There were, to be sure, persons even within Arab-Islamic culture in the period under study who would adopt a cynical and deflationary position as regards the love of one sex, and an idealist position as regards love of the other. For example, Dāwūd al-Antākī treated love in general, and the various anecdotes relating to the love of women, with unconcealed sympathy. At the same time his presentation of the anecdotes dealing with pederastic love affairs is prefaced with the reductionist claim that this type of love first emerged among the people of Sodom, and that it should be avoided by means of averting the eyes.
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On the other hand, the previously mentioned Persian philosopher Mulla Sadrā, whose discussion is cited in the miscellaneous anthology of the Ottoman Grand Vizier Raghib Pasha (d. 1763), identified noble and sublime love with the love of boys, while reducing the love of women to an animalistic desire to perpetuate the species. Muhyī al-Dīn al-Saltī, in his own treatise on love, only cited examples of pederastic love, many of them plagiarized from earlier works, to which he added others that he had heard of or witnessed. The Egyptian belletrist Ibn al-Wakīl al-Mallawī also confined his attention to pederastic love couples, explicitly stating that courting women was in his day fit for libertines rather than lovers.
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However, against the background of the dominant literary tradition, such restrictions based on the gender of the beloved appear somewhat idiosyncratic. For example, the Palestinian scholar Muhammad al-Saffarīnī(d. 1774),who devoted a short tract to denouncing sodomites, divided passionate love into three evaluative categories: (i) praiseworthy, such as the love of a man for his wife; (ii) blameworthy, such as a man’s love for a boy; (iii) neither praise- nor blameworthy, such as an involuntary, chaste love of an unrelated woman.
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However, it seems to have been more usual for religious scholars to allow that the involuntary chaste love of a boy should also be evaluated as neither commendable nor reprehensible. The prominent Damascene scholar Ahmad al-Manīnī(d. 1759), for example, commented on a risque poem which said that if the prophet Lot had seen the beauty of the beloved boy, he would not declare him forbidden to mankind. Manīnī argued that this need not be understood in the unacceptable sense that Lot would have permitted sodomizing the boy, but that he would have permitted loving him, “for love is a natural and coercive matter in which the lover does not have any choice ... and love, if it is not associated with a foul deed, is free from blemish since it does not involve committing what is forbidden by religious law.”
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This was also the position of the Iraqi scholar ʿAbd al-Rahmān al-Suwaydī (d. 1786). In a short tract on the love of boys ( ʿ
ishq al-fityān)
which he wrote at the request of a friend, he advised caution and discretion, but clearly allowed for the possibility of a chaste and involuntary love of boys that was neither reprehensible nor commendable from a religious point of view. He wrote: “If it is established that passionate love is involuntary and chaste, with no admixture of pretense, one should not reproach those afflicted, neither in word or in thought.”
185
The position of Manīnī and Suwaydī was apparently the one sanctioned by Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī’s seminal
Ihyā ‘ulūm al-dīn.
To love someone for his beauty and without any carnal lust was, said Ghazālī, possible, since “the beautiful form is pleasurable in itself even if carnal lust is absent.” Such a love was not religiously commendable
(maḥmūd),
but it was not blameworthy
(madhmūm)
either. It was simply indifferently permissible
(mubāḥ)
.
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Ghazālī did not explicitly claim that he was speaking of the love of handsome boys, but the principle he defended was general. It is therefore safe to assume that his position was widely understood as allowing for the possibility of a chaste and religiously permissible love of beauty in any form.
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Indeed, the position of Saffārīnī was liable to the objection that it was arbitrary to allow that the passionate love of an unrelated woman was not reprehensible if it was chaste and involuntary, and yet refuse to allow that the chaste and involuntary love of a boy fell into the same category. Such an objection was made by scholars who discussed whether the above-mentioned saying of the Prophet, ”He who loves and is chaste and then dies, dies a martyr,“ only applied to the love of women. For example, one of the most prominent jurists of the period, the Egyptian Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Ramlī (d. 1596), replied to the position that the martyrs-of-love tradition did not apply to a man’s love for a boy in the following way:
This is plausible in the case of voluntary love which he [the lover] can choose to end but does not. However, if we assume that the love is involuntary in the sense that he cannot choose to end it, then there is nothing to prevent him from gaining martyrdom, since in that case there is no transgression of religious precepts.
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