The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (131 page)

257.
Oye et al. (eds),
Eagle Defiant
, p. 8 (with a note about the sources used).

258.
I have taken the population and GNP per capita figures from Chaliand and Gageau,
Strategic Atlas
, pp. 214–20, which bases its figures on the World Bank’s
Report on World Development, 1982
. The total GNP is my extrapolation.

259.
Given the assertion by Perkins, in Solomon (ed.),
China Factor
, pp. 118–119, that China’s per capita GNP in 1979 was more likely between $400 and $500 than the official conversion figure of $266, I have included a calculation for 1980 based on $450 per capita.

260.
Cited in Gilpin,
War and Change in World Politics
, pp. 76–77.

1.
Keylor,
Twentieth-Century World
, p. 405.

2.
The classic statement here is E. H. Carr,
What Is History?
(Harmondsworth, Mddsx., 1964), ch. 1, “The Historian and his Facts”; but see also D. Thomson,
The Aims of History
(London, 1969), ch. 4.

3.
See,
inter alia
, Gilpin,
War and Change in World Politics;
G. Modelski, “The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State,”
Comparative Studies in Society and History
, vol. 20 (April 1978), pp. 214–35; Rasler and Thompson, “Global Wars, Public Debts, and the Long Cycle,” passim; McNeill,
Pursuit of Power
, passim; Rosecrance,
Action and Reaction in World Politics
, passim.

4.
As in the well-known quotation in
Herr Eugen Dühring’s Revolution in Science
(London, 1936), p. 188.

5.
The political-science literature here is overwhelming. For a sampling, see M. Wight,
Power Politics
(Harmondsworth, Mddsx., 1979); K. Waltz,
Man, the State and War
(New York, 1959); H. Bull,
The Anarchical Society
(New York, 1977).

6.
See, for example, P. F. Drucker, “The Changed World Economy,”
Foreign Affairs
, vol. 64, no. 4 (Spring 1986), pp. 768–91—a remarkable article. See also the figures given in “Beyond Factory Robots,”
Economist
, July 5, 1986, p. 61.

7.
Drucker, “Changed World Economy,” pp. 771–72; “China and India,”
Economist
, Dec. 21, 1985, pp. 66–67.

8.
Again, the literature on this theme is immense. For good general introductions, see S. B. Linder,
The Pacific Century
(Stanford, Calif., 1986); J. W. Morley (ed.),
The Pacific Basin
(New York, 1986); M. Smith et al.,
Asia’s New Industrial World
(London, 1985); K. E. Calder, “The Making of a Trans-Pacific Economy,”
World Policy Journal
, vol. 2, no. 4 (Fall 1985), pp. 593–623.

9.
Linder,
Pacific Century
, pp. 13–14.

10.
Ibid., pp. 6, 15.

11.
P. Drysdale, “The Pacific Basin and Its Economic Vitality,” in Morley (ed.),
Pacific Basin
, p. 11.

12.
Mathias,
First Industrial Nation
, p. 44.

13.
M. Kaldor,
The Baroque Arsenal
(London, 1982), p. 18. For further examples—from a quite different source—see F. Cooper, “Affordable Defense: In Search of a Strategy,”
Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies
, vol. 130, no. 4 (December 1985), p. 4. Also very useful is the special survey “Defense Technology,”
Economist
, May 21, 1983.

14.
The key work here (by an in-house expert) is J. S. Gansler,
The Defense Industry
(Cambridge, Mass., 1980).

15.
On which see McNeill,
Pursuit of Power
, passim; and Kaldor,
Baroque Arsenal
, passim.

16.
The Military Balance 1985–86
, pp. 170–73; and the SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) publication
The Arms Race and Arms Control
(London, 1982), especially chs. 2–3.

17.
L. Brown et al.,
State of the World, 1986
(New York, 1986), p. 196.

18.
“Excessive” is, of course, a haphazard term; for if a country feels under acute pressure from foreign foes (e.g., Israel), it seems inappropriate to employ that term. On the other hand, the historical record suggests that if a particular nation is allocating
over the long term
more than 10 percent (and in some cases—when it is structurally weak—more than 5 percent) of GNP to armaments, that is likely to limit its growth rate.

19.
For some examples of this, see Cipolla (ed.),
Economic Decline of Empires
, passim; Kennedy,
Strategy and Diplomacy, ch
. 3; F. Lewis, “Military Spending Questioned,”
New York Times
, Nov. 11, 1986, pp. Dl, D5.

20.
Reported in “The Elusive Boom in Productivity,”
New York Times
, April 8, 1984, business section, pp. 1, 26. See also “Richer Than You,”
Economist
, Oct. 25, 1986, pp. 13–14.

21.
See T. Fingar (ed.),
China’s Quest for Independence
(Boulder, Colo., 1980), passim; G. Segal and W. Tow (eds.),
Chinese Defense Policy
(London, 1984); Chaliand and Rageau,
Strategic Atlas
, p. 143; and the important essays in R. H. Solomon (ed.),
The China Factor: Sino-American Relations and the Global Scene
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1981); and J. Camilleri,
Chinese Foreign Policy: The Maoist Era and Its Aftermath
(Seattle, Wash., 1980).

22.
G. Segal,
Defending China
(London, 1985), covers in detail the decline in
Chinese combat effectiveness; see also H. W. Jencks,
From Missiles to Muskets: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army 1945–1981
(Boulder, Colo., 1982).

23.
See D. H. Perkins, “The International Consequences of China’s Economic Development,” in Solomon (ed.),
China Factor
, p. 118.

