determined, it was possible to go ahead with intensive training. Not the least of our difficulties was to find enough room. A broad partition was arranged between British and American forces, whereby the British occupied the southeastern and the Americans the southwestern parts of England. The inhabitants of coastal areas accepted all the inconveniences in good part. One British division with its naval counterpart did all its earlier training in the Moray Firth area in Scotland. The winter storms prepared them for the rough-and-tumble of D-Day.

The theory and practice of amphibious operations had long been established by the Combined Operations Staff, under
Admiral Mountbatten, who had been succeeded by General Laycock. It had now to be taught to all concerned, in addition to the thorough general training needed for modern warfare. This of course had long been going on in Britain and America in exercises great and small with live ammunition. Many officers and men entered into battle for the first time, but all bore themselves like seasoned troops.

Lessons from previous large-scale exercises, and of course from our hard experience at Dieppe, were applied in final rehearsals by all three Services, which culminated in early May. All this activity did not pass unnoticed by the enemy. We did not object, and special pains were taken that they should be remarked by watchers in the Pas de Calais, where we wanted the Germans to believe we were coming.

Our plans had to be altered and kept up to date as fresh information came in about the enemy. We knew the general layout of his troops and his principal defences, the gun positions, the strong points and entrenchments along the coast, but after Rommel took command in late January, great additions and refinements began to appear. In particular we had to discover any new types of obstacle that might be installed, and contrive the antidote.

Constant air reconnaissance kept us informed of what was going on across the Channel. And of course there were other ways of finding out. Many trips were made by parties in small craft to resolve some doubtful point, to take soundings inshore, to examine new obstacles, or to test the slope and nature of a beach. All this had to be done in darkness, with silent approach, stealthy reconnaissance, and timely withdrawal.

*  *  * *  *

An intricate decision was the choice of D-Day and “H-Hour,” the moment at which the leading assault craft should hit the beach. From this many other timings had to be worked backwards. It was agreed to approach the enemy coast by moonlight, because this would help both our ships and our airborne troops. A short period of daylight before H-Hour
was also needed to give order to the deployment of the small craft and accuracy to the covering bombardment. But if the interval between first light and H-Hour was too long, the enemy would have more time to recover from their surprise and fire on our troops in the act of landing.

Then there were the tides. If we landed at high tide, the underwater obstacles would obstruct the approach; if at low tide, the troops would have far to go across the exposed beaches. Many other factors had to be considered, and it was finally decided to land about three hours before high water. But this was not all. The tides varied by forty minutes between the eastern and western beaches, and there was a submerged reef in one of the British sectors. Each sector had to have a different “H-Hour,” which varied from one place to another by as much as eighty-five minutes.