24.
See the important article “A New Long March in China,”
Economist
, Jan. 25, 1986, pp. 29–31; J. T. Dreyer, “China’s Military Modernization,”
Orbis
, vol. 27, no. 4 (Winter 1984), pp. 1011–26;
Military Balance 1985–1986
, pp. 111–15; M. Y. M. Kan, “Deng’s Quest for Military Modernization and National Security,” in
Mainland Chinas Modernization: Its Prospects and Problems
(Berkeley, Calif., 1982), pp. 227–44.

25.
Dreyer, “China’s Military Modernization,” p. 1017.

26.
Ibid., p. 1016. See also J. D. Pollack, “China as a Nuclear Power,” in W. H. Overholt (ed.),
Asia’s Nuclear Future
(Boulder, Colo., 1977), passim.

27.
For a brief survey of these weaknesses, see again Dreyer, “China’s Military Modernization,” pp. 1017ff. On submarine developments, see
New York Times
, April 1, 1986, pp. Cl, C3.

28.
“As China Grows Strong,”
Economist
, Jan. 25, 1986, p. 11; and espec. G. Segal, “Defense Culture and Sino-Soviet Relations,”
Journal of Strategic Studies
, vol. 8, no. 2 (June 1985), pp. 180–98, with fuller references.

29.
B. Reynolds, “China in the International Economy,” in H. Harding (ed.),
China’s Foreign Relations in the 1980s
(New Haven, Conn., 1984), p. 75.

30.
D. H. Perkins, “The International Consequences of China’s Economic Development,” in Solomon (ed.),
China Factor
, pp. 115–16; and for more detail, Perkins (ed.),
China’s Modern Economy in Historical Perspective
(Stanford, Calif., 1975), passim; and A. D. Barnett,
China’s Economy in Global Perspective
(Washington, D.C., 1981), passim.

31.
New York Times
, March 27, 1986, p. A14; Rostow,
World Economy
, pp. 532ff.

32.
Perkins, “International Consequences,” in Solomon (ed.),
China Factor
, p. 128.

33.
Reynolds, “China in the International Economy,” in Harding (ed.),
China’s Foreign Relations in the 1980s
, p. 87.

34.
Quoted in Brown et al.,
State of the World, 1986
, p. 19; and see also, “China and India: Two Billion People Discover the Joys of the Market,”
Economist
, Dec. 21, 1985, pp. 66–67.

35.
“China and India”; and see the amazing eyewitness details of the recent transformation in O. Schell,
To Get Rich Is Glorious: China in the 80s
(New York, 1985).

36.
New York Times
, March 27, 1986, p. A14; and, more generally, K. Lieberthal, “Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy,” in Harding (ed.),
China’s Foreign Relations in the 1980s
, pp. 58ff. See also the CIA report “China: Economic Performance in 1985” (Washington, D.C., 1986); and, finally, the extremely intelligent article by A. D. Barnett, “Ten Years After Mao,”
Foreign Affairs
, vol. 65, no. 1 (Fall 1986), pp. 37–65.

37.
See again the important article “China and India,”
Economist
, Dec. 21, 1985, pp. 65–70, espec. p. 68; and
Ramses
, 1982,
The State of the World Economy
(Cambridge, Mass., 1982), pp. 286–87.

38.
Perkins, “International Consequences,” pp. 130–31.

39.
Military Balance 1985–86
, p. 112; Perkins, “The International Consequences …”, in Solomon (ed.),
China Factor
, p. 132.

40.
See the table in Brown et al.,
State of the World, 1986
, p. 207.

41.
Perkins, “International Consequences,” in Solomon (ed.),
China Factor
, pp. 132–33;
Economist
, Jan. 25, 1986, p. 29.

42.
Perkins, “International Consequences,” in Solomon (ed.),
China Factor
, p. 120.

43.
This projection assumes that “the four largest economies in Western Europe grow in 1985–2000 at the same pace as they did in 1970–82” (which the paper admits may be too pessimistic): “China and India,” p. 69.

44.
Ramses
, 1982, p. 285; the figures in Morley (ed.),
Pacific Basin
, p. 13; Reynolds, “China in the International Economy,” pp. 73–74. By comparison, see again Rosecrance,
Rise of the Trading State
, passim.

45.
See again Segal, “Defense Culture and Sino-Soviet Relations,” passim.

46.
But note R. Taylor,
The Sino-Japanese Axis
(New York, 1985).

47.
“Russia and China,”
Economist
, March 29, 1986, pp. 34–35. This does not, however, make it automatically a member of an “anti-Soviet united front,” as is argued in C. D. McFetridge, “Some Implications of China’s Emergence as a Great Power,”
Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies
, vol. 128, no. 3 (September 1983), p. 43.

48.
On which see J. G. Stoessinger,
Nations in Darkness: China, Russia and America
(New York, 1978), passim; Solomon (ed.),
China Factor
, passim; Segal (ed.),
China Factor
, passim; and Harding (ed.),
China’s Foreign Relations in the 1980s
, passim, espec. ch. 6.

49.
Pollack, “China and the Global Strategic Balance,” in Harding (ed.),
Chinas Foreign Relations in the 1980s
, pp. 173–74.

50.
“A New Long March in China,”
Economist
, Jan. 25, 1986, p. 31.

51.
For this policy, see in particular E. A. Olsen,
U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity: A Neo-Internationalist View
(Stanford, Calif., 1985), passim; the remarks on Japan in R. A. Scalapino, “China and Northeast Asia,” in Solomon (ed.),
China Factor
, pp. 193ff.; Scalapino (ed.),
The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan
(Berkeley, Calif., 1977); T. J. Pempel, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy,” ch. 5 of P. J. Katzenstein (ed.),
Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States
(Madison, Wis., 1978).